childs' inability to recognise the reasoning behind everyday decisions and as adults the mind is exposed to religion and conflicting arguments, thus the mind is torn and it is this mingling of irrational beliefs which contradict one another which causes what is thought of as consciousness. The more one becomes ingrained in a belief, the less one is aware of their conscious self therefore eliminating the prospect of consciousness
Consciousness is nothing more than a void created by contradiction. a meaning(s) lacking in logic yet regarded as truth. Consciousness develops during the first few years because of the.
Does electron have consciousness ? Molecular biology & molecular evolution Cosmology & cosmic evolution If Universe evolve can electron evolve too ? Does evolution of life begin on electron level ? Origin of life is a result of physical laws that govern Universe Electron takes important part in this work Question Why does the simplest particle - electron have six formulas: E=h*f e = +ah*c e = -ah*c +E=Mc^2 -E=Mc^2 E= ∞ ? Nobody knows Electron is not as simple as we think
@gamerunknown Well, I guess that means that there is the fallacy of composition to say that all is physical, because things are composed of the physical. But I don't think you feel that's a fallacy of composition.
ten to the sixty or so selections since origin - there ain't nothing "hard" about that problem. I ain't got a problem with this guy - a fucker work hard, get alla them entitlements.
I just used my morality the way it is supposed to be used- on an individual level. He's "wrong" in a nowhere posting on youtube where I'm right - in that I know what I know 'cause I love Gwyneth Paltrow. 11 years of that is a different kind of endeavor. My entitlement merely states, she's my Gwynnies. ;)
...and! Because I'm a creature of love - I get my rant outta the way first.
He's wrong.
Rather, my naive philosophy may be looking at a different question. Is the difference between organic and inorganic a mathematical structure? Is this hypothetical structure control structure in bacteria? Is morality derivative of this structure? That's all evolution. Think of it in naive terms. Nature selects. Think of discreetness in terms of Planck time. Do some simple math, there's been...
Here's some naive philosophy for ya: Love is Void. Love is the emotional dynamic of least entropy. Since there's some non atheist types on youtube, we got that covered, too. God is Love explains the Love/Fear duality. I explain the Love/evil duality. All I'm saying, this fucker ain't love-able, saying "I'm right - and you're a zombie."
But youtube and the fucking links... besides, Who gives a fuck - it's just another 'random' act of evolution I can draw like ellenjanuary; a chain of causality that ellenjanuary multiplied his identity a hundredfold b drawing my Gwynnies - and a zillion mofo's see "the love of my Gwynnies" in my art. This ain't art class. We all know the public don't know art. This philosophy class. We want action. We want bloodshed. We wanna know...
This fucking dude is a zombie. How do I know? Amo ergo sum. "Consciousness" ain't the identity that exists as I exist - love is. This guy is "leading thinker," got alla kinda entitlement. I'm a naive philosopher. Through a "random' act of evolution, I fell in love with Gwyneth Paltrow. And because she is love-worthy, I seem to have gotten an objective standard of love outta the deal - you know, rather than a restraining order. Usta be, I'd link a mofo up...
Mary could insert an electode into her brain and stimulate a neuron that is responsible for "seeing red" and I'll be she would see red without any actual red there.
@TheConcolor that's because no one has conducted on experiment to see if people are conscious, and neither could they. It's not testable. We're all just zombies, or you all are!
@Hofsteder Thank you very much for the debate, sorry to hear you can't continue - I hope whatever the circumstances are, that it works out for you.
If you should ever feel like taking up the discussion again, just drop me a line here - I'll check my youtube account at least once every 14 days or so.
@Hofsteder OK. we do seem to be getting quite a bit around - I'm going to have a busy weekend, so I'll probably not read your response until monday, so take your time.
@Hofsteder say other people can feel pain? Whats the fundamental difference from your point of view?
3) The non-brain pain: From my point of view this is simply an oxymoron. One needs the physical basis of a brain (or some similarly complex system) to be able to give any sense to the word pain.
4) Wavelength: My point was not about the qualia of red, but of the qualia of wavelength (of red). However it was, for other reasons, an illformed point, and immaterial to my arguments, so nevermind.
@Hofsteder paint", but only in the same way as everything you could say about "qualia of redness" could be translated into statements of the corresponding brainstate.
2) The chinese point: Maybe a better analogy would be a future computer, capable of emulating the human brain (since there are far too few chinese :) ). If such a computer (or any other sufficiently and correctly complex system) was to be built, would you really say it was incapable of pain? And if so, why would you (supposidly)
@Hofsteder as meaningless as it is to ask what "special sauce" da vinci was had to add when he was done painting to turn the "canvas with paint on" into the "mona lisa" - it seems clear that the answer is "none"? Yet you could ascribe things such as aestetic beauty to the mona lisa, which could not readily be ascribed to "canvas with paint" without the "mona lisisity" ;). Ofcause, essentially everything you can say about the mona lisa might be "converted" into things to say about the canvas with
1) The identity of indiscernibles: The identity has to be defined more carefully - I maintain that the qualia of redness and the corresponding brainstate are "fundamentally" identical, however, I grant that it is two different interpretations of the same thing. The situation is perfectly analogous to the identity of the mona lisa and "a canvas and some organised paint". To ask what needs to be added to the neurological pattern to make "qualia" is
@Hofsteder Processing doesn't "explain" conscious experience, it (plus sensing data, ie. getting input to the brain) _is_ conscious experience (from my point of view), which is why I suspected that we disagreed in our definition of same.
Eg. the conscious experience of pain: If I can map some neurological pattern to the subjective experience of pain, and vice versa, ie. have a bijective map, this is my _definition_ of an explanation. Otherwise, I simply don't know what "explanation" means?
@Hofsteder I grant that it is speculative, ie. we could be wrong in saying that it is a necessary truth - but thats a "technical" question, ie. a neurophysiological one. But I fail to see exactly what more is needed to fully describe the "pain", except to say that the psychological way of looking at "the firing of C-fibers", rather like the "mona lisa" is the artistic way of looking at "a canvas and some paint". (cont)
@Hofsteder It still seems to me that answering the easy problem will do: If I explain the neural maps of all qualia plus all of the processing of these qualia, I do not see what is left to explain of "conscious experience" - what could that be, more than processing of qualia (in the broadest sense, eg. the "qualia" of the wavelength of red, but also of "red" itself)?
I guess my problem is exactly that: What do "hard problemers" ( :-) ) mean, exactly, by "conscious experience"?
@Hofsteder neural activity. Similarily, to solve the "easy" problem wrt. qualia of red is to map the qualia of red onto neural activity. Once this (if possible) is done, we have explained qualia. Further, since it seems to me that one way to define consiousness is to collect all qualia plus processing of same (which can again be mapped onto neural activity), we have then an explanation of consiousness through answering the "easy" problem alone. Thus, the hard problem evaporates.
@Hofsteder well, obviously my position is somewhat speculative: Until the "easy" problem has been solved, I have no way of knowing whether it is possible to describe _any_ property of the mind through ultimately neural mechanics (we have explained _some_, but far from all).
My point is that there is no fundamental difference between the qualia of red, and say the wavelength of red light: To solve the "easy problem wrt. wavelength is to map the understanding of reds wavelength to (cont)
this guy is a dum dum, he know nothing about the process of the brain, yet he still says that the brain is unable to produce consciousness. When we know about the brain 100% then we can address consciousness. I not sure I can agree with him what consciousness is even.
@Hofsteder I suppose we might not quite agree what "physicalist" means: To my mind it means that everything is ultimately describable by its physical constituents, at least in principle. From that position the answer would clearly be "no", since you would not have access to all the data about echo location (or redness) without the qualia, but perhaps we are just debating semantics here.
Still, I have never come across any explanatory gap in "my" picture - what would that be?
@Hofsteder another way of putting my point would be this: Mary knew _about_ the neural correlates of the qualia of red, but they had never been activated in herself - therefore, from a strict physicalist point of view, she does not yet know everything there is to know about the color red.
@Hofsteder I do not see why I should answer "yes", even assuming strict physicalism. I would not have the "data" or "experience" of the neurological pathways corresponding to echo location in a bat, and perhaps I never could have. Thus, I would only know "about" the qualia of echo location, not know the qualia of it myself.
My question remains: Why does this imply that consiousness must be a primitve? Or why would it even suggest it?
@Hofsteder Yes, that is how I "understand" it as well: But that is exactly what doesn't make sense to me: Obviously(?) she would learn something new, namely the socalled "qualia" of red - that is a physical entity, no? It has, supposidly, it's own neural patterns that has to be activated for us to feel the qualia of red, in the same way as the understanding of its wavelength has /its/ own neural underpinning.
Why does it follow from this that consiousness must be a primitive?
Hm?? This sounded like gibberish to me... If we magically fired up all the same neurons in marys brain as is activated in mine by seeing red, she would have precisely the same "qualia" of seeing red, yes?
Ofcause these neurons wouldn't be activated by learning about, say, wavelengths, but what's that got to do with anything? It doesn't follow that the qualia of red is something else than neuron activity.
@f43d348k - It's not gibberish. One might disagree with him, but that doesn't mean what he's saying is gibberish. This is a HUGE issue in philosophy and science, and there is no consensus. Why don't you go and read up on it before posting your ill-informed opinions?
@flefft I'm aware that it's an issue within contemporary philosophy, but I've yet to see (or read) anyone define the socalled hard problem in a meaningful way: A good example is this guy - hence the "gibberish" comment, I'm not sure what, if anything, he says, so I'm not merely "disagreeing" with him, it actually seems like a litteral nonsense to me. But, I'm always open to persuation: Do you know of any youtube videos (or books) where this problem is clearly defined?
@f43d348k God dag, there are several Youtube channels that I think are worth checking out. 0ThouArtThat0, spiritualatheist have done a number of videos talking about the "hard problem". Also Peter Russell (the psychologist) has some videos on here which I felt discuss the subject very well.
@f43d348k The point of that argument is that there is a first person subjective experience, even if all objective facts are known about neuron activity in a brain when seeing red. Experience itself is not objective fact, there is no way to prove it.
@JohnMatrix89 Yes, I'm think I understand him that far, but my problem is that I've never seen any argument that "subjective experience" is anything other than a representation of "neural activity in the brain", rather like "the Mona Lisa" is an representation of "a canvas and some paint". But thanks for the channels, I'll have a look at them...
i think hes sumerizing the differentiation of objectivity as subjective, but is disillusioned by the thought that subtly exists as it is. i too hold some promises for spirit.
to support my opinion let me elaborate..God created us, therefore our good and bad intention also are His creations. Therefore, its not justified to punish people for wrong-doing. But if we think, our free wills originated from God Himself as form of induced consciousness, then it make sense. We are not part of God rather have induced consciousness whosesource is God. That's what the soul means. "..They ask about soul, say, you are given little knowledge.."(Quran)
To my opinion, there is nothing conscious except God Himself. God induced his consciousness to living beings. Think of analogy of a magnet. A magnet can induce magnetic property to some metal. Similarly God induced His consciousness to us including other conscious beings. Therefore, none is able to identify the soul.
We perceive stories in our perceived realities. Why see change in reality, such as a third party individual changing as a person. We only witness cause and effect occurrences. We then evaluate the situation occurring with some sort of reflection on the perceived actions occurring. Religion creates premises to accept which change the perceived stories to change the individuals perception of his perceived reality (the world).
Consciousness is required to have this strange system set up.
I'm an atheist and I have a deep respect towards the sciences, especially the natural sciences. For a long time I almost found myself guilt-tripped into denying that there is an inherently subjective element to consciousness, but no longer; I've read a lot of articles dedicated to The Hard Problem, and I do not feel the least bit persuaded that the sciences are able to adequately capture the subjective elements of consciousness.
It's funny how hardcore materialists say that not reverting to eliminative physicalism is "mysterian mumbo-jumbo," and unscientific. They say, "Ignore everything you feel inside, otherwise you're being unscientific. You don't want to be unscientific, do you?" It's like saying, "every time you do *A*, god kills a kitten. You don't want god to kill a kitten, do you?"
By the way, don't take Dennett seriously, he was raised by behaviorists in a time when consciousness-denial was trendy.
I like the zombie idea!!! But the problem of when consciousness comes into play or why is that. THIS WHOLE Exsistance is Consciousness and with the expansion from the origin we are just electrons getting sucked down these pipe dreams :D I'm joseph, And I'm a PHILOSOPHER
all of this is based on a paradigm that "existence" means something specific, that doesn't need to be explained or clarified... but i heard Dawkins say, just because a question can be formulated, does not mean it merits and answer."
the concepts these men are talking about are taken for granted, but they are NOT granted. debating the 'existence' or 'necessity' of consciousness is nonsensical once we examine the metaphor structure of the concept of consciousness...
@dissimul: That's the exact point Chalmers is making. The mechanistic story doesn't predict consciousness. Yet it is here...you are conscious, aren't you?
This guy isn't an atheist, he's not even a rationalist. To say there is something more to conciousness that the physical process is to try to explain it using supernatural phenomena; a concept that goes against evolutionary biology. Chalmers is in awe of his own experience, which naturally we all seem to be most of the time. To explain conciousness one must step back and look at the measurable - the only thing that has ever given us hard answers to anything.
2. The fact that you incorrectly use the term "rationalist" is a sign of your lack of understanding of philosopohy which explains why you posit the false dichotomy and think that consciousness is either physical or "supernatural" completely ignoring other explanations such as double aspect theory.
1. probably a fair point mate. I can't consider conciousness as anything other than material, so maybe I'm at fault for assuming most other atheists would naturally assume the same standpoint. I'm the contemporary definition of a layman on this topic, but Chalmers rejection of evolutionary biology as an explanation for conciousness doesn't make sense to me at all, so I guess that makes me a materialist/physicalist.
2. I consider describing conciousness as anything other than material irrational, and so in that reclaim the word 'rationalist'. I ignore double aspect theory on the grounds that it doesn't seem to advance any argument so it deserves to be. Chalmers says that neuroscience can't explain conciousness. Even if that's true it doesn't mean evolution and neurology aren't responsible for it. Thoughts come from our brains, and what are they but physical?
@themuledoctor 'Thoughts come from our brains, and what are they but physical?'
How can they be physical if you cant see hear feel taste or smell them? Or are you suggesting that we may be able to isolate some kind of physical aspect of thought one day? Even if that were the case and you could look at what produced the thought under a microscope you would still have had to have had the thought personally in order for it to qualify as being a thought. See the problem? Hard isn't it?
@fishybishbash I agree it's very hard if you create riddles for yourself. I'm really not well-read enough to argue effectively on the topic, but it seems odd to me that an atheist can look at consciousness like it's a magical substance that exists outside the physical, like it belongs within/is emitted by a soul. I think that, because we have a very limited understanding of it, people are often left in awe of their conscious. Science is the only thing that'll ever explain it.
@fishybishbash I guess we'll leave it at that then, as you don't have anything interesting to add and your basic ploy is to act like you've figured it all out without actually saying anything at all. It's clear that 'thoughts' and ideas come about from the flow of information from our senses and from our memories. Getting caught up in qualia just confuses the issue and doesn't mean anything important. Read some Pinker or Dennett, if you're able to without sarcasm cluttering your mind. Cheers.
The thinker is the very concept of self and is an illusion.One could take scrap from the same pile and make two different computers, however really they're the same metal from one pile.However, now the scraps are organized in a fashion that can route information and hold memory.These two separate memory systems might assume a self, but the truth is theres no distiction between the two. The thinker isnt the scrap metal, its the phenomenon of electrical commands in a certain pattern-intangible.
I mush prefer to hear the opinions of living people who have real opinions - and not just repeating something that was said about two thousand years ago.
This guy is an over-rated blowhard. How he ever got to prominence is a sad commentary on the contemporary scene. I once emailed him with the simple question: Can consciousness define itself? And he tried to bamboozle me!
@lookatmepleasesir Hello. Sorry to take so long to reply. I seldom use the email box your post was sent to. Instead of responding to my question directly he obfuscated with a reference to "the hard problem" etc. claiming insufficient time and space to properly respond. I responded by saying Socrates or Wittgenstein would never cop out like that. This is testing my memory as it happened maybe 10 or more years ago. So, let me put it to you: Can consciousness define itself? raymondsteiner@mac.com
google penrose/hameroff. Just for the hell of it. Quantum Consciousness is held in deep contempt these days by the ruling Scientific Orthodoxy. Find out why.
@midplanewanderer I did that but there's a lot to wade through to find the main criticisms. Could you tell us, in a nutshell, why "Quantum Consciousness is held in deep contempt these days by the ruling Scientific Orthodoxy"? And is that contempt directed specifically toward universal quantum effects (ie: a universal consciousness), or does it include the narrower idea of quantum effects in the brain? Is this criticism to do with the speed at which the wave function collapses or something else?
@SolarFlare42 You're quite right, there's a lot to wade through, In a nutshell, if this theory should suddenly gain more adherents (-I'm a dreamer- perhaps even a balanced article in SciAm Mind!), it could pose a threat to the materialist world-view that holds sway today with such mealy-mouthed smugness; specifically, that the phenomena of consciousness -of Beingness- is merely a temporary sliver of false existence spawned by -and soon reabsorbed into- a dead and unknowing eternity.
im no zombie in psychology i have been told to be schizotypal, i wrote a ffn story about it. bout ppl to be not concious they are 'normal' /slash/ ZOMBIES!
language is a massive barrier in this vid. would've been a lot better if he spent the time explaining what he meant by his terms. you can see the interviewer is constantly trying to get him to do this but he fails.
Why everything you've been told about evolution is wrongWhat if Darwin's theory of natural selection is inaccurate? What if the way you live now affects the life expectancy of your descendants? Evolutionary thinking is having a revolution . .
I believe that hatred and love - two mighty forces of Universe, one - for destruction, another for construction. But when hatred is stronger than love - our body destroys. If love surpasses hatred - the same. Hatred is necessary for healthy instinct of self-preservation.
To forgive a harm of bad man - impossible as he feel himself - unpunished.
But we need to supervise our feelings, the greatest authority - authority above self. Selfcontrol.
It's silly to think that conciousness is its own "stuff." It gets you know where in trying to answer the question "what is conciousness?" That this universe has the right "stuff" in order to have concious beings and another universe might not, is a fancy form of dualism. The Zombie scenerio is a dead-end, hmm hmm
About the zombies, I've often had the impression that the person I was talking with was in fact an automaton putting on a near perfect "show" of consciousness. Chalmers doesn't think such zombies really exist. But what about sociopaths for instance. They have no moral, ethical consciousness at all, but they imitate and act as if they have the same feelings as normal people and they fool their families and friends. I think there might well be a vast spectrum of what could be called zombie people.
What if you're like a computer program that's formatted to fallow rules. The very nature of "being" is the format. You're supposed to worry about your job, your suppose to get jealous when guys hit on your girlfriend, you're suppose to seek out your desires, you're suppose to live life ignoring the fact its a mystery, and your suppose to condition an ego....people who live life like its normal are the automation, the zombies. The people aware that things are strange are the "real" people.
"I think therefore I am." I disagree. I think it's more like this. A composition of matter called a brain genreates chemical / electrical activity. Thoughts, feelings, etc are mere conceptual representations of these physical processes in the brain. Among these conceptual representations is the "I" thought - the "I'm the one doing the thinking" thought. That's just another conceptual representation of material processes over which I have no control, over which there is no me TO be in control.
After seeing all this video, Chalmers would really benefit from a 4 minute conversation with Dan Dennet... how does he not get that the personal part of experience is neat, but ultimately inconsequential? He's drastically inflating the importance of personal experience to appeal to regular solipsism.
@dmcgraye To be fair, Chalmers really isn't at his most lucid here. I'd highly recommend the Conscious Mind. While his "zombies" argument is sort of...well, ridiculous, he does an admirable job of challenging materialist orthodoxy. Even the zombie argument has value as a thought experiment.
And of course he's read/spoken with Dan Dennett. The two are mortal enemies when it comes to philosophy of mind.
@lookatmepleasesir Its inconsequential because it doesn't effect anything else, its the end product of a long chain of chemical reactions, but that gives it no special status. The fact that it is the end makes it less consequential because... it has NO CONSQUENCES.
I find that a lot of people are misunderstanding the other guy in this video (and Dan Dennet's) points. They are not saying that consciousness does not exist. Even if they said that it was in every sense an illusion, it would still exist. Dennet (who, i presume the other speaker is referring to) acknowledges that consciousness is as real as everything. however at 2:20 Chalmers dodges a pretty lucid point. Consciousness is something real, but sketchy and makeshift, with an illusion of perfection.
13.7 billion yrs ago the universe appeared. Matter cooled and condensed, stars ignited to forge heavy elements, supernovae seeded the galaxy. 9.2 billion yrs after the bang, the Earth formed. Starshine made organic molecules reproduce, compete and evolve. 2.5 million yrs ago an apelike creature started to use tools. Humans walked on the moon and now approach immortality. A small part of the cosmos, the human mind, reflects on itself and the universe becomes self-aware. Explain that!
@ roserh6 'physical experience of a certain wavelength' ??
A machine can have a physical 'reaction' to certain wavelengths if it's programmed that way but I doubt it would have any experience of it. Reacting and experiencing seem to me like two different things, like brain and mind. It's easy to show how something reacts but very difficult to show how something experiences.
@scribb7 I was using flyinhawaiian's own use of the word "experience". I understand the difference between reception and perception. You seem to have jumped in the middle of this discussion with no frame of reference.
So what does Chalmers think consciousness is the result of? Invisible supernatural fairies flying around in our skulls? Someone who can not understand the idea of Physicalism should not be the Director of the Center for Consciousness. Perhaps a job at a New Age festival, next to the spiritual healers and mystics, might be more suitable.
His claim is utterly anthropocentric. You and you consciousness are just a lump of chemical reactions Mr Chalmers, just like all other matter. Get over it
It may not be a matter of what "consciousness is the result of", but rather the amazing and nearly magical result itself. The ingredients may be relatively uncomplicated, but the results (if achieved) may be almost mystical.
The physical processes in the brain, while running, may create an emergent consciousness that is much greater than the sum of the parts.
I think the science of emergence holds more of the answers than the science of neurology.
@kf1000 "The physical processes in the brain, while running, may create an emergent consciousness that is much greater than the sum of the parts" Unfortunately Chalmers is a critic of physicalism, and denies it when it comes to consciousness. Even the science of emergence doesn't deny physicalism. Oh, and at least neuroscience uses empirical science to understand the causes of the emergent properties in question, rather than inventing supernatural theories to explain stuff away (like Chalmers)
All properties that emerge from physics are explainable in terms of physics, in terms of complex interactions of structure and function. The "hard problem of consciousness" is that you can have all the structure and function you want, but there's still no way qualia are entailed by that. Qualia are simply not physical properties, and there's no way to explain them or reduce them to something physical.
If you limit "existence" to physical facts only, then sure. But nothing precludes an ontology that contains nonphysical facts. You're not going to convince me that all there is to "happiness" is my behavior when I'm happy, or the neural state I'm in when I'm happy. Happiness feels a certain way, and no physical fact can explain that.
@flyinhawaiian43 I ask you this: could the feeling of happiness exist if there were no (and never had been) physical brains in the universe? Could the feeling or experience or 'qualia' of anything exist if there were no physical brains?
@johndoe43210 To answer your question I am inclined to say no, so long as you define a "brain" purely functionally. Qualia are nomologically (NOT logically) supervenient on the physical. One still must posit a fundamental law to explain the emergence of qualia from physical systems. Would a robot built to act exactly like a human have qualitative experiences? The mere fact that you cannot know for sure shows that the physical does not logically entail the phenomenal.
@flyinhawaiian43 The brain works in mysterious ways. Your brain is a highly complex machine that has given rise to an extremely rich and vivid abstraction of all of your experiences past and present. Your entire sense of self is a product of the set of symbolic structures which your brain has created. You are like a mirage or a rainbow, a hallucination of a hallucination, a reflection of everything that is around you. Deep down, the only laws are physical laws.
@roserh6 The complexity of the brain does nothing to elucidate its ability to produce qualia. You can connect all of the neurons together that you want, but you're never going to have a physical system that logically entails phenomenal properties (i.e. properties of a completely nonphysical kind). There's no reason to assume that the only laws are physical laws, especially when we have such direct evidence to the contrary.
@flyinhawaiian43 There absolutely is reason to believe that consciousness emerges from the finite stuff of brains. Otherwise you are stuck trying to explain an even more preposterous dualism. Kurt Godel demonstrated how it makes perfect mathematical sense to have an infinite, paradoxical, self-referential, strange loop arise from the set of formal, finite, logically coherent mathematical rules called the Principia Mathematica, indeed it is an inevitability!
@roserh6 I think we're talking about different kinds of consciousness. If we're discussing self-awareness, then I completely agree that it can arise from the physical structure of the brain. Self awareness is a functional concept, and physics is well-suited to explaining functional concepts. But if we're talking about qualia, e.g. the feeling (NOT the behavioral disposition) of pain, or the perceived redness of red, then physics leaves us completely in the dark.
@flyinhawaiian43 Your qualia are nothing more than the result of your brain's extremely sophisticated ability to store episodic memories and build up a vast and organized repertoire of symbols that can be triggered at any time. Human cognition works by collecting, categorizing and comparing all of the various stimuli in our life and constructing a highly complex "self-model".
@flyinhawaiian43 If you agree that self-awareness can arise from the physical structure of the brain, I don't see why it is so difficult to understand that what you call "qualia" are also functional products of the human brain's rich and complex cognitive abilities. I believe it is blind faith in some non-physical entity and an irrational aversion to the fact that humans are indeed animals and evolutionary beings.
@roserh6 Qualia are inherently different than self-awareness. If you had never seen the color red before, but you knew the exact neural patterns that occurred when someone was seeing red, would you know what red looked like? If you say no, then there is a fact that is not explained by the underlying physical facts. If you say yes, then...well I don't even know how you could defend that position.
@flyinhawaiian43 Hypothetically, if I knew the exact neural patterns that occurred when someone was seeing red then I would know which neural pathways were being stimulated going from the optical nerve to the visual cortex to the brain and I would be able to see which rods and cones were being stimulated in the eye and therefore know the spectral quality of the light being received by the eye, ergo I could "discover" what red looked like.
@roserh6 Well if you think that, then we're at an impasse. I believe you would know that this person is seeing "red", but you could not picture what red looks like. Many prominent neuroscientists agree with my point in this thought experiment, as do many philosophers. The physics of the neural pathways do not entail the experienced color of red. They entail the behavioral dispositions associated with seeing red, but not the actual experience itself.
@flyinhawaiian43 I think if you really look at it, your thought experiment is a moot point. The neural pathways associated with this "behavioral disposition" stem from the physical experience of certain wavelengths being absorbed by the eye. Scientists know about the evolution of color perception and the ability of most primates including humans to discern between different wavelengths.
@roserh6 I'm not entirely sure what you're saying here. Clearly the behavioral response to seeing red is completely explainable in terms of the physical neural connections. I'm not contesting that. What the experiment (not mine, by the way - search for Mary's Room on wikipedia) shows is that there IS a fact that is NOT captured by the physical explanation. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the evolution of color perception.
@flyinhawaiian43 I looked up the wikipedia article and was pleased to see that there is a nice explanation of Daniel Dennett's view on this thought experiment. I was already familiar with Dennett and his views and I can honestly say that I came to the same conclusions about this matter without thinking about him. Nevertheless he seems to agree with me that the Mary's Room scenario is a moot point and does not prove anything about the existence of qualia.
@roserh6 Dennett is a notorious materialist, so it is not surprising that he objects. Still, he offers no reason to accept his argument; it is based solely on his physicalist premise. He cannot show HOW knowledge of the complete physical picture would entail knowledge of the "redness of red." He simply asserts this.
And if you're going to contest the usefulness of thought experiments, you may want to throw philosophy out the window.
@flyinhawaiian43 Dennett doesn't believe in magic, that is all. And I'm not contesting the usefulness of thought experiments, just useless ones. Simply attributing something that you can't understand to a non-physical dualistic entity, even though everything you DO know suggests that such things could not possibly exist, is like saying "That sunset is just too picture perfect not to have been designed by the very hand of god."
@roserh6 It's not magic, it's property dualism. And believe me I tried to save materialism for myself for a long time before resigning to this stance. It is not a lack of understanding that prevents me from seeing how qualia are entailed by the physical. Any kind of physical explanation imaginable would simply be the wrong kind of explanation. Physics deals with dispositional properties, primarily relations of objects to other objects. Qualia are not dispositional but qualitative.
@roserh6 How's this: if you can help me see how physics at least MIGHT account for qualia, I'd readily revert to physicalism. Just give me an example of the type of physical explanation that would work. But FYI I've thought a long time about how physics could do this, and I simply cannot see a way.
Wow. I have absolutely no idea what anything is anymore.
bogtheforest 3 weeks ago
were not conscious it just seems like we are
mikkwik 1 month ago
I think this guy can win any staring contest.
football25 2 months ago
childs' inability to recognise the reasoning behind everyday decisions and as adults the mind is exposed to religion and conflicting arguments, thus the mind is torn and it is this mingling of irrational beliefs which contradict one another which causes what is thought of as consciousness. The more one becomes ingrained in a belief, the less one is aware of their conscious self therefore eliminating the prospect of consciousness
jazzyjayser 2 months ago
@jazzyjayser I think when your born you dream yourself into existance, so is it the sub-concious that creates your now cousiousness ???
ThumperThumpselevend 2 months ago
Consciousness is nothing more than a void created by contradiction. a meaning(s) lacking in logic yet regarded as truth. Consciousness develops during the first few years because of the.
jazzyjayser 2 months ago
A rock doesn't behave like it's kicked until it's kicked. It has subjectivity. This is qualia.
keyfeatures 2 months ago
All philosophers should dress and look like members of Metallica. That would be awesome.
frabjous79 3 months ago
Beavis interviewing?
gamerunknown 3 months ago
israelsocratus 3 months ago
@israelsocratus
Fallacy of composition.
gamerunknown 3 months ago
@gamerunknown Well, I guess that means that there is the fallacy of composition to say that all is physical, because things are composed of the physical. But I don't think you feel that's a fallacy of composition.
TheApollo81 2 months ago
ten to the sixty or so selections since origin - there ain't nothing "hard" about that problem. I ain't got a problem with this guy - a fucker work hard, get alla them entitlements.
I just used my morality the way it is supposed to be used- on an individual level. He's "wrong" in a nowhere posting on youtube where I'm right - in that I know what I know 'cause I love Gwyneth Paltrow. 11 years of that is a different kind of endeavor. My entitlement merely states, she's my Gwynnies. ;)
houseofcantor 4 months ago
...and! Because I'm a creature of love - I get my rant outta the way first.
He's wrong.
Rather, my naive philosophy may be looking at a different question. Is the difference between organic and inorganic a mathematical structure? Is this hypothetical structure control structure in bacteria? Is morality derivative of this structure? That's all evolution. Think of it in naive terms. Nature selects. Think of discreetness in terms of Planck time. Do some simple math, there's been...
houseofcantor 4 months ago
Here's some naive philosophy for ya: Love is Void. Love is the emotional dynamic of least entropy. Since there's some non atheist types on youtube, we got that covered, too. God is Love explains the Love/Fear duality. I explain the Love/evil duality. All I'm saying, this fucker ain't love-able, saying "I'm right - and you're a zombie."
Whadda think? Yeah or nay.
houseofcantor 4 months ago
But youtube and the fucking links... besides, Who gives a fuck - it's just another 'random' act of evolution I can draw like ellenjanuary; a chain of causality that ellenjanuary multiplied his identity a hundredfold b drawing my Gwynnies - and a zillion mofo's see "the love of my Gwynnies" in my art. This ain't art class. We all know the public don't know art. This philosophy class. We want action. We want bloodshed. We wanna know...
houseofcantor 4 months ago
This fucking dude is a zombie. How do I know? Amo ergo sum. "Consciousness" ain't the identity that exists as I exist - love is. This guy is "leading thinker," got alla kinda entitlement. I'm a naive philosopher. Through a "random' act of evolution, I fell in love with Gwyneth Paltrow. And because she is love-worthy, I seem to have gotten an objective standard of love outta the deal - you know, rather than a restraining order. Usta be, I'd link a mofo up...
houseofcantor 4 months ago
Mary could insert an electode into her brain and stimulate a neuron that is responsible for "seeing red" and I'll be she would see red without any actual red there.
dlbattle100 5 months ago
Wow! He didn't bring a single argument. He merely stated that he feels consciousness is really important in the most elaborate way imaginable :)
TheConcolor 5 months ago
@TheConcolor that's because no one has conducted on experiment to see if people are conscious, and neither could they. It's not testable. We're all just zombies, or you all are!
TheApollo81 2 months ago
@Hofsteder Thank you very much for the debate, sorry to hear you can't continue - I hope whatever the circumstances are, that it works out for you.
If you should ever feel like taking up the discussion again, just drop me a line here - I'll check my youtube account at least once every 14 days or so.
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder OK. we do seem to be getting quite a bit around - I'm going to have a busy weekend, so I'll probably not read your response until monday, so take your time.
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder say other people can feel pain? Whats the fundamental difference from your point of view?
3) The non-brain pain: From my point of view this is simply an oxymoron. One needs the physical basis of a brain (or some similarly complex system) to be able to give any sense to the word pain.
4) Wavelength: My point was not about the qualia of red, but of the qualia of wavelength (of red). However it was, for other reasons, an illformed point, and immaterial to my arguments, so nevermind.
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder paint", but only in the same way as everything you could say about "qualia of redness" could be translated into statements of the corresponding brainstate.
2) The chinese point: Maybe a better analogy would be a future computer, capable of emulating the human brain (since there are far too few chinese :) ). If such a computer (or any other sufficiently and correctly complex system) was to be built, would you really say it was incapable of pain? And if so, why would you (supposidly)
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder as meaningless as it is to ask what "special sauce" da vinci was had to add when he was done painting to turn the "canvas with paint on" into the "mona lisa" - it seems clear that the answer is "none"? Yet you could ascribe things such as aestetic beauty to the mona lisa, which could not readily be ascribed to "canvas with paint" without the "mona lisisity" ;). Ofcause, essentially everything you can say about the mona lisa might be "converted" into things to say about the canvas with
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder OK, quite a lot of points to cover :)
1) The identity of indiscernibles: The identity has to be defined more carefully - I maintain that the qualia of redness and the corresponding brainstate are "fundamentally" identical, however, I grant that it is two different interpretations of the same thing. The situation is perfectly analogous to the identity of the mona lisa and "a canvas and some organised paint". To ask what needs to be added to the neurological pattern to make "qualia" is
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder Processing doesn't "explain" conscious experience, it (plus sensing data, ie. getting input to the brain) _is_ conscious experience (from my point of view), which is why I suspected that we disagreed in our definition of same.
Eg. the conscious experience of pain: If I can map some neurological pattern to the subjective experience of pain, and vice versa, ie. have a bijective map, this is my _definition_ of an explanation. Otherwise, I simply don't know what "explanation" means?
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder I grant that it is speculative, ie. we could be wrong in saying that it is a necessary truth - but thats a "technical" question, ie. a neurophysiological one. But I fail to see exactly what more is needed to fully describe the "pain", except to say that the psychological way of looking at "the firing of C-fibers", rather like the "mona lisa" is the artistic way of looking at "a canvas and some paint". (cont)
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder It still seems to me that answering the easy problem will do: If I explain the neural maps of all qualia plus all of the processing of these qualia, I do not see what is left to explain of "conscious experience" - what could that be, more than processing of qualia (in the broadest sense, eg. the "qualia" of the wavelength of red, but also of "red" itself)?
I guess my problem is exactly that: What do "hard problemers" ( :-) ) mean, exactly, by "conscious experience"?
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder neural activity. Similarily, to solve the "easy" problem wrt. qualia of red is to map the qualia of red onto neural activity. Once this (if possible) is done, we have explained qualia. Further, since it seems to me that one way to define consiousness is to collect all qualia plus processing of same (which can again be mapped onto neural activity), we have then an explanation of consiousness through answering the "easy" problem alone. Thus, the hard problem evaporates.
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder well, obviously my position is somewhat speculative: Until the "easy" problem has been solved, I have no way of knowing whether it is possible to describe _any_ property of the mind through ultimately neural mechanics (we have explained _some_, but far from all).
My point is that there is no fundamental difference between the qualia of red, and say the wavelength of red light: To solve the "easy problem wrt. wavelength is to map the understanding of reds wavelength to (cont)
f43d348k 6 months ago
this guy is a dum dum, he know nothing about the process of the brain, yet he still says that the brain is unable to produce consciousness. When we know about the brain 100% then we can address consciousness. I not sure I can agree with him what consciousness is even.
shanecox704 6 months ago
@Hofsteder I suppose we might not quite agree what "physicalist" means: To my mind it means that everything is ultimately describable by its physical constituents, at least in principle. From that position the answer would clearly be "no", since you would not have access to all the data about echo location (or redness) without the qualia, but perhaps we are just debating semantics here.
Still, I have never come across any explanatory gap in "my" picture - what would that be?
f43d348k 6 months ago
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@Hofsteder another way of putting my point would be this: Mary knew _about_ the neural correlates of the qualia of red, but they had never been activated in herself - therefore, from a strict physicalist point of view, she does not yet know everything there is to know about the color red.
f43d348k 6 months ago
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f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder I do not see why I should answer "yes", even assuming strict physicalism. I would not have the "data" or "experience" of the neurological pathways corresponding to echo location in a bat, and perhaps I never could have. Thus, I would only know "about" the qualia of echo location, not know the qualia of it myself.
My question remains: Why does this imply that consiousness must be a primitve? Or why would it even suggest it?
f43d348k 6 months ago
@Hofsteder Yes, that is how I "understand" it as well: But that is exactly what doesn't make sense to me: Obviously(?) she would learn something new, namely the socalled "qualia" of red - that is a physical entity, no? It has, supposidly, it's own neural patterns that has to be activated for us to feel the qualia of red, in the same way as the understanding of its wavelength has /its/ own neural underpinning.
Why does it follow from this that consiousness must be a primitive?
f43d348k 6 months ago
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f43d348k 6 months ago
Hm?? This sounded like gibberish to me... If we magically fired up all the same neurons in marys brain as is activated in mine by seeing red, she would have precisely the same "qualia" of seeing red, yes?
Ofcause these neurons wouldn't be activated by learning about, say, wavelengths, but what's that got to do with anything? It doesn't follow that the qualia of red is something else than neuron activity.
f43d348k 6 months ago
@f43d348k - It's not gibberish. One might disagree with him, but that doesn't mean what he's saying is gibberish. This is a HUGE issue in philosophy and science, and there is no consensus. Why don't you go and read up on it before posting your ill-informed opinions?
flefft 6 months ago
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f43d348k 6 months ago
@flefft I'm aware that it's an issue within contemporary philosophy, but I've yet to see (or read) anyone define the socalled hard problem in a meaningful way: A good example is this guy - hence the "gibberish" comment, I'm not sure what, if anything, he says, so I'm not merely "disagreeing" with him, it actually seems like a litteral nonsense to me. But, I'm always open to persuation: Do you know of any youtube videos (or books) where this problem is clearly defined?
f43d348k 6 months ago
@f43d348k God dag, there are several Youtube channels that I think are worth checking out. 0ThouArtThat0, spiritualatheist have done a number of videos talking about the "hard problem". Also Peter Russell (the psychologist) has some videos on here which I felt discuss the subject very well.
JohnMatrix89 6 months ago
@f43d348k The point of that argument is that there is a first person subjective experience, even if all objective facts are known about neuron activity in a brain when seeing red. Experience itself is not objective fact, there is no way to prove it.
JohnMatrix89 6 months ago
@JohnMatrix89 Yes, I'm think I understand him that far, but my problem is that I've never seen any argument that "subjective experience" is anything other than a representation of "neural activity in the brain", rather like "the Mona Lisa" is an representation of "a canvas and some paint". But thanks for the channels, I'll have a look at them...
f43d348k 6 months ago
i think hes sumerizing the differentiation of objectivity as subjective, but is disillusioned by the thought that subtly exists as it is. i too hold some promises for spirit.
gen6k 8 months ago
what an acidhead
gen6k 8 months ago 4
@gen6k Haha
HomuncuIus 8 months ago
to support my opinion let me elaborate..God created us, therefore our good and bad intention also are His creations. Therefore, its not justified to punish people for wrong-doing. But if we think, our free wills originated from God Himself as form of induced consciousness, then it make sense. We are not part of God rather have induced consciousness whosesource is God. That's what the soul means. "..They ask about soul, say, you are given little knowledge.."(Quran)
alamin104 8 months ago
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alamin104 8 months ago
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"..the word was with God, the word is God"...
"..I and Father are one.."
To my opinion, there is nothing conscious except God Himself. God induced his consciousness to living beings. Think of analogy of a magnet. A magnet can induce magnetic property to some metal. Similarly God induced His consciousness to us including other conscious beings. Therefore, none is able to identify the soul.
alamin104 8 months ago
We perceive stories in our perceived realities. Why see change in reality, such as a third party individual changing as a person. We only witness cause and effect occurrences. We then evaluate the situation occurring with some sort of reflection on the perceived actions occurring. Religion creates premises to accept which change the perceived stories to change the individuals perception of his perceived reality (the world).
Consciousness is required to have this strange system set up.
bobbyjet2 9 months ago
this dude looks like a roadie for Motorhead. Cool.
ar4216 9 months ago
I'm an atheist and I have a deep respect towards the sciences, especially the natural sciences. For a long time I almost found myself guilt-tripped into denying that there is an inherently subjective element to consciousness, but no longer; I've read a lot of articles dedicated to The Hard Problem, and I do not feel the least bit persuaded that the sciences are able to adequately capture the subjective elements of consciousness.
Huesos138 9 months ago 28
@Huesos138 Try reading about ORCH-OR by Roger Penrose., it's the most promising theory so far.
packe777 4 months ago
@Huesos138
I find myself in exactly the same situation. This said, it feels good to know there are still mysteries to unveil.
ThisOneIsTaken 2 months ago
poor explanation i was expecting more from David
Neueregel 9 months ago
@Neueregel Elaborate.
AWDracer 9 months ago 12
It's funny how hardcore materialists say that not reverting to eliminative physicalism is "mysterian mumbo-jumbo," and unscientific. They say, "Ignore everything you feel inside, otherwise you're being unscientific. You don't want to be unscientific, do you?" It's like saying, "every time you do *A*, god kills a kitten. You don't want god to kill a kitten, do you?"
By the way, don't take Dennett seriously, he was raised by behaviorists in a time when consciousness-denial was trendy.
theocean1973 10 months ago 7
@theocean1973 It is mysterian par excellence.
Paraconsistant 9 months ago
@theocean1973 Is that true? would make sense as Dennett seems to think showing a few clips of optical illusions explains consciousness
GCthegreat1ify 4 months ago
...he also doesn't actually answer the question about data flow.
themuledoctor 10 months ago
Dennett refuted Zombies.
Frutoses 11 months ago
I like the zombie idea!!! But the problem of when consciousness comes into play or why is that. THIS WHOLE Exsistance is Consciousness and with the expansion from the origin we are just electrons getting sucked down these pipe dreams :D I'm joseph, And I'm a PHILOSOPHER
masterj9000 11 months ago
all of this is based on a paradigm that "existence" means something specific, that doesn't need to be explained or clarified... but i heard Dawkins say, just because a question can be formulated, does not mean it merits and answer."
the concepts these men are talking about are taken for granted, but they are NOT granted. debating the 'existence' or 'necessity' of consciousness is nonsensical once we examine the metaphor structure of the concept of consciousness...
dingai 11 months ago
@dissimul: That's the exact point Chalmers is making. The mechanistic story doesn't predict consciousness. Yet it is here...you are conscious, aren't you?
danth78 11 months ago
philosophy = serious business
....doesn't mean you can't have hair like a rockstar.
rahxun 11 months ago 2
He looks like a rockstar, not a philosopher.
RonBurgundy161 1 year ago
@RonBurgundy161
check this vid, chalmers is rocking!:
Zombie Blues at the Qualia Fest
chocoberto 11 months ago
@RonBurgundy161 Go read a book!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
masterj9000 11 months ago
@masterj9000 I read a lot you idiot, I'm just stating what everyone is most likely thinking.
RonBurgundy161 11 months ago
This guy isn't an atheist, he's not even a rationalist. To say there is something more to conciousness that the physical process is to try to explain it using supernatural phenomena; a concept that goes against evolutionary biology. Chalmers is in awe of his own experience, which naturally we all seem to be most of the time. To explain conciousness one must step back and look at the measurable - the only thing that has ever given us hard answers to anything.
themuledoctor 1 year ago
@themuledoctor
1. conflating atheism with absolute materialism.
2. The fact that you incorrectly use the term "rationalist" is a sign of your lack of understanding of philosopohy which explains why you posit the false dichotomy and think that consciousness is either physical or "supernatural" completely ignoring other explanations such as double aspect theory.
SecularNumanist 11 months ago
@SecularNumanist
1. probably a fair point mate. I can't consider conciousness as anything other than material, so maybe I'm at fault for assuming most other atheists would naturally assume the same standpoint. I'm the contemporary definition of a layman on this topic, but Chalmers rejection of evolutionary biology as an explanation for conciousness doesn't make sense to me at all, so I guess that makes me a materialist/physicalist.
themuledoctor 11 months ago
@SecularNumanist
2. I consider describing conciousness as anything other than material irrational, and so in that reclaim the word 'rationalist'. I ignore double aspect theory on the grounds that it doesn't seem to advance any argument so it deserves to be. Chalmers says that neuroscience can't explain conciousness. Even if that's true it doesn't mean evolution and neurology aren't responsible for it. Thoughts come from our brains, and what are they but physical?
themuledoctor 11 months ago
@themuledoctor 'Thoughts come from our brains, and what are they but physical?'
How can they be physical if you cant see hear feel taste or smell them? Or are you suggesting that we may be able to isolate some kind of physical aspect of thought one day? Even if that were the case and you could look at what produced the thought under a microscope you would still have had to have had the thought personally in order for it to qualify as being a thought. See the problem? Hard isn't it?
fishybishbash 10 months ago
@fishybishbash I agree it's very hard if you create riddles for yourself. I'm really not well-read enough to argue effectively on the topic, but it seems odd to me that an atheist can look at consciousness like it's a magical substance that exists outside the physical, like it belongs within/is emitted by a soul. I think that, because we have a very limited understanding of it, people are often left in awe of their conscious. Science is the only thing that'll ever explain it.
themuledoctor 10 months ago
@themuledoctor Good for you!
fishybishbash 10 months ago
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themuledoctor 10 months ago
@fishybishbash well anyone can be a philosopher. Your notion of what a 'thought' is is more amusing than the 'good for you'.
themuledoctor 10 months ago
@themuledoctor haha great!
fishybishbash 10 months ago
@fishybishbash I guess we'll leave it at that then, as you don't have anything interesting to add and your basic ploy is to act like you've figured it all out without actually saying anything at all. It's clear that 'thoughts' and ideas come about from the flow of information from our senses and from our memories. Getting caught up in qualia just confuses the issue and doesn't mean anything important. Read some Pinker or Dennett, if you're able to without sarcasm cluttering your mind. Cheers.
themuledoctor 10 months ago
@themuledoctor Cheers.
fishybishbash 10 months ago
@themuledoctor yes. anyone can be a philosopher. Anyone with a PhD in philosophy....
bwest8888 8 months ago
Chalmers is putting the mystery back into philosophy.He reminds us that the only thing we ever see is the interior of our own brain.
henryporter101 1 year ago 2
He resembles Julian Barret from the Mighty Boosh.
YouSmellLikeACat 1 year ago
The right TPJ is responsible for thinking of other people's minds. There are 7 consciousness in every person working together as one.
derman077 1 year ago
The thinker is the very concept of self and is an illusion.One could take scrap from the same pile and make two different computers, however really they're the same metal from one pile.However, now the scraps are organized in a fashion that can route information and hold memory.These two separate memory systems might assume a self, but the truth is theres no distiction between the two. The thinker isnt the scrap metal, its the phenomenon of electrical commands in a certain pattern-intangible.
dcraven016465 1 year ago
The perfect substitution to academic books and journals in studying for your philosophy exam, on you go Chalmers!
PanchoAndDrum 1 year ago
did lemmy dyes....his hair?
Xxaprilb223xX 1 year ago
Great!
ORAKAR 1 year ago
I mush prefer to hear the opinions of living people who have real opinions - and not just repeating something that was said about two thousand years ago.
RayL1983 1 year ago
This guy is an over-rated blowhard. How he ever got to prominence is a sad commentary on the contemporary scene. I once emailed him with the simple question: Can consciousness define itself? And he tried to bamboozle me!
raysrags23 1 year ago
@raysrags23 how did he try to bamboozle you?
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
@lookatmepleasesir Hello. Sorry to take so long to reply. I seldom use the email box your post was sent to. Instead of responding to my question directly he obfuscated with a reference to "the hard problem" etc. claiming insufficient time and space to properly respond. I responded by saying Socrates or Wittgenstein would never cop out like that. This is testing my memory as it happened maybe 10 or more years ago. So, let me put it to you: Can consciousness define itself? raymondsteiner@mac.com
raysrags23 1 year ago
google penrose/hameroff. Just for the hell of it. Quantum Consciousness is held in deep contempt these days by the ruling Scientific Orthodoxy. Find out why.
midplanewanderer 1 year ago
@midplanewanderer I did that but there's a lot to wade through to find the main criticisms. Could you tell us, in a nutshell, why "Quantum Consciousness is held in deep contempt these days by the ruling Scientific Orthodoxy"? And is that contempt directed specifically toward universal quantum effects (ie: a universal consciousness), or does it include the narrower idea of quantum effects in the brain? Is this criticism to do with the speed at which the wave function collapses or something else?
SolarFlare42 1 year ago
@SolarFlare42 You're quite right, there's a lot to wade through, In a nutshell, if this theory should suddenly gain more adherents (-I'm a dreamer- perhaps even a balanced article in SciAm Mind!), it could pose a threat to the materialist world-view that holds sway today with such mealy-mouthed smugness; specifically, that the phenomena of consciousness -of Beingness- is merely a temporary sliver of false existence spawned by -and soon reabsorbed into- a dead and unknowing eternity.
midplanewanderer 1 year ago
im no zombie in psychology i have been told to be schizotypal, i wrote a ffn story about it. bout ppl to be not concious they are 'normal' /slash/ ZOMBIES!
MysteryProjectThe 1 year ago
language is a massive barrier in this vid. would've been a lot better if he spent the time explaining what he meant by his terms. you can see the interviewer is constantly trying to get him to do this but he fails.
PornographicSoul 1 year ago
Why everything you've been told about evolution is wrongWhat if Darwin's theory of natural selection is inaccurate? What if the way you live now affects the life expectancy of your descendants? Evolutionary thinking is having a revolution . .
FOXTERRY 1 year ago
I dont trust scientist and christians too.
I believe that hatred and love - two mighty forces of Universe, one - for destruction, another for construction. But when hatred is stronger than love - our body destroys. If love surpasses hatred - the same. Hatred is necessary for healthy instinct of self-preservation.
To forgive a harm of bad man - impossible as he feel himself - unpunished.
But we need to supervise our feelings, the greatest authority - authority above self. Selfcontrol.
TheChicarusa 1 year ago
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@TheChicarusa: If you don't trust scientist get the fuck off the computer hahaha.
HispanicIsNotARace1 1 year ago
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TheChicarusa 1 year ago
Is David Chalmers = Gowron ?
Prytanus 1 year ago
It's silly to think that conciousness is its own "stuff." It gets you know where in trying to answer the question "what is conciousness?" That this universe has the right "stuff" in order to have concious beings and another universe might not, is a fancy form of dualism. The Zombie scenerio is a dead-end, hmm hmm
pprimmuss 1 year ago
@pprimmuss what do you mean by "stuff"?
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
About the zombies, I've often had the impression that the person I was talking with was in fact an automaton putting on a near perfect "show" of consciousness. Chalmers doesn't think such zombies really exist. But what about sociopaths for instance. They have no moral, ethical consciousness at all, but they imitate and act as if they have the same feelings as normal people and they fool their families and friends. I think there might well be a vast spectrum of what could be called zombie people.
scruethedemiurge 1 year ago
What if you're like a computer program that's formatted to fallow rules. The very nature of "being" is the format. You're supposed to worry about your job, your suppose to get jealous when guys hit on your girlfriend, you're suppose to seek out your desires, you're suppose to live life ignoring the fact its a mystery, and your suppose to condition an ego....people who live life like its normal are the automation, the zombies. The people aware that things are strange are the "real" people.
dcraven016465 1 year ago 2
"I think therefore I am." I disagree. I think it's more like this. A composition of matter called a brain genreates chemical / electrical activity. Thoughts, feelings, etc are mere conceptual representations of these physical processes in the brain. Among these conceptual representations is the "I" thought - the "I'm the one doing the thinking" thought. That's just another conceptual representation of material processes over which I have no control, over which there is no me TO be in control.
scruethedemiurge 1 year ago
@scruethedemiurge so thinking doesn't imply a thinker? how can you deny a thinker if "you" are thinking?
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
After seeing all this video, Chalmers would really benefit from a 4 minute conversation with Dan Dennet... how does he not get that the personal part of experience is neat, but ultimately inconsequential? He's drastically inflating the importance of personal experience to appeal to regular solipsism.
dmcgraye 1 year ago
@dmcgraye I can guarantee he has read Dan Dennett.
natedaug1 1 year ago
@dmcgraye To be fair, Chalmers really isn't at his most lucid here. I'd highly recommend the Conscious Mind. While his "zombies" argument is sort of...well, ridiculous, he does an admirable job of challenging materialist orthodoxy. Even the zombie argument has value as a thought experiment.
And of course he's read/spoken with Dan Dennett. The two are mortal enemies when it comes to philosophy of mind.
Mood1ndigo 1 year ago
@Mood1ndigo why is it ridiculous?
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
@dmcgraye how the hell is it inconsequential?
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
@lookatmepleasesir Its inconsequential because it doesn't effect anything else, its the end product of a long chain of chemical reactions, but that gives it no special status. The fact that it is the end makes it less consequential because... it has NO CONSQUENCES.
dmcgraye 1 year ago
@dmcgraye it doesn't effect anything else? how did you write that message? you are consciousness
lookatmepleasesir 1 year ago
I find that a lot of people are misunderstanding the other guy in this video (and Dan Dennet's) points. They are not saying that consciousness does not exist. Even if they said that it was in every sense an illusion, it would still exist. Dennet (who, i presume the other speaker is referring to) acknowledges that consciousness is as real as everything. however at 2:20 Chalmers dodges a pretty lucid point. Consciousness is something real, but sketchy and makeshift, with an illusion of perfection.
dmcgraye 1 year ago
I wonder if Chalmers does drugs?
JimmyJoyce77 1 year ago
13.7 billion yrs ago the universe appeared. Matter cooled and condensed, stars ignited to forge heavy elements, supernovae seeded the galaxy. 9.2 billion yrs after the bang, the Earth formed. Starshine made organic molecules reproduce, compete and evolve. 2.5 million yrs ago an apelike creature started to use tools. Humans walked on the moon and now approach immortality. A small part of the cosmos, the human mind, reflects on itself and the universe becomes self-aware. Explain that!
mrfpercival 1 year ago
@mrfpercival didn't you just explain it? If not then I will. Its the qualities of the universe's physical laws.
dmcgraye 1 year ago
Mary's room. The joke is, everyone knows women are all dark on the inside.
iamthewalrusQ 1 year ago 13
@iamthewalrusQ
no, theyre pink on the inside.
mcpencil 11 months ago
@iamthewalrusQ I thought they were squishy and wet on the inside.
thewiffenpoof 10 months ago
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iamthewalrusQ 1 year ago
Why are they doing this interview in a morgue?
rumblefishism 1 year ago
Chalmers is definitely a zombie
nelsogg85 1 year ago
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scribb7 1 year ago
@ roserh6 'physical experience of a certain wavelength' ??
A machine can have a physical 'reaction' to certain wavelengths if it's programmed that way but I doubt it would have any experience of it. Reacting and experiencing seem to me like two different things, like brain and mind. It's easy to show how something reacts but very difficult to show how something experiences.
scribb7 1 year ago
@scribb7 I was using flyinhawaiian's own use of the word "experience". I understand the difference between reception and perception. You seem to have jumped in the middle of this discussion with no frame of reference.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 Fair enough.
scribb7 1 year ago
His philosophical zombies sound a lot like Julian Jaynes’ bicameral mind.
jeisolomon 1 year ago
Using 5:38 for a presentation :P
ChronicMetamorphosis 1 year ago
So what does Chalmers think consciousness is the result of? Invisible supernatural fairies flying around in our skulls? Someone who can not understand the idea of Physicalism should not be the Director of the Center for Consciousness. Perhaps a job at a New Age festival, next to the spiritual healers and mystics, might be more suitable.
His claim is utterly anthropocentric. You and you consciousness are just a lump of chemical reactions Mr Chalmers, just like all other matter. Get over it
johndoe43210 1 year ago
@johndoe43210
It may not be a matter of what "consciousness is the result of", but rather the amazing and nearly magical result itself. The ingredients may be relatively uncomplicated, but the results (if achieved) may be almost mystical.
The physical processes in the brain, while running, may create an emergent consciousness that is much greater than the sum of the parts.
I think the science of emergence holds more of the answers than the science of neurology.
kf1000 1 year ago
@kf1000 "The physical processes in the brain, while running, may create an emergent consciousness that is much greater than the sum of the parts" Unfortunately Chalmers is a critic of physicalism, and denies it when it comes to consciousness. Even the science of emergence doesn't deny physicalism. Oh, and at least neuroscience uses empirical science to understand the causes of the emergent properties in question, rather than inventing supernatural theories to explain stuff away (like Chalmers)
johndoe43210 1 year ago
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scribb7 1 year ago
This has been flagged as spam show
@johndoe43210 If chemicals become self aware I'm inclined to call that supernatural.
scribb7 1 year ago
This has been flagged as spam show
@johndoe43210 If chemicals can become selfaware I'm inclined to call that supernatural.
scribb7 1 year ago
@johndoe43210
All properties that emerge from physics are explainable in terms of physics, in terms of complex interactions of structure and function. The "hard problem of consciousness" is that you can have all the structure and function you want, but there's still no way qualia are entailed by that. Qualia are simply not physical properties, and there's no way to explain them or reduce them to something physical.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 2
@flyinhawaiian43 If that is the case, then Qualia do not exist.
johndoe43210 1 year ago
@johndoe43210
If you limit "existence" to physical facts only, then sure. But nothing precludes an ontology that contains nonphysical facts. You're not going to convince me that all there is to "happiness" is my behavior when I'm happy, or the neural state I'm in when I'm happy. Happiness feels a certain way, and no physical fact can explain that.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 3
@flyinhawaiian43 I ask you this: could the feeling of happiness exist if there were no (and never had been) physical brains in the universe? Could the feeling or experience or 'qualia' of anything exist if there were no physical brains?
johndoe43210 1 year ago
@johndoe43210 To answer your question I am inclined to say no, so long as you define a "brain" purely functionally. Qualia are nomologically (NOT logically) supervenient on the physical. One still must posit a fundamental law to explain the emergence of qualia from physical systems. Would a robot built to act exactly like a human have qualitative experiences? The mere fact that you cannot know for sure shows that the physical does not logically entail the phenomenal.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 3
@flyinhawaiian43 The brain works in mysterious ways. Your brain is a highly complex machine that has given rise to an extremely rich and vivid abstraction of all of your experiences past and present. Your entire sense of self is a product of the set of symbolic structures which your brain has created. You are like a mirage or a rainbow, a hallucination of a hallucination, a reflection of everything that is around you. Deep down, the only laws are physical laws.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 The complexity of the brain does nothing to elucidate its ability to produce qualia. You can connect all of the neurons together that you want, but you're never going to have a physical system that logically entails phenomenal properties (i.e. properties of a completely nonphysical kind). There's no reason to assume that the only laws are physical laws, especially when we have such direct evidence to the contrary.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 3
@flyinhawaiian43 There absolutely is reason to believe that consciousness emerges from the finite stuff of brains. Otherwise you are stuck trying to explain an even more preposterous dualism. Kurt Godel demonstrated how it makes perfect mathematical sense to have an infinite, paradoxical, self-referential, strange loop arise from the set of formal, finite, logically coherent mathematical rules called the Principia Mathematica, indeed it is an inevitability!
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 I think we're talking about different kinds of consciousness. If we're discussing self-awareness, then I completely agree that it can arise from the physical structure of the brain. Self awareness is a functional concept, and physics is well-suited to explaining functional concepts. But if we're talking about qualia, e.g. the feeling (NOT the behavioral disposition) of pain, or the perceived redness of red, then physics leaves us completely in the dark.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 2
@flyinhawaiian43 Your qualia are nothing more than the result of your brain's extremely sophisticated ability to store episodic memories and build up a vast and organized repertoire of symbols that can be triggered at any time. Human cognition works by collecting, categorizing and comparing all of the various stimuli in our life and constructing a highly complex "self-model".
roserh6 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 If you agree that self-awareness can arise from the physical structure of the brain, I don't see why it is so difficult to understand that what you call "qualia" are also functional products of the human brain's rich and complex cognitive abilities. I believe it is blind faith in some non-physical entity and an irrational aversion to the fact that humans are indeed animals and evolutionary beings.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 Qualia are inherently different than self-awareness. If you had never seen the color red before, but you knew the exact neural patterns that occurred when someone was seeing red, would you know what red looked like? If you say no, then there is a fact that is not explained by the underlying physical facts. If you say yes, then...well I don't even know how you could defend that position.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 Hypothetically, if I knew the exact neural patterns that occurred when someone was seeing red then I would know which neural pathways were being stimulated going from the optical nerve to the visual cortex to the brain and I would be able to see which rods and cones were being stimulated in the eye and therefore know the spectral quality of the light being received by the eye, ergo I could "discover" what red looked like.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 Well if you think that, then we're at an impasse. I believe you would know that this person is seeing "red", but you could not picture what red looks like. Many prominent neuroscientists agree with my point in this thought experiment, as do many philosophers. The physics of the neural pathways do not entail the experienced color of red. They entail the behavioral dispositions associated with seeing red, but not the actual experience itself.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 I think if you really look at it, your thought experiment is a moot point. The neural pathways associated with this "behavioral disposition" stem from the physical experience of certain wavelengths being absorbed by the eye. Scientists know about the evolution of color perception and the ability of most primates including humans to discern between different wavelengths.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 I'm not entirely sure what you're saying here. Clearly the behavioral response to seeing red is completely explainable in terms of the physical neural connections. I'm not contesting that. What the experiment (not mine, by the way - search for Mary's Room on wikipedia) shows is that there IS a fact that is NOT captured by the physical explanation. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the evolution of color perception.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 I looked up the wikipedia article and was pleased to see that there is a nice explanation of Daniel Dennett's view on this thought experiment. I was already familiar with Dennett and his views and I can honestly say that I came to the same conclusions about this matter without thinking about him. Nevertheless he seems to agree with me that the Mary's Room scenario is a moot point and does not prove anything about the existence of qualia.
roserh6 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 Anyways, we should not base our conclusions on unrealistic hypothetical thought experiments in the first place.
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 Dennett is a notorious materialist, so it is not surprising that he objects. Still, he offers no reason to accept his argument; it is based solely on his physicalist premise. He cannot show HOW knowledge of the complete physical picture would entail knowledge of the "redness of red." He simply asserts this.
And if you're going to contest the usefulness of thought experiments, you may want to throw philosophy out the window.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 3
@flyinhawaiian43 Dennett doesn't believe in magic, that is all. And I'm not contesting the usefulness of thought experiments, just useless ones. Simply attributing something that you can't understand to a non-physical dualistic entity, even though everything you DO know suggests that such things could not possibly exist, is like saying "That sunset is just too picture perfect not to have been designed by the very hand of god."
roserh6 1 year ago
@roserh6 It's not magic, it's property dualism. And believe me I tried to save materialism for myself for a long time before resigning to this stance. It is not a lack of understanding that prevents me from seeing how qualia are entailed by the physical. Any kind of physical explanation imaginable would simply be the wrong kind of explanation. Physics deals with dispositional properties, primarily relations of objects to other objects. Qualia are not dispositional but qualitative.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 4
@roserh6 How's this: if you can help me see how physics at least MIGHT account for qualia, I'd readily revert to physicalism. Just give me an example of the type of physical explanation that would work. But FYI I've thought a long time about how physics could do this, and I simply cannot see a way.
flyinhawaiian43 1 year ago 12
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roserh6 1 year ago
@flyinhawaiian43 I think this