"Well, it's hard to think of what such an explanation would consist in..."
"What could be added is an explanation for the feeling itself..."
The host comes nowhere near pinning down what explanandum remains to be addressed, but I propose it is this: the implicit supposition that some physical systems experience qualiative states, and some (again, we suppose) do not.
If it is the case that qualia are an emergent property, and arise only when matter and energy are arranged...
...in certain patterns, it is entirely reasonable to ask by what methodology we know which patterns result in systems that are conscious and which kindle no spark of qualitive experience at all not -or indeed even *if *we know this.
Never mind for the moment describing or ascertaining the *exact* "something it is like" to be a given system, just consider for the moment the criteria by which you decide whether and how you know a system experiences anything at all. I have yet to see...
...any proposed solution to this problem -or dismissal of it- that is not utterly hollowly arbitrary and and tautological.
Let's say I have a sentient computer (and I'll remark in passing that there simply *are no* arguments against strong AI that cannot be completely dismissed with a wave of the hand) that is presently shut off and takes several minutes to boot; or let's say even for the sake of (thought) experiment I have it set up so that subsystems come in line sequentially and...
...only gradually (let's say over the course of ten minutes) become integrated computationally) to put it simply, imagine HAL being shut down in reverse).
If eliminative materialism is correct, there must necessarily be an *exact* point in time at which the computer absolutely abruptly springs into some sort of qualiative state -however faint- from an immediately preceding state of complete oblivion. I find this extraordinarily odd, but then the corollary alternative, pansychism, seems...
This comment is running into five parts and exceeding my desire to express it(who's reading it anyway) but, to be complete... I would strenuously aver that any satisfactory theory of consciousness must offer an epistemology that at least attempts to decide, by some means other than just subjective report (George is in pain because he says so) which systems are conscious, and why.
This sounds absurdly impossible, but I think might I know how it could be done.
The man who is devoted and not attached to the fruit of his actions obtains tranquillity; whilst he who through desire has attachment for the fruit of action is bound down thereby.
As there are oxymorons, there also are little nuts
so hard to let look even our best minds like nuts (or morons).
As there are the knowns and the known unknowns there are also the unknowns we will never know to un-un-know. (And also are there nuts (of the moronic kind) that can drive one nuts!)
@Gippeyy Well, yeah, I suppose it must admitted Quine's speaking voice is far less sonorous than his prose, which is exquisite and absolutely seamless.
The inquisitor looks like he's wearing a disguise kit.
olllHashedFetish 1 year ago
@ 7:37
I.
"Well, it's hard to think of what such an explanation would consist in..."
"What could be added is an explanation for the feeling itself..."
The host comes nowhere near pinning down what explanandum remains to be addressed, but I propose it is this: the implicit supposition that some physical systems experience qualiative states, and some (again, we suppose) do not.
If it is the case that qualia are an emergent property, and arise only when matter and energy are arranged...
polymath7 1 year ago
II.
...in certain patterns, it is entirely reasonable to ask by what methodology we know which patterns result in systems that are conscious and which kindle no spark of qualitive experience at all not -or indeed even *if *we know this.
Never mind for the moment describing or ascertaining the *exact* "something it is like" to be a given system, just consider for the moment the criteria by which you decide whether and how you know a system experiences anything at all. I have yet to see...
polymath7 1 year ago
III.
...any proposed solution to this problem -or dismissal of it- that is not utterly hollowly arbitrary and and tautological.
Let's say I have a sentient computer (and I'll remark in passing that there simply *are no* arguments against strong AI that cannot be completely dismissed with a wave of the hand) that is presently shut off and takes several minutes to boot; or let's say even for the sake of (thought) experiment I have it set up so that subsystems come in line sequentially and...
polymath7 1 year ago
IV.
...only gradually (let's say over the course of ten minutes) become integrated computationally) to put it simply, imagine HAL being shut down in reverse).
If eliminative materialism is correct, there must necessarily be an *exact* point in time at which the computer absolutely abruptly springs into some sort of qualiative state -however faint- from an immediately preceding state of complete oblivion. I find this extraordinarily odd, but then the corollary alternative, pansychism, seems...
polymath7 1 year ago
V.
...at least equally odd.
This comment is running into five parts and exceeding my desire to express it(who's reading it anyway) but, to be complete... I would strenuously aver that any satisfactory theory of consciousness must offer an epistemology that at least attempts to decide, by some means other than just subjective report (George is in pain because he says so) which systems are conscious, and why.
This sounds absurdly impossible, but I think might I know how it could be done.
polymath7 1 year ago
@polymath7 "who's reading it anyway":
.
The man who is devoted and not attached to the fruit of his actions obtains tranquillity; whilst he who through desire has attachment for the fruit of action is bound down thereby.
a11mind 1 year ago
@polymath7 "equally odd" equals "equally weird"
and yet is there no known weird odd number...
isn't that also "equally odd"?
As there are oxymorons, there also are little nuts
so hard to let look even our best minds like nuts (or morons).
As there are the knowns and the known unknowns there are also the unknowns we will never know to un-un-know. (And also are there nuts (of the moronic kind) that can drive one nuts!)
a11mind 1 year ago
@polymath7 "who's reading it anyway":
i did, but i skimmed in such a fleeting way of manner
as to let appear it an altogether incoherent babble
of mindlessly bubbling balbutations ;-)
(such has been done to slighten and diminish you!)
((the (mainly French) onomatopoeticon "balbutation"
was put in to best you on your one field of forte))
presentlyabsent 1 year ago
@polymath7 "the field of struggle has been broadened"
to avert your (seemingly) omnipotent "remove" device!
presentlyabsent 1 year ago
If Quine weren't so old, I would think he was drunk or something... and Ned Block's moustache cracks me up.
But anyway, it's great to see this stuff available to the public!
Gippeyy 2 years ago
@Gippeyy Well, yeah, I suppose it must admitted Quine's speaking voice is far less sonorous than his prose, which is exquisite and absolutely seamless.
polymath7 1 year ago
Comment removed
gen6k 3 years ago
Thank you so much.
KontrolVoltage 3 years ago
yea, I would also like to thank you. Great upload.
rootberg 3 years ago
That would make him about 86 here.
Guaguanco11 3 years ago
Indeed. I hope I'll be such a beast at 86.
flame0430 3 years ago
@flame0430 What does he say here that's so beastly?
isselman2000 1 year ago
Is this early eighties?
Guaguanco11 3 years ago
1994 I think.
flame0430 3 years ago
Yeah, truly, thank you for uploading all of these videos, your channel is fantastic.
PaulRenwick 3 years ago 5
@PaulRenwick : Best channel on Youtube. Nobel Youtube Prize for flame0430!
DrDeist 1 year ago
Thanks for posting these, flame0430! You rock.
mavaddat 3 years ago 9
Glad to be of service!
flame0430 3 years ago
@mavaddat
Indeed.
This is precisely why Youtube beats television all to hell.
polymath7 1 year ago
@mavaddat Yeah good job, flame0430.
natedaug1 10 months ago