Moral Facts Don't Exist, Even Though We'd Like Them To

[extremeeXrement1]

good and bad morals aren't real but they still exist.

I.E. the equator isn't real but it exists

[senisensible]

thank you for this.

[Chrisnoscrub047]

this video is amazing.

[Huesos138]

You haven't convinced me, and neither has the three books you mention in your description (I read them years ago). I'm on board with the Cornell realists on this one. If you are able and willing, take a look at Richard Boyds article "How to be a moral realist". He tries to argue from some recent developments in the philosophy of science and language as to why a non-reductionist moral naturalism is a plausible theory. Also take a look at his followers, David Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon.

[Huesos138]

One needn't be a non-naturalist or a supernaturalist to be a moral realist you know... Indeed, many of the most influential moral realists of today aren't.

[bryanperf]

Sorry if I've missed the entire objective of this video, but aren't you implying at the end that it is wrong for a religious fanatic to murder innocent civilians? If morality is arbitrary, on what basis can one condemn murder in the name of God?

[bitbutter]

If i say or imply that something is wrong, it should be understood that all i mean by this is that it does not cohere with my moral sense. In addition, if i'm saying something along these lines i'm often expecting that there is a good deal of overlap between the foundational elements of my moral sense, and those of my interlocutor.

[Mjhavok]

Just bought the three books you have the in description.

[whinywalrus]

You may say that my wanting to hurt people is illogical, but i say that your wanting to help people is illogical too, or your wanting to have a chocolate ice cream.

Let's take your example, fine let's say it is illogical to discriminate. Then it still won't be immoral in your terms for me to stab everyone, as long as i don't discriminate against who i stab.

[whinywalrus]

Sorry, to me it seems that morals are not derived from logic.

It may be illogical to walk to the shop instead of drive for whatever reason (lets say you don't want to miss the next episode of lost) but it certainly doesn't make walking to the shop immoral.

Similarly if i want to hurt people, just because i like to (probably caused by some incident in my youth, but thats beside the point), logically, a good way would be to get a knife and run around stabbing people.

[xxWhiteBrickWallxx]

You speak in words.. hahaha, How trite...

[gbcharlie]

If i've got you right? i'm afraid this is a nonsense, and I'd leave 'Kant the cul-de-sac' the heck alone if I was you.

Acts of 'moral kindness' serve/d a very specific evolutionary purpose.

In a city environment or when a donation is made where you may never see the person you've helped ever again, I suppose you could call this a misfiring, but nonetheless there is a logical historically justifiably natural reason for this sort of morality.

[bitbutter]

"If i've got you right"

I don't know if your comment was in direct reply to the video, if it was then there was a misunderstading.

I think there are very plausible Darwinian explanations for the development of an instinct for altruism as well as the habit of believing (mistakenly) that moral facts exist.

[gbcharlie]

Yes sorry it was my misunderstanding (semantics), then we agree. I've always been a rubbish listener :)

[GeorgeWHutton]

I believe that "right" and "wrong" are collectively accepted strategies that keep society functioning (easiest life w/o braining each other to death). From a societal standpoint, the easiest way to believe in something like this as an adult is to shift your childhood obedience to parents to an adulthood obedience to a make believe god.

It's just a model societies collective unconscious came up with. A metaphor. Problems arise when you believe the metaphor to be true.

[vicepresidentfru1tly]

Poor argument, or rather no argument here at all. Instead of bouncing a decent philosophical problem off of people like Jesusfreak, why not examine Kant's categorical imperatives? Focusing on rubbish arguments against the claim that there is no moral objectivity does not justify the statement alone....

[bitbutter]

"why not examine Kant's categorical imperatives?"

Why assume that I haven't? I'm not persuaded that there are any good reasons to believe that such a thing as a categorical imperative exists.

[vicepresidentfru1tly]

You've missed the point entirely. If you are going to make the statement "moral facts don't exist" you need to say why. I'm not going to just take your word for it! You need to show how there is a logical gap between fact and morality, and gun down the best arguments for objective morals (no not god). "moral facts most certainly do not exist"........ WHY?

[bitbutter]

"You've missed the point entirely."

I think you did. I can understand the confusion though, from the video title. But this wasn't intended to be an argument for the non-existence of moral facts, but a sketch of my beliefs about moral facts, and a my reasons for being a moral skeptic.

[vicepresidentfru1tly]

I don't understand. Surely your "reasons for being a moral skeptic" would amount to an "an argument for the non-existence of moral facts"?

[bitbutter]

"Surely your "reasons for being a moral skeptic" would amount to an "an argument for the non-existence of moral facts"? "

There's certainly a big overlap between making an argument for X and stating one's reasons for belief in X.

I present something as an argument, that's a case that I think has a particular persuasive force.

But if i state my reasons without framing it as an argument, I don't have any expectation that this will persuade others to come to the same conclusion that I have.

[Chrisnoscrub047]

this is not even a correct quotation.  the quote is "moral facts almost certainly do no exist." yes. that makes a difference.

[vicepresidentfru1tly]

You're replying to an 8 month old comment because I heard "most" instead of "almost"? Anyway, where is the difference? The title of the vid is "Moral facts don't exist, even though we'd like them to"? He's still making an unequivocal statement that they don't exist.

[bitbutter]

@vicepresidentfru1tly The title is a hyperbolic version of the message in the vid, like book titles often are.

[YoMutha2]

Do you know where to get a util counter?

[Chrisnoscrub047]

Wal mart, I think.

[GodMechanism]

then you are also committed to their being no mistakes

[Chrisnoscrub047]

well that would depend on how you define mistakes, now wouldn't it?

[pourcho101]

What created natural?

-Possibly something spiritual or "supernatural" therefore the word "supernatural" was made to by humans to discribe this entity therefore it would be beyond the "natural."

-If so than this entity is powerful

-If it is powerful enough to create can it not punish "Wrong."

just something to think about

[bitbutter]

This channel is for dialogue, if you're not interested in that please stay away.

[ProcInc]

"What created natural?"

There needn't be a time that "natural" did not exist. "supernatural" on the other hand could have developed from "natural" (If it is supposedly higher and more powerful then the simpler would need to come first)

[pourcho101]

Is there a purpose to life?

Is there any thing after death?

Is there a judgement for what one does in life or after death?

If not why should i not commit a holocost or rape if it is not "Wrong?"

Why live if there is no purpose?

Is there a consequence for not beliving this?

If not why not believe something with consequences in case it turns out they are right and you are wrong?

Why supernatural and not spiritual if supernatural is dependent on what is natural?

[Dswelli23]

Also what do you think of Deweyean Moral Instrumentalism?

[bitbutter]

Sounds interesting. I'll look at it further.

[Dswelli23]

Very fascinating discussion as usual on your channel. If Moral Skepticism is more favorable than Moral Realism, in the absence of laws prohibiting it, why is slavery undesirable? If a business can expropriate labor without compensation that enterprise is far more valuable than a competitor that pays wages. Slavery then would make good economic sense; in the absence of legal and moral considerations why would a business not fire its workers and replace them with slaves? cont.

[bitbutter]

"why is slavery undesirable?"

Given moral skepticism and moral fictionalism (ie. the idea that makes instrumental sense to adopt the policy of acting as though moral facts exist), an agent might oppose slavery on the following grounds:

1) It offends his/her first order moral feelings.

2) The existence of slavery may be judged a threat to a normally situated agent in terms of satisfying his/her desires/preferences in the long-term, because of the climate of violence it's existence fosters.

[bitbutter]

typo: "the idea that IT makes instrumental sense"

[shadowyn2000]

Because skilled workers will leave the slave conditions to work for the paying competitor. If the legal system is in support of the slavery, then they will attempt to leave the country and/or change the system.

[Dswelli23]

Slavery by definition is compulsory. Even unskilled workers would leave the slave conditions if that were an option. I also would like clarification by what bitbutter refers to as "first order moral feelings." Moral facts don't exist, then what basis do we have to rely on moral sentiments?

[shadowyn2000]

Coerced, not compulsory. One can always refuse to work and/or spend their time and energy attempting to escape, as happened in the US before slavery was illegal.

[Dswelli23]

If you are going to play semantical games, please pick up a theseraus first. Compulsory and coercive are synonyms. Nor did I suggest slaves were more efficient than paid laborers. There are some industries, however, where the tradeoffs between the inefficient slaves and more efficient paid laborers are such that the enterprise would be more profitable with slaves. Also can bitbutter explain in more detail why first order moral feelings are a more reliable basis for reasoning than moral truth?

[NemoUtopian]

i think there could be a difference between our supposed moral intuitions,and deductions regarding morality.our moral intuitions remain like all intuitions a flawed and impersice tool.i have yet to find a criteria by with i can rationaly put my well being above the well being of another (all things being equal)

[qanazir]

Morality are our unwritten rules of social interaction, they help us navigate in a world filled with other humans.

The feelings we base our morality on are hardwired into our brains and from there we have built our complex sets of morals and ethics.

[LennyBound]

Moral Error Theory FTW!

You, FatGermanBastard, and myself... that makes three! =:-O

[bitbutter]

Thanks again lennybound for your pointers; its thanks to you that i came across these books.

[legodesi]

if one doesn't know what supernatural is positively doesn't mean the term is meaningless; the word is a category that includes all facts that are outside of nature - that's what the word means.

[Chrisnoscrub047]

wow.  was that really meant to be a counter arg?

[legodesi]

Yeah.

[Chrisnoscrub047]

well, to be charitable to your argument, maybe bitbutter ought to qualify his statement to: if one doesn't know what supernatural is positively then it means the term is independently meaningless -- meaning: without positive knowledge of what is natural knowing was is supernatural is impossible. Remember his use of the term parasitic. At least I think that was the word he used.

[legodesi]

If "supernatural" is meaningless because it depends on knowing what natural means, then atheism is meaningless since it is parasitic off the term theism. Without positive knowledge of the term theism, atheism is impossible.

[Chrisnoscrub047]

Immediately, I think I want to agree with that (if you add the term "independently" to meaningless). If no one ever conceived of the ill-conceived notion of God then the term atheism would never have come into existence because there would be no theism for atheism to reject. So.. what else you got?

[legodesi]

Good. Nothing, we're in agreement.

[V4Andy]

Some 'atheists' actually believe this. Introducing yourself as an atheist is like introducing yourself as 'not a surgeon'.

I mean think about it, my dog is atheist and so is a rock, but really they have nothing in common.

[TheNakedAtheist]

Your views are something I've personally taken for granted for 25 years or more. I don't recall ever feeling uncomfortable about the idea. Perhaps because I believe that morality based on practicality is a "better" way to arrive at what we describe as right, or wrong.

[TheBlackwaterDemon]

Excellent video, man - your treatment here dovetails neatly with my own inclinations on the subject (something I spend a fair deal of time thinking about), so it was great to have such a concise, well-put analysis of the topic. Keep up the good work.

[bitbutter]

Thanks very much.

[AmericanApostate]

On another note, though, I have become fairly comfortable in my moral skepticism. Most of that is because of my comfort level in creating my own valuations, even if I know that they are not objectively tenable.

[facilisdescenus]

What I always found shocking was that atheists would sometimes claim that Christianity is immoral and that certain actions committed by religious people are immoral (like The Crusades, war...etc). But when you ask them about their views on ethics they take up a position of moral skepticism.

[facilisdescenus]

One example of this veritas48 pointed out was Dawkins , who prominently declared in river out of Eden that there was no good and no evil and our moral sense evolved. However in the God Delusion he accuses faith ,all religion and God of being evil.Yet another example of the doublethink that is atheism.

[AmericanApostate]

Not quite. More like the doublethink that is Dawkins. The argument against Christian morality is, to me, not prescriptive in terms of "Christians should not be Christians because Christianity is immoral" and more along the lines of "Christians have an inconsistency in their beliefs due to their inability to explain moral realism and their god's interaction with that morality, i.e. the events of the Old Testament."

[bitbutter]

"Christians have an inconsistency in their beliefs due to their inability to explain moral realism and their god's interaction with that morality, i.e. the events of the Old Testament."

Exactly.

[bitbutter]

This is a issue I think Dawkins needs to address--he needs to clarify how he's using moral language.

[AmericanApostate]

Eh, there are a lot of things he needs to address. I'm more concerned with Christians addressing moral claims without resorting to the claim that God's values are valid because they are God's values, despite their visibly normative purpose, no different in appearance or structure from human normative statements.

[bitbutter]

Agreed.

[facilisdescenus]

Isn't that a bit of a genetic fallacy you are engaging in . "Our moral intuitions evolved therefore they are wrong"

[bitbutter]

And that's the straw man fallacy you're engaging in.

[Mjhavok]

Where do you live Bitbutter? What city in England?

[bitbutter]

I live in rotterdam. A city in The Netherlands.

[Mjhavok]

You are English though?

[bitbutter]

Yes, i'm from west yorkshire originally.

[Mjhavok]

So why the move to The Netherlands, can't be the legalised pot and prostitution surely lol. Btw what do the Dutch call it. Holland or The Netherlands. I heard once that one was is sort of offensive.

[bitbutter]

I came here because it was a convenient way for me to leave England, specifically London.

The name: It can be confusing. The official name is The Netherlands, and Holland is an area in the western part. Having said that though there are occasions when this rule is broken. Stick to using The Netherlands and you'll be ok though.

[RyuDarragh]

Hehe.. always funny, that.. doesn't it make more sense to say "You can't eat your cake and have it, too/" ?

[bitbutter]

In real life we can either have an (intact) cake or we can have eaten the same cake and not have it anymore. The implication, i think, is that both of these things are desirable and we have a dilemma about which to choose. A perculiar saying for sure.

[RyuDarragh]

It got inverted in the 1940's but when Heywood wrote his "A Dialogue Conteynyng Prouerbes and Epigrammes" in 1562 it was Wolde ye bothe eate your cake, and haue your cake?. John Keats quoted it as "Eat your cake and have it" at the beginning of his poem On Fame in 1816 and Roosevelt used it that way at his inaugeration. But, all subsequent usages have inverted it and dropped the "both" from it. Ain't language *fun*? :P

[bitbutter]

Ah, intersting! thanks.

[RowanFortuneWood]

Interesting video and Mackie's book is certainly worth reading. However, moral scepticism (ethical nihilism) fails because it demands the wrong thing; a foundation for morality. Foundationalism is poor epistemology largely abandoned by contemporary philosophy. It also seems that, in appealing to the value of 'our interests' to justify the morality that you critique you are contradicting your ethical scepticism. I did a limited video on this subject a while back that I will post as a response.

[bitbutter]

"It also seems that, in appealing to the value of 'our interests' to justify the morality that you critique you are contradicting your ethical scepticism."

I'm not sure i follow, can you rephrase?

[RowanFortuneWood]

Sorry, the word limit makes clarity hard. In your video you justify behaving according to the principle of universalising moral claims by an appeal to self interest, but self interest is a normative notion. And you have claimed to reject the idea of such notions because they lack an epistemological foundation.

[bitbutter]

"you justify behaving according to the principle of universalising moral claims by an appeal to self interest, but self interest is a normative notion."

I meant the reference to self interest in terms of hypothetical imperatives: "if I want to live in a society where X, i should do Y". I don't think this leads to a contradiction.

[RowanFortuneWood]

Perhaps not, particularly if you meant it purely hypothetically. However, following this thought through what would be the imperative for self-interest if self-interest is not a moral standard?

I suspect this kind of nihilistic meta-ethics can only result from separating moral philosophy from moral practice. Admittedly morality is not something inferred from axioms or found in the physical world, but rather interacting values that enable social interaction and are open deductive reasoning.

[RowanFortuneWood]

open to*

Confounded typos.

[bitbutter]

"However, following this thought through what would be the imperative for self-interest if self-interest is not a moral standard?"

There is none. An agent will act according to his preferences and desires, this is neither Good or Bad.

Given this, you can build a case that (for instance) it's instrumentally a good idea to adopt a policy of using moral language as though our fist order moral feelings do reflect facts about the universe (moral error theory).

[RowanFortuneWood]

"There is none. An agent will act according to his preferences and desires, this is neither Good or Bad."

If preferences and desires impel an agent to act then they are imperatives and your first claim contradicts your second.

"instrumentally a good idea"

If you describe instrumentalism as 'good' you are presupposing what you describe as erroneous. Isn't this instrumental morality parasitical on the notion of good and therefore on a non-instrumental morality?

[bitbutter]

"..and your first claim contradicts your second."

Sorry, which claims are you referring to here?

"If you describe instrumentalism as 'good' you are presupposing what you describe as erroneous."

I'm not claiming that instrumentalism is Good (big g). I'm saying that a thing can be considered good (small g) in terms of satisfying a hypothetical imperative.

[bitbutter]

good in the sense of: "It's a good idea to X if you want Y"

[RowanFortuneWood]

"which claims are you referring to here?"

Sorry, that was not very clear. Claim 1: there is no imperative; claim 2: an agent acts according to his preferences and desires.

I'm not claiming that instrumentalism is Good (big g).

Okay, I think I understand this dual usage of good/Good. You are saying that a person can be impelled to act by what s/he wants (means) but not impelled to want anything in particular (ends)?

All ends are chosen arbitrarily without values? Can an end be critiqued?

[RowanFortuneWood]

*quote marks for: "I'm not claiming that instrumentalism is Good (big g)."

:S

[bitbutter]

Yes that sounds about right to me. Apart from the last sentence, I'm getting confused by your use of 'ends' i think.

If it helps clarify things, I believe that desires are not chosen. A desire can be critiqued, but in doing so i think we have to adopt the fictionalist stance. In our 'most critical moments', in the context of philosophical enquiry, i don't think we can critique desires.

[RowanFortuneWood]

If 'ends' is confusing I will gladly abandon the word; it is only useful insofar as it clarifies.

If critiques alter desires and preferences then why describe them as fictional? And if (as an example of such criticism) two preferences or desires contradict each other would not the criticism be real?

[CocoMac877]

i dont think theres anything thats inherently wrong, or immoral, it is humans who attribute these things, and as we evolve so too do our morals

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

It sounds as though your view is that moral facts must be rejected as not existing because you think they lack naturalistic justification, and (correctly) think that a supernatural justification/explanation is vacuous. When you ask about the existence of "moral facts", I think you need to reflect on what "fact" means. Clearly, moral facts, if they "exist", won't be found under a microscope. So what is the meaning of the thing you're denying?

[bitbutter]

"So what is the meaning of the thing you're denying? "

Part of the reason i judge that there is no such thing as a moral fact is that i can't think of a way of redefining 'fact' such that it "torturing the innocent for sport is good" becomes a (universally true) fact (or a fact about the universe)--and i believe that its in these latter ways that statements like this are meant.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

It's not a fact about the universe; it's rather a fact about our language. In both the sense of universal agreement (which I'd suggest is equivocally meant along with "actually existing" when we use the word fact), and the analytic sense of semantic content (which while open in places, is not up for grabs, as I argued with the torture sentence example), I think the word fact, not by redefinition, but by its current use, can fairly be applied to the egregious examples of moral wrongs.

[bitbutter]

The problem is that when we say "torturing babies is wrong" what we're saying is not reducible to "all psychologically healthy people feel negatively towards it".

When we interpret the moral statement to mean anything sigificantly different to "it is a fact about the universe that torturing babies is wrong" we're not doing justice to how moral discourse is used. Moral language is 'for prescribing or condemning various actions with categorical force' (joyce).

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

I agree that "torturing babies is wrong" isn't intending a claim about consensus. But it is communicating using language, and the meanings of words are both not arbitrary, and are invisibly determined by consensus. Anyone seriously affirming that "needlessly hurting babies is morally good" is factually wrong, not because of a show of hands, but because our words have meanings.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

Using language incorrectly is a FACTUAL error - there is a fact of the matter. A car is not a lampshade. Good is not evil. Up is not down. Right is not left. Etc. Any claim about consensus I'm making is only relevant insofar as semantic content is implicitly determined by the consensus of the language's fluent speakers.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

"Moral language is 'for prescribing or condemning various actions...'" That's half the story (the oughtness - one very much ought not do what is wrong, and ought do what is right). The other half is the evaluation itself. And what can be evaluated as right and wrong is under some circumstances not a matter of judgment, but is rather a matter of meaning. The prescribing or condemning follows from the evaluation.

[riversonthemoon]

I read the thread above and thought what you said was interesting. Are you advocating a kind of moral relativism? The reason I ask is that if moral facts come from the implied consensus of language then "Infanticide is morally good" would have been a moral 'fact' to the Carthaginians.

But what about statements like "Abortion is wrong" which are in contention? How do we determine whether this is actually a fact or not? I'm not sure how useful it is to use this conception of facts.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

(cont)

Stipulating your claim about ancient Carthage, someone there saying "infanticide is immoral" would've been considered either wrong or virtually incoherent/crazy. If the former, then "infanticide is morally good" wouldn't count as a moral fact. If the later (which I doubt), then it would be a moral fact on my view. My position is misleading, for although I argue that moral facts exist, it's not an attempt to ground or justify morality in such facts. It's more a claim about language.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

Riversonthemoon:

My claim is that the meanings of our moral language are not arbitrary. At the extreme, certain moral statements no longer reflect a moral position, but rather reflect a failure to use language properly. My claim isn't about morality per se so much as about how semantics restricts what we can or cannot consider a "fact" - for morality or any topic. Arguing that abortion is moral, or immoral, is coherent, unlike arguing that that torturing the innocent for sport is moral.

[bitbutter]

"My claim is that the meanings of our moral language are not arbitrary."

I agree with this. But I can't translate this to "moral facts exist" without some kind of violence to the way I understand the word "fact": which to me implies non-subjectivity.

Of course it is a fact in this sense that "most people feel negatively towards torturing babies" but to me that's something very different from "torturing babies is wrong", which is why i think non-cognitivism about moral language is false.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

(cont)

Also, border cases exist for both, where there is no clear consensus within the community of fluent speakers. Some will call that green, others blue. Some will call that right, and others wrong. But archetype cases exist for both, like the examples above.

So in terms of "objectivity" of language's meaning, where's the vast divide between the words green and wrong, that makes it violence to the word "fact" to call the meaning of "wrong" a fact, but not so for "green"?

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

Consider "grass is green" versus "torture for sport is wrong." How does a child learn the word green, or the word wrong? Don't both come from a community of fluent speakers using the words in agreement over a huge number of examples? "Green" relies on a common human sensory agreement, while "wrong" relies on common human moral agreement (which will vary some between communities, but little within a society). Deviations exist: some people are color blind, and some people are psychopaths.

[bitbutter]

"Consider "grass is green" versus "torture for sport is wrong." How does a child learn the word green, or the word wrong? Don't both come from a community of fluent speakers using the words in agreement over a huge number of examples?"

Not in the case of 'wrong'. We can easily imagine an entire community of cat burners, with a single dissenter. It's not obvious that the statement he makes "cat burning is wrong" is false simply because the word wrong hasn't been used that way before.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

Likewise, almost everyone will call some shade of color green, except for Bob, who calls it blue. Bob uses color terms correctly otherwise. There is a hint of blue there. Is Bob wrong as a matter of fact? Is Bob "objectively" wrong? I see no difference in kind between the objectivity of meaning of "wrong" versus "green". There will be more border cases within cultures, and disagreement between cultures, for moral language than sensory language, but I'd call that a difference in degree, not kind

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

By "facts" we intend thinks that somehow have objective actual existence. The archetype is scientific facts, but I'd argue there are semantic facts also. Words have meanings, and they are not arbitrary. There is also a implicit relationship between "fact due to nearly universal agreement" and "fact due to objective existence." With these in mind, I'd argue that someone saying "torturing the innocent for sport is moral" is as factually wrong as someone claiming that "every car is lampshade".

[bitbutter]

It sounds like you believe that The Good exists, and that its nature is determined by consensus. Is that correct?

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

I'm hesitant in commenting about "The Good". My claim is about "The Bad". What I meant was that the things we can correctly use language to describe as horribly immoral aren't arbitrary. If some villain says "For fun, I like to needlessly cause severe harm to innocent people, and this is moral behavior on my part", then his claim is objectively factually wrong because it's an abuse the English language, just as if he walked around calling cars lampshades.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

Language is more organic than a majority vote, but ultimately rests on the "consensus" of how it's used. These reasons are why the claim "it is immoral to needlessly cause severe harm to innocent people" can be fairly counted as a fact. This might not get to the meat of why we care about correctly identifying actions as moral or not, but that's not the topic at hand. The question is about "moral facts."

[bitbutter]

"Language is more organic than a majority vote, but ultimately rests on the "consensus" of how it's used. These reasons are why the claim "it is immoral to needlessly cause severe harm to innocent people" can be fairly counted as a fact."

On your view, was "the earth is flat" ever a fact?

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

The "the Earth is flat" is contingent, and there are obvious types of information that could've, and did, revise the position of those who previously held. It is, in effect, a hypothesis open to revision. "Torturing babies for sport is wrong" is a different type of claim. The former is a posteriori and synthetic, while the later, while not analytic, is virtually a priori. Can you envision some future knowledge whereby you might change your mind and conclude "Torturing babies sport is moral"?

[bitbutter]

"Can you envision some future knowledge whereby you might change your mind and conclude "Torturing babies sport is moral"? "

No i can't, but that's a failure of the imagination. But we have a grisly treasure trove of moral statements that 'we' once believed were true, and now do not: eg. "burning cats for entertainment is morally permissible".

Was "burning cats for entertainment is morally permissable" a moral fact at a time (if such a time existed) when almost everyone agreed with it?

[GodMechanism]

the reduction of oughtness lies in the rigididty of physical laws, specifically the electric law for charged Ions, in the world, in the cell, and dendrites of nerve cells

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

The question was raised to highlight that synthetic statements like the "Earth is flat" are understood to depend on conceivable observations, while "torturing babies is wrong" is not. Calling it a failure of imagination to imagine the type of new information that would change your mind is a category mistake. It's akin to saying "I accept that 1+1=2, but I might learn some new fact later that would change my mind, though I can't imagine exactly what that might be."

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

I think you're missing my point. I think you think I'm talking about consensus. I'm not. I'm talking about semantics. And what I'm saying only applies in the extreme. People can intelligibly speak of capital punishment or abortion being either moral or immoral. People cannot intelligibly speak of torturing babies for sport being moral.

[bitbutter]

I'm trying to understand your point.

Was "burning cats for entertainment is morally permissable" in your view, a moral fact, at a time (if such a time existed) when almost everyone agreed with it?

In any case you seem to have a very different kind of fact in mind than the kind i'm interested in. So i'm not sure if the disagreement is all that important.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

I'm sure many disputed that animal cruelty at the time. They might not have raised a fuss, and it wouldn't show in the history books, but I've no doubt many found it repellent. I wouldn't call it a moral fact. Regardless, consensus isn't relevant to my point. Language, semantics, intelligibility of assertions - these are relevant.

And yes, this a pedantic point more than a substantive one. I draw no grand conclusions about morality from my claim that there are moral facts.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

My claim is this: the things that qualify as moral facts are statements that, were someone to dispute them, your conclusion wouldn't be that they were taking a moral position, but rather that, by intention or not, they weren't using the English language properly.

My claim that some moral facts exist is unrelated to the reasons we hold morality important. I'm not trying to "ground morality". I'm here concerned more about the "fact' than the "moral" in "moral fact."

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

If I heard someone say "torturing babies for sport being moral", I'd assume they were being ironic, kidding, attempting to shock, not fluent in English, on drugs, or insane - for exactly the same reason I'd have those reactions to if they said that a car was a lampshade. It's not that it violates consensus; it's that it violates the English language.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

So the use of "fact" is different for "the Earth is flat" versus "torturing babies for sport is wrong", because we know the difference between a moral claim and an empirical claim. In particular, we know the possibility of evidence changing our position for one, but not the other. If a claim might reasonably change with new information, then using "fact" incorporates the possibility of error/new information, etc. Moral claims are not facts in this sense, but instead in light of their meaning.

[Throred]

I keep enjoying your videos bitbutter.

But I have to ask, have you been sneaking into my head and copying all my thoughts and ideas?

Great vid as always =)

[bitbutter]

Thanks very much throred.

[riversonthemoon]

I've been thinking a lot about this, too, recently. It seems that no moral system is unproblematic, and the usual refutations are reductios that pump our intuitions to show circumstances where the system fails, or where some part of it is unjustified or arbitrary.

Moral realism seems to be a dead end if it can't be shown that moral disagreements are always the result of some factual disagreement. I don't think it can.

[riversonthemoon]

My own sense is that when we talk about morals (in a modern non-God sense) we are talking about courses of action we would prefer if we put all others interests on par with (and sometimes above = heroic?) our own. From there I think we could work towards a universal consensus. Though just as with science, we only have our own human judgment to create standards that are satisfactory for our purposes. Isn't that what we're trying to do with laws anyway?

[bitbutter]

Even this kind of non cognitive redux doesn't seem adequately reflect our moral feelings. For instance, it doesn't seem morally wrong (to me) to try to save your own child before saving someone elses, even if your chance of success in your attempt to save your child is lower than the likelihood that you will succeed in saving the other child.

[riversonthemoon]

That's an interesting example. It doesn't seem wrong. But then I don't think many would think such action to be moral. Expected, understandable, loving, amoral perhaps, but not right nor wrong. Why you would make the choice and have no qualms about it is explained by evolution, so inconsistency in our moral intuitions should be expected in such a case. The same would hold for animals and enemies, whose interests aren't as well represented in our intuitions and for whom we have less empathy.

[ec2like]

Yes. It's just that to get a consensus regarding certain morals we have to bring up the understanding about morals among the population. So many are scared about the thought that morality can be subjective and that there is no absolute objective moral code.

To many religious people equate God with morality.

[riversonthemoon]

"So many are scared about the thought that morality can be subjective"

Yes, that's true. But a plurality of views seems to be the world were living in, and we don't seem to have a basis for denying others take on right and wrong. Though that doesn't mean we shouldn't try!

"To many religious people equate God with morality."

I'm steering away from that debate because (besides the futility of it) I'm finding the secular one to be far more interesting.

[WizardJim]

Anyone claiming objective morality is automatically setting themselves up to become a hypocrite.

[VeryEvilPettingZoo]

WizardJim:

Being a moral hypocrite is commendable, if you're a sincere hypocrite. It's better to fail while seeking the good, than to succeed while seeking otherwise.