He said in one video that watching your reply to him changed his view on the topic and now he prescibes to your view of the is-ought, except I don't see you going so far as claiming that moral truths must exist, just that you see no way for a moral system to work without that being the case.
My own perspective is that oughts are goal dependent, which you already discuss, yet I don't think you take that thought far enough...(cont)
@bignastydragon .... So in what way do you not take it far enough. Using your example, we have a neo-nazi who wants to emulate Hitler because his goal is genocide. Let's say that the entire human species took this same goal, but with their genocidal preferences. Would the neo-nazi want that to happen?
Whilst the goal we choose is subjective, we choose it based on what everyone would prefer, and this preference assumes that they could have any position in society...(cont2)
@bignastydragon ....(2) So assuming that you don't know what you will be in society, what rules should we impose? Equality is something we should want, since we don't want to end up as 'slaves' to any degree. Due to their very nature we would not wish to be murdered, raped, or stolen from, since these are non-consensual acts. Yet we should be free to give our property away, to have sex with any other consenting being, and also have assisted suicide...(cont3)
@bignastydragon ....(3) So in conclusion, whilst the is-ought gap as you posit it is certainly not bridged, since we still rely on a subjective viewpoint. This subjective view would attempt to be as universal as possible, and thus, while not actually objective, it would tend towards objectivity.
As for ignorance , no worries at all. I hope I didn't come across dismissive. Ambiguity, and it's insidious effects, are common in philosophy. Happens all the time. It's all part of the language game of philosophy: getting clear, making distinctions, pointing out ambiguity, etc.
And while I'm at it, I should clarify that talk of the "physical" is convenient, but talk of the supernatural would be of no help. The is-ought problem, and its cousin the naturalistic "fallacy" (I add quotes because while I think it diagnoses a problem, it's not technically a fallacy) forbid the derivation of the moral from the factual (whether those facts are physical or not).
I acknowledge this philosophical is-ought problem, but I think perhaps the lack of a perfect meta-ethical solution should not prevent us from learning more about happiness, and ways for people to obtain it socially. At the bottom of all this, I think, is desire, and I don't see how we can regress past it, or learn more, without neuroscience. The answers to questions like, "Why does truth matter?" or "What do you care most about?" seem to lead directly to desires in the brain.
@h0tsex0r I guess there's no real disagreement here... I do think the issue between TBS and Epydemic 2020 on the one hand, and Sam Harris' cause on the other, are largely meta-ethical, even if there are interesting and perfectly sound points arising tangentially.
I think of TBS and Harris as being largely on the same page, since they both seem to define ethics as a fuzzy branch of knowledge which can be improved through neuroscience and sociology, aimed at the goal of improving well-being.
I think of Epydemic in a different category. He told me objective morality exists in the same way stars exist. While Harris claims to be a moral realist, I doubt he would make such a statement.
I think Epy's statement is inflexible essentialism, do you?
@h0tsex0r Umm, well, the word inflexible seems to have a negative connotation, maybe "strict" or something rather? But I think that gets to the heart of the matter. And as annoyed as I am at Sam Harris, I too think he would balk at making such a strong statement about the existence of morality.
Well, I think you should make a video explaining how Sam Harris annoys you. I almost think the guy shits gold bricks, so I could probably use someone taking him down a peg or two.
If my characterization of Epydemic's position sounds biased, I admit I've had heated discussions with him on Biblical slavery which consisted of him completely denying the Bible's unabashed approval and regulation of slavery and slave-beating. It was depressing and frustrating, and colored my view of him.
@h0tsex0r continued on our lack of disagreement: I agree on the importance learning about happiness. And, I agree on the importance of brain science. Not sure if we agree that the answers science provides are going to be particularly helpful meta-ethically (I highly doubt it) but they will be generally very helpful nonetheless.
I am afraid I am not very good at articulating my meta-ethical concept beyond describing it as a nihilism or functionalism. I say nihilism because I cannot imagine any objective morality; I say functionalism because ethics seems a tool toward the goal of man's desires.
When I imagine an ethical dilemma or a conflict of wills, and I attempt to regress or reason "why" one side is wrong or right, I find no premise/anchor beyond the desires of the parties and/or society.
@h0tsex0r I think your formulation here is clear and articulate. As for nihilism, spot on. As for functionalism, that sounds good (colloquially, it sounds good, but the word is tossed around some in philosophy and so it's a part of the jargon in other ways, that's my only hesitation). Both words describe your view well. And your experience strikes me as natural and sensible.
Regarding the "deflated" version of morality you mention in this video, and your criticism on TBS's attempt to avoid the is/ought distinction, what do you think about Dan Dennett's idea that we are in a world of "is", so any "ought" which is divorced from "is" would be utterly meaningless to us? Phrased as a rhetorical question, if "oughts" are not based upon "is", what on earth else could they be based upon? Any avoided result, or desired result, manifests itself to us as an "is".
@h0tsex0r Hello, thanks for the reply. I'm glad I logged on today to see many replies and messages (it's been a while for me). OK, so, I would say that oughts are in the realm of sentimentality. So long as you acknowledge that sentiments are meaningful, then I suppose we have no problem.
But of course we also have to be careful when we talk about what morality is "based" on. It could be that certain facts are responsible for why we have the moral sentiments we do, and that's all fine and good. But the is-ought gap points out that there is nothing about the meaning of descriptiveness that allows us (logically) to derive normativity.
Sam Harris might respond to this by remarking that a norm which is divorced from descriptiveness is morally meaningless to us, by definition. If you were to discover something you thought was a moral norm, but it had no descriptive result (no positive or negative value to anyone), it would seem incorrect to label it a moral norm.
Perhaps we don't need a perfect philosophical meta ethic to make progress toward understanding the brain and improving moral health.
@h0tsex0r In reverse order, Sam Harris has introduced his view with enough vigor and specific language as to make it meta-ethical. It's not like he has humbly declined to discuss meta-ethical views. Rather, he has unreflectively made bold assertions that would be looked at askance even in Phil 101.
@wilthiswork Continued.. Again on meaninglessness, in what sense do you mean this? Sentiments just are, they are not derived from facts (notice there is a difference between something causing something on the one hand, and the effect being logically derivable from the cause, on the other). As for results, this is tinkering with the order too much. The controversy arises (here at least) from whether value can be derived from facts, not from whether morality is causally impotent.
When I say "meaningless", I think I mean "something of no concern to conscious creatures".
When you said, "Sentiments just are, they are not derived from facts," I immediately thought that my sentiment for a delicious burger and fries is probably derived from the facts that I am a biologically omnivorous creature living in a certain time and place where burgers and fries are regarded as delicious, and they are available for me 24 hours a day. Please clarify?
"Please clarify?" Sure: I agree with your summary of how your sentiment for a delicious burger was caused. The problem is, there is no moral normativity carried over from the purely factual, over to the morally normative. Hitler has a sentiment for killing Jews (and many others). I'm sure his sentiment had some sort of factual explanation. But the factual explanation behind his sentiment did not justify anything.
I agree that the facts underlying Hitler's apparent sentiment for killing Jews did not "justify" those murders (objectively). However - and this is where I think my nihilism/functionalism stands out - I do not think it is possible to "objectively" justify any action, ever, unless we have an (arbitrary/subjective) goal in mind. If we claim an action is "justified", I think we can only ever give proofs for or against that claim within the scope of what we (arbitrarily) value.
Please clarify, continued.. Sentiments we approve of, and sentiments we disapprove of, are both explained by physical facts (whether *fully* explained or not is another matter, for the sake of being tidy, let's say explanation is complete) but the physical facts don't help us justify what we approve of over what we disapprove of. Nothing moral is derived from the physical (even if one believes that the physical causes everything).
If we tried to remove oughts from the realm of sentimentality, where could we move them? If we tried to place them somewhere else, I don't see how they could matter to us.
@h0tsex0r Hello again. My point about sentimentality is that we can have sentiments about all sorts of things. Using rational argument to evaluate sentimentality seems misapplied. So I'm simply concerned with the definition of *meaningful* used in your original question.
@wilthiswork continuing... If things must be amenable to rational or factual justification to be meaningful, then we're in trouble (after all, some skeptics assert morality is meaningless, so it's not necessarily a reductio to point out it could be the case).
@wilthiswork continuing again... If sentimentality can also be meaningful, then the concern is dealt with successfully. It's just that with the way philosophers sometimes use the word "meaning" compared to its colloquial usage, there could be some insidious ambiguity there, hence my mention of sentimentality.
I'm sorry for my ignorance; I don't know how philosophers sometimes use the word "meaning". For me, "meaning", in the context of a philosophical discussion, relates to the "end" or the value of a thing, according to the appraisal of a conscious being. Meaning seems to be a subjective idea based solely upon a conscious creature's concern. Sorry again if I am being dense; this whole discussion has been a real pleasure. Thanks very much.
I don't think "things must be amenable to rational or factual justification to be meaningful." I think the sentimentality of something having meaning to a person is puzzling and often irrational, but that these sentiments deal with the brain. I hope that we can learn about situations/behaviors which tend to be meaningful to us (things which concern conscious creatures) in order to move away from behaviors we find harmful, and to move toward obtaining greater well-being.
While I agree that using rational argument to evaluate sentimentality is problematic, I don't think I agree that it is "misapplied". Isn't this where ethical analysis focuses its attention? We evaluate the sentiments of actors, we make observations of their actions, and perhaps we draw conclusions or give opinions of our own regarding them.
I think "meaningful" in my usage could be as loose as "something of concern to a conscious being." If you enjoyed a nap, that is meaningful.
I think the "deflated" version of morality you mention at 2:10 features prominently in Sam Harris' new book on morality. He states that morality deals with the well-being of conscious creatures.
@h0tsex0r Ahh yes; "well being." But of course we differ on what counts as human flourishing, and we're looking for something non-normative to settle the argument, so appealing to well-being may be very relevant in some contexts (I for one think it is) it doesn't solve any meta-ethical problems.
I think Sam agrees that we differ on what counts as human flourishing, but he compares well-being to the concept of health: we may have differing opinions on what constitutes health, but those differences do not stop us from learning more about health, and improving our health through science. We know that our current understanding of health may change and improve in unforeseen leaps and bounds, and we have experts on health called doctors. Perhaps this can be so for morality, too.
@h0tsex0r On health, yes, this isn't controversial. It's an analogy/ comparison at this point. So it's fine, I guess. But it's not original to Sam Harris. It's a very old idea, actually. And yet the meta-ethical controversies we're stuck with arouse in spite of the idea. So while I have no rebuttal, it's a bit banal.
I think the point TBS was making is that the common understanding of morality includes assumptions that can't be proven true. There is no reason (as far as I can see) to suppose that there are any moral facts, aside from statements that take the form "ought-if". See my video for another take on this.
@borgimplant If there is no reason to suppose that there are any moral facts, then this is no consolation to theists. I agree that you can have fact based oughts, but we shouldn't forget that a goal most of us would consider horrible could be at the foundation. So, that kind of ought doesn't help us distinguish between right and wrong. Moral right and wrong: it's what the meta-ethical discussion between theists and atheists is about.
@wilthiswork I see where you are coming from. You are talking about things that are just right or wrong......PERIOD. I don't see any reason for thinking that we should even talk in such terms. If I find an action to be abhorrent, my own feelings are all I have to work with. How could I possibly know that it really IS wrong, regardless of my sentiments. Even if God knows, how am I supposed to know that he knows, if I cannot arrive at the knowledge myself. I'm not gonna take his word for it.
@borgimplant Thatz fine. I think the choices left over are that we have to be moral skeptics (meaning, morality properties do not exist in a strict sense) or moral intutionists (we apprehend moral properties through intuition). In either case, we have no factual argument to offer the Nazi's on why they're wrong and we're right. Do you agree?
@wilthiswork I essentially agree with you. I think intuitionism is far too audacious to be credible, and that moral skepticism is much safer and more reasonable. If we define "right and wrong" in factual terms, we can easily apply the terms to the Nazi's without blushing. Aside from that, it's apparently purely sentimental. But personally, I really don't have a problem with imposing my sentiments on others. How could I endorse a system of law if I said otherwise?
@borgimplant OK, Cool. It's just that many people balk at that last part, the part you essentially agree with. If at bottom there are no, strictly speaking, moral facts, then epistemological standards, preference in sports cars, and beliefs about murdering innocents are all on the same footing (even though we are hard-wired to take some as real and some as merely sentimental).
@borgimplant We're both sentimentalists, but we part company on moral skepticism. I'm an intuitionist. Why? Well, I have no cogent argument that you should accept if you don't already have the same intuitions. I think the conversation between skeptics and realists, at best, is a matter of adding up and tallying plausibility points (said so well by David Enoch).
@borgimplant For my side, adding up plausibility points will be a matter of identifying partners in crime in areas considered respectable, (such that something can't be wrong simply because it is a matter of intuition) and perhaps arguing over what naturalism means and/or arguing against naturalistic reductionism (not sure if this caveat is necessary, but theism or even superstition aren't the only candidates waiting in the wings).
@hOtsexOr And I can't resist adding: If Sam Harris wants to point out that we can improve our lives through neuroscience and sociology, then well, OK, great. But that's hardly worth any great amount of attention. In his TED talk though, he made statements which imposed his view on meta-ethics. And those who take on the is-ought problem using the Harris line do the same.
Just want to let you know I watched your video. Perhaps I'll leave a more detailed (and interesting) comment later, so we can move our exchange here rather than under TB's comment section.
I was directed here by Epy2020.
He said in one video that watching your reply to him changed his view on the topic and now he prescibes to your view of the is-ought, except I don't see you going so far as claiming that moral truths must exist, just that you see no way for a moral system to work without that being the case.
My own perspective is that oughts are goal dependent, which you already discuss, yet I don't think you take that thought far enough...(cont)
bignastydragon 8 months ago
@bignastydragon .... So in what way do you not take it far enough. Using your example, we have a neo-nazi who wants to emulate Hitler because his goal is genocide. Let's say that the entire human species took this same goal, but with their genocidal preferences. Would the neo-nazi want that to happen?
Whilst the goal we choose is subjective, we choose it based on what everyone would prefer, and this preference assumes that they could have any position in society...(cont2)
bignastydragon 8 months ago
@bignastydragon ....(2) So assuming that you don't know what you will be in society, what rules should we impose? Equality is something we should want, since we don't want to end up as 'slaves' to any degree. Due to their very nature we would not wish to be murdered, raped, or stolen from, since these are non-consensual acts. Yet we should be free to give our property away, to have sex with any other consenting being, and also have assisted suicide...(cont3)
bignastydragon 8 months ago
@bignastydragon ....(3) So in conclusion, whilst the is-ought gap as you posit it is certainly not bridged, since we still rely on a subjective viewpoint. This subjective view would attempt to be as universal as possible, and thus, while not actually objective, it would tend towards objectivity.
What are your views on this?
bignastydragon 8 months ago
As for ignorance , no worries at all. I hope I didn't come across dismissive. Ambiguity, and it's insidious effects, are common in philosophy. Happens all the time. It's all part of the language game of philosophy: getting clear, making distinctions, pointing out ambiguity, etc.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
And while I'm at it, I should clarify that talk of the "physical" is convenient, but talk of the supernatural would be of no help. The is-ought problem, and its cousin the naturalistic "fallacy" (I add quotes because while I think it diagnoses a problem, it's not technically a fallacy) forbid the derivation of the moral from the factual (whether those facts are physical or not).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I acknowledge this philosophical is-ought problem, but I think perhaps the lack of a perfect meta-ethical solution should not prevent us from learning more about happiness, and ways for people to obtain it socially. At the bottom of all this, I think, is desire, and I don't see how we can regress past it, or learn more, without neuroscience. The answers to questions like, "Why does truth matter?" or "What do you care most about?" seem to lead directly to desires in the brain.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r I guess there's no real disagreement here... I do think the issue between TBS and Epydemic 2020 on the one hand, and Sam Harris' cause on the other, are largely meta-ethical, even if there are interesting and perfectly sound points arising tangentially.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I think of TBS and Harris as being largely on the same page, since they both seem to define ethics as a fuzzy branch of knowledge which can be improved through neuroscience and sociology, aimed at the goal of improving well-being.
I think of Epydemic in a different category. He told me objective morality exists in the same way stars exist. While Harris claims to be a moral realist, I doubt he would make such a statement.
I think Epy's statement is inflexible essentialism, do you?
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r Umm, well, the word inflexible seems to have a negative connotation, maybe "strict" or something rather? But I think that gets to the heart of the matter. And as annoyed as I am at Sam Harris, I too think he would balk at making such a strong statement about the existence of morality.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
Well, I think you should make a video explaining how Sam Harris annoys you. I almost think the guy shits gold bricks, so I could probably use someone taking him down a peg or two.
If my characterization of Epydemic's position sounds biased, I admit I've had heated discussions with him on Biblical slavery which consisted of him completely denying the Bible's unabashed approval and regulation of slavery and slave-beating. It was depressing and frustrating, and colored my view of him.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r continued on our lack of disagreement: I agree on the importance learning about happiness. And, I agree on the importance of brain science. Not sure if we agree that the answers science provides are going to be particularly helpful meta-ethically (I highly doubt it) but they will be generally very helpful nonetheless.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I am afraid I am not very good at articulating my meta-ethical concept beyond describing it as a nihilism or functionalism. I say nihilism because I cannot imagine any objective morality; I say functionalism because ethics seems a tool toward the goal of man's desires.
When I imagine an ethical dilemma or a conflict of wills, and I attempt to regress or reason "why" one side is wrong or right, I find no premise/anchor beyond the desires of the parties and/or society.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r Beautifully said. The matter need not be articulated any further. Doing so would be a fool's errand.
borgimplant 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r I think your formulation here is clear and articulate. As for nihilism, spot on. As for functionalism, that sounds good (colloquially, it sounds good, but the word is tossed around some in philosophy and so it's a part of the jargon in other ways, that's my only hesitation). Both words describe your view well. And your experience strikes me as natural and sensible.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
Wil,
Regarding the "deflated" version of morality you mention in this video, and your criticism on TBS's attempt to avoid the is/ought distinction, what do you think about Dan Dennett's idea that we are in a world of "is", so any "ought" which is divorced from "is" would be utterly meaningless to us? Phrased as a rhetorical question, if "oughts" are not based upon "is", what on earth else could they be based upon? Any avoided result, or desired result, manifests itself to us as an "is".
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r Hello, thanks for the reply. I'm glad I logged on today to see many replies and messages (it's been a while for me). OK, so, I would say that oughts are in the realm of sentimentality. So long as you acknowledge that sentiments are meaningful, then I suppose we have no problem.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
But of course we also have to be careful when we talk about what morality is "based" on. It could be that certain facts are responsible for why we have the moral sentiments we do, and that's all fine and good. But the is-ought gap points out that there is nothing about the meaning of descriptiveness that allows us (logically) to derive normativity.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
Sam Harris might respond to this by remarking that a norm which is divorced from descriptiveness is morally meaningless to us, by definition. If you were to discover something you thought was a moral norm, but it had no descriptive result (no positive or negative value to anyone), it would seem incorrect to label it a moral norm.
Perhaps we don't need a perfect philosophical meta ethic to make progress toward understanding the brain and improving moral health.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r In reverse order, Sam Harris has introduced his view with enough vigor and specific language as to make it meta-ethical. It's not like he has humbly declined to discuss meta-ethical views. Rather, he has unreflectively made bold assertions that would be looked at askance even in Phil 101.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork Continued.. Again on meaninglessness, in what sense do you mean this? Sentiments just are, they are not derived from facts (notice there is a difference between something causing something on the one hand, and the effect being logically derivable from the cause, on the other). As for results, this is tinkering with the order too much. The controversy arises (here at least) from whether value can be derived from facts, not from whether morality is causally impotent.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
When I say "meaningless", I think I mean "something of no concern to conscious creatures".
When you said, "Sentiments just are, they are not derived from facts," I immediately thought that my sentiment for a delicious burger and fries is probably derived from the facts that I am a biologically omnivorous creature living in a certain time and place where burgers and fries are regarded as delicious, and they are available for me 24 hours a day. Please clarify?
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
"Please clarify?" Sure: I agree with your summary of how your sentiment for a delicious burger was caused. The problem is, there is no moral normativity carried over from the purely factual, over to the morally normative. Hitler has a sentiment for killing Jews (and many others). I'm sure his sentiment had some sort of factual explanation. But the factual explanation behind his sentiment did not justify anything.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I agree that the facts underlying Hitler's apparent sentiment for killing Jews did not "justify" those murders (objectively). However - and this is where I think my nihilism/functionalism stands out - I do not think it is possible to "objectively" justify any action, ever, unless we have an (arbitrary/subjective) goal in mind. If we claim an action is "justified", I think we can only ever give proofs for or against that claim within the scope of what we (arbitrarily) value.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
Please clarify, continued.. Sentiments we approve of, and sentiments we disapprove of, are both explained by physical facts (whether *fully* explained or not is another matter, for the sake of being tidy, let's say explanation is complete) but the physical facts don't help us justify what we approve of over what we disapprove of. Nothing moral is derived from the physical (even if one believes that the physical causes everything).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wil
If we tried to remove oughts from the realm of sentimentality, where could we move them? If we tried to place them somewhere else, I don't see how they could matter to us.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r Hello again. My point about sentimentality is that we can have sentiments about all sorts of things. Using rational argument to evaluate sentimentality seems misapplied. So I'm simply concerned with the definition of *meaningful* used in your original question.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork continuing... If things must be amenable to rational or factual justification to be meaningful, then we're in trouble (after all, some skeptics assert morality is meaningless, so it's not necessarily a reductio to point out it could be the case).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork continuing again... If sentimentality can also be meaningful, then the concern is dealt with successfully. It's just that with the way philosophers sometimes use the word "meaning" compared to its colloquial usage, there could be some insidious ambiguity there, hence my mention of sentimentality.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I'm sorry for my ignorance; I don't know how philosophers sometimes use the word "meaning". For me, "meaning", in the context of a philosophical discussion, relates to the "end" or the value of a thing, according to the appraisal of a conscious being. Meaning seems to be a subjective idea based solely upon a conscious creature's concern. Sorry again if I am being dense; this whole discussion has been a real pleasure. Thanks very much.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I don't think "things must be amenable to rational or factual justification to be meaningful." I think the sentimentality of something having meaning to a person is puzzling and often irrational, but that these sentiments deal with the brain. I hope that we can learn about situations/behaviors which tend to be meaningful to us (things which concern conscious creatures) in order to move away from behaviors we find harmful, and to move toward obtaining greater well-being.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
While I agree that using rational argument to evaluate sentimentality is problematic, I don't think I agree that it is "misapplied". Isn't this where ethical analysis focuses its attention? We evaluate the sentiments of actors, we make observations of their actions, and perhaps we draw conclusions or give opinions of our own regarding them.
I think "meaningful" in my usage could be as loose as "something of concern to a conscious being." If you enjoyed a nap, that is meaningful.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
Hi Wil,
I think the "deflated" version of morality you mention at 2:10 features prominently in Sam Harris' new book on morality. He states that morality deals with the well-being of conscious creatures.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r Ahh yes; "well being." But of course we differ on what counts as human flourishing, and we're looking for something non-normative to settle the argument, so appealing to well-being may be very relevant in some contexts (I for one think it is) it doesn't solve any meta-ethical problems.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
I think Sam agrees that we differ on what counts as human flourishing, but he compares well-being to the concept of health: we may have differing opinions on what constitutes health, but those differences do not stop us from learning more about health, and improving our health through science. We know that our current understanding of health may change and improve in unforeseen leaps and bounds, and we have experts on health called doctors. Perhaps this can be so for morality, too.
h0tsex0r 1 year ago
@h0tsex0r On health, yes, this isn't controversial. It's an analogy/ comparison at this point. So it's fine, I guess. But it's not original to Sam Harris. It's a very old idea, actually. And yet the meta-ethical controversies we're stuck with arouse in spite of the idea. So while I have no rebuttal, it's a bit banal.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
I think the point TBS was making is that the common understanding of morality includes assumptions that can't be proven true. There is no reason (as far as I can see) to suppose that there are any moral facts, aside from statements that take the form "ought-if". See my video for another take on this.
borgimplant 1 year ago
@borgimplant If there is no reason to suppose that there are any moral facts, then this is no consolation to theists. I agree that you can have fact based oughts, but we shouldn't forget that a goal most of us would consider horrible could be at the foundation. So, that kind of ought doesn't help us distinguish between right and wrong. Moral right and wrong: it's what the meta-ethical discussion between theists and atheists is about.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork I see where you are coming from. You are talking about things that are just right or wrong......PERIOD. I don't see any reason for thinking that we should even talk in such terms. If I find an action to be abhorrent, my own feelings are all I have to work with. How could I possibly know that it really IS wrong, regardless of my sentiments. Even if God knows, how am I supposed to know that he knows, if I cannot arrive at the knowledge myself. I'm not gonna take his word for it.
borgimplant 1 year ago
@borgimplant Thatz fine. I think the choices left over are that we have to be moral skeptics (meaning, morality properties do not exist in a strict sense) or moral intutionists (we apprehend moral properties through intuition). In either case, we have no factual argument to offer the Nazi's on why they're wrong and we're right. Do you agree?
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork I essentially agree with you. I think intuitionism is far too audacious to be credible, and that moral skepticism is much safer and more reasonable. If we define "right and wrong" in factual terms, we can easily apply the terms to the Nazi's without blushing. Aside from that, it's apparently purely sentimental. But personally, I really don't have a problem with imposing my sentiments on others. How could I endorse a system of law if I said otherwise?
borgimplant 1 year ago
@borgimplant OK, Cool. It's just that many people balk at that last part, the part you essentially agree with. If at bottom there are no, strictly speaking, moral facts, then epistemological standards, preference in sports cars, and beliefs about murdering innocents are all on the same footing (even though we are hard-wired to take some as real and some as merely sentimental).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@wilthiswork
The aesthetic sense:
Felt weakly: Taste, fashion
Felt strongly: Morality, "right and wrong"
borgimplant 1 year ago
@wilthiswork By the way, what is your position on the matter at this point in time? And why?
borgimplant 1 year ago
@borgimplant We're both sentimentalists, but we part company on moral skepticism. I'm an intuitionist. Why? Well, I have no cogent argument that you should accept if you don't already have the same intuitions. I think the conversation between skeptics and realists, at best, is a matter of adding up and tallying plausibility points (said so well by David Enoch).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@borgimplant For my side, adding up plausibility points will be a matter of identifying partners in crime in areas considered respectable, (such that something can't be wrong simply because it is a matter of intuition) and perhaps arguing over what naturalism means and/or arguing against naturalistic reductionism (not sure if this caveat is necessary, but theism or even superstition aren't the only candidates waiting in the wings).
wilthiswork 1 year ago
@hOtsexOr And I can't resist adding: If Sam Harris wants to point out that we can improve our lives through neuroscience and sociology, then well, OK, great. But that's hardly worth any great amount of attention. In his TED talk though, he made statements which imposed his view on meta-ethics. And those who take on the is-ought problem using the Harris line do the same.
wilthiswork 1 year ago
Just want to let you know I watched your video. Perhaps I'll leave a more detailed (and interesting) comment later, so we can move our exchange here rather than under TB's comment section.
Theophage 2 years ago
Sounds good Theophage, I look forward to it.
wilthiswork 2 years ago