I'm going to be the rude guy who just posts comments since I have no mic. and this seems to be my modus operandi anyways...
@ 3:20 when you bring up the double think idea... I believe double think is the foundation for a new and unique/genius/novel notion (it's a notion for now, but when there's a breakthrough it becomes an original, definable idea)
This dialogue is bringing us closer to a breakthrough in the understanding of free will.
As much as I'd disagree that you are pursuing this with no end but continuous self-actualization,
I think that without your perspective we'd bear no potential fruits in this area. I don't know if I've communicated myself effectively, but all I have are vague pointers for now, as far as a deeper complexification in the understanding of the Human experience of will is concerned.
I'll check the rest later and see if I have more verbal masturbation to achieve. Thanks for posting!
but also... you can't not use what you think about... you cannot have it not affect your life. Everything you think has some impact on how you are living, for one, youare living when you think it. It IS a behavior. Thinking is doing something so you always do something as a "result" of how you think and that is your life, and affects your life.
The possibility of an idea you can learn something that doesn't affect your life comes from the sense that ideas are immaterial.
I agree with that, but we don't even need to invoke materialism to see that learning is never without its effects. Time spent learning one thing is time not spent learning another or doing some other thing, so of course it affects us.
Of course, effects and "useful," or "positive," effects are an entirely different matter. We can reliably establish the existence of effects based on simple a priori logic because the definition of "effect" doesn't stretch, shrink, or shift much. To say that
"learning has positive or useful effects" requires us to agree upon usefulness or positivity, which is dependent on motives, desired outcomes, preferences, and of course compulsions.
You seldom find someone who doesn't enjoy learning about a particular thing arguing strongly in favor of the real absolute worth of learning about it at all convincingly. Isn't our shared belief in the value of learning or "modeling" then easily conceived of as a rationalization of a biological compulsion?
I don't think you can explain why it's "never without affect" without materialism... you in fact seemed to say some learning was without affects, or "signiicant" affects perhaps? That is unworkable imo, the grammar and logic of subjectiism will not support it, and weak props for objectivism have to be made... and there is no benefit to the result.
It is materialism that tells us what a "unicorn" "really is".
And materialism is subjective/emperical. Subjective/emperical == "objective".
for the record: lots of text comments or videos are fine... but vids are slightly better
two: I see we are both subjectivist... it's occurred to me that i'm 41 and I used to say "nothing is known" then I said "nothing is -really- known" then I realized subjectivity own the idea of "real knowledge", so it is "really" known. It's not "ideally known", perhaps.
So it's sort of a semantics... we can be more forward subjectivists.
As far as subjectivism goes, I don't apply it in an epistemological sense. It's pretty obvious to me that there is no knowledge which falls outside of subjective experience, so there's no issue to me of "really" knowing or not.
There is an issue when we talk about value judgments, though. Where an ethical system about the self becomes an ethical system about others (the vast majority of cases, otherwise we wouldn't even talk about it), I see a serious problem
in even the most momentary inability to distinguish the two. "Usefulness," "worth," "goodness," "a point," or any other such qualifier which invokes a should/shouldn't relationship are always a matter of preference, whether it's willful or determined preference.
In regards to learning quantum physics -- whether you do or don't experience interest, enjoyment, or satisfaction from doing so is bound to be the primary motivator to your defending it as useful or criticizing it as a waste of time.
The only competition I can see for this motive in terms of dictating the value judgment is whether the next step (or some further step down the line for which learning about quantum physics in a prerequisite) is conceived of as yielding satisfaction, pleasure, enjoyment or perhaps survival. Examples would be money, fame, social prestige, personal satisfaction, etc.
How the individual here computes work-to-reward determines everything about whether it is "useful" or there is a "point" to them.
the problem with the classic mathematics of worth is not just at the outset of the problem, when we accept facts, but in the whole methodology.
It seeks values, that persist, but everything is in flux. You can get money, be satisfied, see it ruin your life and regret all the more. Satisfaction is temporary, a function of the future, reevaluated, iterative and recursive. It's nothing like what they looked for. Their concepts polute our tools.
Beyond "lateral" chronological flux (money is good for me now, in the future it can ruin me), there is a "horizontal" identity flux in worth.
At the same instant in time, money or any other particular example may mean life for one person and death for another.
We can apply this across the board to nutrition, morality, war, guns, ad infinitum. I saw you do this in your interpretation of Nietszche's "virtues are vices." It's not just a matter of when but whom, and furthermore of scale.
Example: "Eating is good," is something we intuitively want to agree with. This is because our inherent standard is based on self as the subject and other (anything else) as the object. So what "eating is good" really means is "Me eating others is good." Reverse the pronouns and the value judgment changes.
You can make this tricky. i.e. "Love is good," but when we get specific and say "My wife loving my worst enemy is good," we find that there is a mental gymnastics involved that strains the
applicability of the same terms to previous uses. We can posit the meaning in this case to be:
a. "My wife loving my worst enemy is Good for the world," or
b. "My wife loving my worst enemy is good for my wife and my worst enemy."
In this case B is a more meaningful and agreeable interpretation precisely because it is self-centered. We can project ourselves vicariously into the minds of spouse and worst enemy; we do not conceive of "the world" as actually even possessing a self in the sense
that we do and so have more difficulty projecting. But the ease with which our mind performs this function and the empirical experience we have with the self loving or the self being loved as good does not in turn establish anything that can be called an objective truth. This is because the subjective experiences of the spouse/enemy are permanently off-limits to us. They can communicate to us deceptively or honestly, they can abscond from our lives completely, and in all cases the actual
"goodness" or "badness" of their mutual experience is something we can only guess at and trust ourselves to believe or disbelieve.
This is a broadly-applicable framework for value judgments and for me belies extreme danger in any attempt to pose even remotely objective ideas of what is good or bad, worth or waste.
When we attempt to project into the imagined objective world, we immediately level the self's position with all that is not the self. This is only half-objectivity unless we include
the non-human and the non-living in this leveling of positions. When non-living matter is leveled with the human mind in deciding morality, the objective result is always going to be amoral and worthless, because worth and goodness are properties of subjective human-only experience.
I'd go further and say that to be perfectly clear, in my view, "worth" and "goodness" as terms in the English language are only conceptually experienced by Anglophones, and even so without any uniformity.
well, as you agree, I bet, there "is" no such thing as "being good"... that is an appraisal, something is good only by a criteria which ASSERTS x is good or bad by means ABC.
I'm going to be the rude guy who just posts comments since I have no mic. and this seems to be my modus operandi anyways...
@ 3:20 when you bring up the double think idea... I believe double think is the foundation for a new and unique/genius/novel notion (it's a notion for now, but when there's a breakthrough it becomes an original, definable idea)
This dialogue is bringing us closer to a breakthrough in the understanding of free will.
Monolith1618 2 years ago
As much as I'd disagree that you are pursuing this with no end but continuous self-actualization,
I think that without your perspective we'd bear no potential fruits in this area. I don't know if I've communicated myself effectively, but all I have are vague pointers for now, as far as a deeper complexification in the understanding of the Human experience of will is concerned.
I'll check the rest later and see if I have more verbal masturbation to achieve. Thanks for posting!
Monolith1618 2 years ago
but also... you can't not use what you think about... you cannot have it not affect your life. Everything you think has some impact on how you are living, for one, youare living when you think it. It IS a behavior. Thinking is doing something so you always do something as a "result" of how you think and that is your life, and affects your life.
The possibility of an idea you can learn something that doesn't affect your life comes from the sense that ideas are immaterial.
pyrrho314 2 years ago
I agree with that, but we don't even need to invoke materialism to see that learning is never without its effects. Time spent learning one thing is time not spent learning another or doing some other thing, so of course it affects us.
Of course, effects and "useful," or "positive," effects are an entirely different matter. We can reliably establish the existence of effects based on simple a priori logic because the definition of "effect" doesn't stretch, shrink, or shift much. To say that
donnachaidh 2 years ago
"learning has positive or useful effects" requires us to agree upon usefulness or positivity, which is dependent on motives, desired outcomes, preferences, and of course compulsions.
You seldom find someone who doesn't enjoy learning about a particular thing arguing strongly in favor of the real absolute worth of learning about it at all convincingly. Isn't our shared belief in the value of learning or "modeling" then easily conceived of as a rationalization of a biological compulsion?
donnachaidh 2 years ago
sort of. everything is biological compulsion though so that's sort of the trivial solution to explination.
pyrrho314 2 years ago
I don't think you can explain why it's "never without affect" without materialism... you in fact seemed to say some learning was without affects, or "signiicant" affects perhaps? That is unworkable imo, the grammar and logic of subjectiism will not support it, and weak props for objectivism have to be made... and there is no benefit to the result.
It is materialism that tells us what a "unicorn" "really is".
And materialism is subjective/emperical. Subjective/emperical == "objective".
pyrrho314 2 years ago
for the record: lots of text comments or videos are fine... but vids are slightly better
two: I see we are both subjectivist... it's occurred to me that i'm 41 and I used to say "nothing is known" then I said "nothing is -really- known" then I realized subjectivity own the idea of "real knowledge", so it is "really" known. It's not "ideally known", perhaps.
So it's sort of a semantics... we can be more forward subjectivists.
pyrrho314 2 years ago
Good to know about the videos.
As far as subjectivism goes, I don't apply it in an epistemological sense. It's pretty obvious to me that there is no knowledge which falls outside of subjective experience, so there's no issue to me of "really" knowing or not.
There is an issue when we talk about value judgments, though. Where an ethical system about the self becomes an ethical system about others (the vast majority of cases, otherwise we wouldn't even talk about it), I see a serious problem
donnachaidh 2 years ago
in even the most momentary inability to distinguish the two. "Usefulness," "worth," "goodness," "a point," or any other such qualifier which invokes a should/shouldn't relationship are always a matter of preference, whether it's willful or determined preference.
In regards to learning quantum physics -- whether you do or don't experience interest, enjoyment, or satisfaction from doing so is bound to be the primary motivator to your defending it as useful or criticizing it as a waste of time.
donnachaidh 2 years ago
The only competition I can see for this motive in terms of dictating the value judgment is whether the next step (or some further step down the line for which learning about quantum physics in a prerequisite) is conceived of as yielding satisfaction, pleasure, enjoyment or perhaps survival. Examples would be money, fame, social prestige, personal satisfaction, etc.
How the individual here computes work-to-reward determines everything about whether it is "useful" or there is a "point" to them.
donnachaidh 2 years ago
the problem with the classic mathematics of worth is not just at the outset of the problem, when we accept facts, but in the whole methodology.
It seeks values, that persist, but everything is in flux. You can get money, be satisfied, see it ruin your life and regret all the more. Satisfaction is temporary, a function of the future, reevaluated, iterative and recursive. It's nothing like what they looked for. Their concepts polute our tools.
pyrrho314 2 years ago
Yes.
Beyond "lateral" chronological flux (money is good for me now, in the future it can ruin me), there is a "horizontal" identity flux in worth.
At the same instant in time, money or any other particular example may mean life for one person and death for another.
We can apply this across the board to nutrition, morality, war, guns, ad infinitum. I saw you do this in your interpretation of Nietszche's "virtues are vices." It's not just a matter of when but whom, and furthermore of scale.
donnachaidh 2 years ago
Example: "Eating is good," is something we intuitively want to agree with. This is because our inherent standard is based on self as the subject and other (anything else) as the object. So what "eating is good" really means is "Me eating others is good." Reverse the pronouns and the value judgment changes.
You can make this tricky. i.e. "Love is good," but when we get specific and say "My wife loving my worst enemy is good," we find that there is a mental gymnastics involved that strains the
donnachaidh 2 years ago
applicability of the same terms to previous uses. We can posit the meaning in this case to be:
a. "My wife loving my worst enemy is Good for the world," or
b. "My wife loving my worst enemy is good for my wife and my worst enemy."
In this case B is a more meaningful and agreeable interpretation precisely because it is self-centered. We can project ourselves vicariously into the minds of spouse and worst enemy; we do not conceive of "the world" as actually even possessing a self in the sense
donnachaidh 2 years ago
that we do and so have more difficulty projecting. But the ease with which our mind performs this function and the empirical experience we have with the self loving or the self being loved as good does not in turn establish anything that can be called an objective truth. This is because the subjective experiences of the spouse/enemy are permanently off-limits to us. They can communicate to us deceptively or honestly, they can abscond from our lives completely, and in all cases the actual
donnachaidh 2 years ago
"goodness" or "badness" of their mutual experience is something we can only guess at and trust ourselves to believe or disbelieve.
This is a broadly-applicable framework for value judgments and for me belies extreme danger in any attempt to pose even remotely objective ideas of what is good or bad, worth or waste.
When we attempt to project into the imagined objective world, we immediately level the self's position with all that is not the self. This is only half-objectivity unless we include
donnachaidh 2 years ago
the non-human and the non-living in this leveling of positions. When non-living matter is leveled with the human mind in deciding morality, the objective result is always going to be amoral and worthless, because worth and goodness are properties of subjective human-only experience.
I'd go further and say that to be perfectly clear, in my view, "worth" and "goodness" as terms in the English language are only conceptually experienced by Anglophones, and even so without any uniformity.
donnachaidh 2 years ago
well, as you agree, I bet, there "is" no such thing as "being good"... that is an appraisal, something is good only by a criteria which ASSERTS x is good or bad by means ABC.
pyrrho314 2 years ago