Sorry, after AP. The AP threshold is surpassed 300ms before the conscious awareness. So the motor activity is already ready to go by the time you know you made a decision to act.
In NG's "Fight Science" they demonstrated this by showing that a martial artist can react to an attack faster than the fighter can possibly be aware of it.
In Haynes and Libet's work the time-interval was stretched out for experimentation. I.e. a simpler "conscious" task was used.
Hi Rybot9000, w.r.t. a martial artist reacting to attacks etc, once again, this just proves that conciousness is slow. It doesn't prove that choices arn't free.
Whatever else you say... how does any of this refute the fact that a seemingly free-decision can be predicted based on frontopolar and pareital lobe activity up to 10s before the conscious sensation of having made a decision at all (Nature Neuroscience 11, 543 - 545 (2008))?
The awareness of having made a decision occurs 300ms before AP of the motor neuron (Libet 1984). The decision can be predicted 7 - 10s before by MRI.
Hi Rybot9000, you are aware that Libet believes we have free will? He does not claim that his experiment disproves it. think about it this way: sure, you can sometimes predict what a person will choose to do before they are consciously aware of their choices. So what? All that proves is that the neurons which implement conciousness are slow. it takes time to communicate to the rest of the brain what has been decided.
Ok so when human action can be predicted with 80% accuracy 10 minutes before a choice (either/or) action takes place by looking at the brain pattern will that finally disprove free will? lol Or how long does it have to be man?
I don't think you could do it from a brain scan--no matter how much earlier, you could always make an argument that the choice was made before then. The only way to show that we are determnistic is to be able to control us by manipulating our inputs. If somebody came up with, say, a sure-fire way to seduce any woman (which I could use :-)) for example, I'd believe that we were deterministic. Prediction is only half the battle--the other half is control.
You seem to be saying here that because finite beings cannot know everthing that is effecting them, they are therefore not determined.
I'm sorry Randy, but in my opinion when a being reacts chaotically or weirdly, it is because they are unaware and are becoming ever more so of what is making them act. There is a value-connotation to the word "freedom" here that is misleading.
Hi Kierketaard, it is important to draw a distinction here between chaotic behavior and the behavior of my neuron. Chaotic systems are unpredictable because of a finite amount of numerical precision: tiny errors are multiplied. This neuron is quite different. The unpredictability of my neuron is not simply due to lack of knowledge: we could know to infinite degrees of precision about it, and still not know when it was going to fire. It is genuinely nondeterministic. crucial difference.
Okay Randy. Questions at that level does not strike me as especially important to a wounded vet wondering why he can't stand up anymore, or why the funny clasp at the end of his Bush mandated economy-chair doesn't work properly when he squeezes it.
Anyway, I think that you are cool, and smart - and you know that already. Micro particle fleas/nuerons notwithstanding.
Your last comment implies to me that you are set in your ways. Becuase I'm 27 and your 40ish you know more about this?
I know it's called an "axon" and the depolarization occurs at the "axon hillock". I know the anatomy of nerve cells and of the human brain (to some extent). I've also spent years reading papers on the subject.
Even the yokels at Dana foundation don't suggest we have free-will. Just weirdo philosophers and physicists, people who don't study the human brain/decision process.
Hi Rybot9000 "because you're 40 and I'm 27 you know more about this?" Uh, that's not what I said at all. Please go back and relisten to it carefully, with a charitable ear, assuming that I'm not a total asshole. You'll see that's not what I said at all.
You say the "cell" chooses and the other cells just follow suit, but this is patently false. The chain doesn't start with the cell, it starts with external stimuli. Take the visual system for example, well studied by Koch, Crick, etc..
The process "begins" with stimulation of the RGC (Retinal Ganglion Cells) and excite the Opsin/Rhodopsin in the RGCs which causes spiking of the neurons. The RGCs don't "choose" to fire.
Hi Rybot9000, "do you have any other videos on brain stuff? I'm really tired of all the philosophical nonsense". Have you watched my two videos entitled "Nondeterminism in the Hodgkin's Huxley Equations?" There's no philosophy in them, only biochemestry and math.
We use math to approximate behavior in systems like these. The measured behavior of the neuron is a complex interaction of proteins, lipids and ions.
The equation doesn't define these attributes, but instead the range of results, from their probable interactions.
It appears non-determinalistic because information leading to the 'vote', is not observable in this experiment. Your appearance of nondeterminalism, comes from the error range of lost information.
Hi Weaseldog2001, we can describe the behavior of neurons at many levels, as collections of subatomic particles, as atoms, as molecules and ions, etc. At the lower levels, of course, quantum effects hold and there is no need to postulate determinacy. My contribution is this: people used to think that by the time you get to the level of modeling the neuron in terms of ion flows, the neuron would always be approximatable with deterministic models. I've shown that this is not inevitably true.
(cont, to Weaseldog2001) what I like about your comment is that it points out that when we are talking about whether something is deterministic or not, we tend to confuse two things (a) whether the neuron itself is nondeterministic, or (b) whether our model of that neuron is nondeterministic. (cont)
(cont, to Weaseldog2001) What I've shown is that even when you are modeling a neuron as a set of differential equations describing ion flows, the most accurate model for that neuron might very well be nondeterminisitic. Does this mean the neuron itself is nondeterministic? Well, we have many ways of modeling the behavior of neurons, but now we can say that none of them are deterministic in all cases.
physical laws; in order for them to be true, one would have to show why charged Ions behave in a different way than the default mode; that was why I rambled on about Default VS Secondary Mode; Having a physics background, I see this a lot in philosophy; saying new things like self organized, self relplicating, or emergent property, are meaningless unless you show how it is connected to what is known to at least usually be true about +-charges
At Dendritic Bifurication Points, Ion Flow is Inhibited or Excited; This is where the secondary mode would be used, where the flow of say-Ions can Come Tgthr or Move A p a r t from a molecule that controls a gate that allow more Ions into one branch and is inhibited going down the other branch towards another neuron, and this would depend not on something that exists, but on what they are being used to build(the intention). Not Free and not mechanical
Now, If there is a default and secondary mode in which charges behave, we have introduced flexibility; this flexibility is how Intentions explain Charged Ion Behavior in normal body of cells and in the dendritic branches of nerve cells, particullarlly at Dendritic Bifurication Points. But Intentions are not something that exist, nor are they Free. Even if the choice is between 3 ways to cut a pie, there is always a reason we take one way over the other; there is never ambiguity
Hi GodMech, did you see my video on the Hodgkin-Huxley equation? The HH-equation describes how ions move around in nerve cells. In that video I show that there are nondeterministic solutions to that equation. So I claim that a nondeterministic neuron like this one, can exist. (cont)
(cont, to GodMech) Now, as to how our intensions constrain our behavior, you say that there is always a reason why we take one way over the other. I disagree--I don't know how many of the other videos in this series you have seen, but heres the thing--our intentions are NORMATIVE. e.g. I intend to be fair to the boys. But there are many many different ways to be fair to them. No matter how many norms I throw in there still is a wide variety of choices I could make to satisfy my (cont)
(cont, to GodMech) intention to be fair to the boys. Norms constrain us differently than causes do. Another example: the speed limit sign says 55mph. But that doesn't cause me to drive at any particular speed, there are a range of different speeds I can choose to drive. What I'm suggesting in this series is that the brain uses a nondeterministic mechanism to select which of the many options is open to it when its making free-will choices.
the Problem With this, is that how Cahrged Ions behave in nerve cells can be described as opposite charges move Tgthr and like charges move A p a r t; anything extra, must violate this, for this is deterministic. Unless, there are exceptions to this, meaning that opposite charges can also move A p a r t and Like charges can come Tgthr. Such That, there is a default mode and a secondary mode in which charges operate.
Hi GodMech, it was meant to symbolize that the output of a neuron could go to more than one other neuron. In the brain, for example, an axion will branch out and typically feeds into many thousands of other neurons.
So Randy. Do you believe that computers operate deterministically? Can we put a couple of these neurons in a computer?
Also, I record the state of the universe, then watch what unfolds. Then I go back in time! And watch the same events unfold, ie starting from the same initial condition. Do you think (assuming we could perform this experiment) that it is possible for different outcomes to occur?
Do you think this is different from just starting at the same initial condition?
Hi 126altf4, let me see if I can answer your qeustions. (1) most computers are indented by their designers to operate deterministically, but of course, all might suffer from random memory corruption :-) (2) I didn't quite understand this question, do you mean can we make some sort of brain-computer hybrid incorporating nondeterminstic neurons as components to a new kind of computer? (3) yes, I think there are multiple possible futures for any present state of the universe
2) you say a neuron is inderterministic, why could I not make a computer nonderterministic?
4) I was asking do you distinguish between recreating the i.c. and watching an event play out and going back in time to that i.c. and watching an event play out.
yeah, I have no life :-) (2) sure, you could make a nondeterminstic computer. (4) interesting question. I suppose theres a difference if you look at it from the viewpoint of 4-dimensional spacetime.
If you think the same think would happen in the time travel case(that is the same events as just observed) then arn't you acknowledging that there are properties of a system that can exist which will guarentee an outcome in spite of the nondeterministic behaviour outlined in this video?
If you say something different could happen then I find that a very interesting position for anyone to hold... to say the least.
I also wanted to point out that consciousness is not the cause in the case of a nondeterministic computer. Also, If there are nondeterministic causes then we are creating information all the time. But... we aren't losing information. Too much information, doesn't all fit, eventually new information becomes worthless and unimportant!
The example of the delayed firing determining your action is that same of an example I dreamed up yesterday. If I am deciding what to do when I have incomplete and ambiguous data and I am waffling between two or more paths to attain my goal. The "executive function" might determine how long to continue weighing my options as I keep changing my mind. Maybe that "executive function" will stop when your neuron fires leaving me with whatever decision was winning at that moment...
...That still leaves me with a randomized process as opposed to a process that my mind controls. I know from studies of attention that people can change the activity of the brain by focusing on a certain subject. Attention also alters a person's ability to remember the target of the attention. What if we are asked to focus on important, ambiguous information, make an "election" and base the rest of our lives on that decision... I think I'm going in circles at this point.
(part 3) If there is (or ever will be) proof of free will, we need only to show that it happens a small number of times in each person's life. Based on your definition (and my thoughts), the best chance for this is when information is incomplete and there is no physiological compulsion to choose one choice over another. Sometimes those "choices" are big... like staying in school or quitting. Once the "choice" is made, our mind/body are affected by the physical experiences that follow.
Are you aware of the research of Benjamin Libet. Taken from wikipeida "Libet's experiments suggest unconscious processes in the brain are the true initiator of volitional acts, therefore, little room remains for the operations of free will. If the brain has already taken steps to initiate an action before we are aware of any desire to perform it, the causal role of consciousness in volition is all but eliminated."
Libet finds room for free will in the interpretation of his results only in the form of 'the power of veto'; conscious acquiescence is required to allow the unconscious buildup of the readiness potential to be actualized as a movement.
Hi Mjhavok, yeah; I think (and as you probably have already lept ahead to surmise) that this picture would be very compatible with Libet's empirical results; surely marshalling all the possible alternative actions and deliberating which one to do is something which, in general, has to be done far faster than what conscious thought allows. There might be enough time for conciousness to do one more scrutenizing pass to double check the option which was elected.
Randy or anyone, consider that A is the neural state at 0 Volts, and B is the following 'uncaused state' such that the neuron displays voltage. C is the cause of this new voltage.
A -spooky non-determinism -> B -> C
Now, causality seems to me just as spooky as non-determinism. I only wish to make the following point:
Is the first cause of 'C':
1.)[A changing to B]
or
2.) B
This is actually quite puzzling if you think about it, due to the nature of A changing to be being "uncaused
Hi Everett, this is a great question. I'm going to try to explain it and answer it in a video, but my wife wants me to go to bed..... *sigh* if you want to get anywhere in philosophy dude, don't get married (assuming this hasn't come too late..)
did you create your own neuron to prove yourself right.. LOL i accept at least we have the idea of free will maybe it does not exist maybe it does. the chaotic ness of the universe makes me think so, but other than that i dont know..
Hi x71, you bet :-) Somebody has to do something dramatic to move the debate forrward. And yes, I think your answer to the question "I don't know" is about the best answer we can expect :-)
Everett's conditions also imply another obstacle to your argument: to believe in Free Will, you must first prove the self, but to believe in the self, you must first prove Free Will. If a self is fully determined, it is not a self, but a part of the universe; if a free will is self-less, it is mere randomness. You must therefore prove both self and Frew Will at the same time.
I know that I'm stepping in metaphysics here, but I think this question has an empirical relevance, since we are assuming the self: an additional axiom that is not at all a basic assumption of empiricism.
However, I think we can skip this problem for the sake of the discussion.
To satisfy the Everett's first conclusion, FW must come from the self, but what is an non-free self? it would be one that is completely determined; part of "the machine" and therefore not a self at all.
therefore the self is no more basic than free will: neither can exist without the other, so if one is proved wrong the other follows and to prove one right, both must be proved true.
So your contention is that we can't really be selfs if we don't have free will? I actually would agree with that; although I suppose I'd offer as a proof that there are selfs the same kind of proof I offer for free will: we treat each other as if we are selfs, peoples with free will.
But many of us still disagree with you that we _must_ treat people as if they had FW. I think it is only folk psycho-causality.
Take Dentrophilian's last video: all but you is the same machine: your body, your car, you guinea pig... I quite agree with that when taken from a first person perspective (if we should take a 1st persone perspective is another question)
Hi mak. "only" folk psychology. Yeah, I get that a lot :-) By that logic we would have to say there's no such thing as water, there's only H20. Wait!! There's not really any such thing as water molecules, there's just atoms doing their thing. But wait! There's no such thing as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, its just electrons, protons, and neutrons doing there thing. But wait! Its really quarks, or strings, or branes....ANYTHING but whater!! ANYTHING but persons with free will!!
I was typing my answer to that, and I found myself talkign about ontology for what could have taken many times 500 caraters so I think I'll make a video response when this house gets less noisy i.e. when everyone's asleep i.e. very late in the night.
but! I was so busy answering that I did not realised that I do not see what is the link between your comment and mine you were replying to. Taking the whole universe as a machine has nothing to do with what there is relatively to reductionism.
Hi mak, I'm just saying, suppose we _could_ analyse people and free will in terms of simpler components. So what? that wouldn't mean that people and free will didn't exist, any more than analyzing water in terms of simpler components means that water doesn't exist. Consider the following two conversations: (cont)
(cont, to mak) A: "we know there's water because we can see it, drink, it take a swim in it". B: "nonsense!!! There's no such thing as water; its just a useful heuristic we use to deal with what is really h20".
I think that's as silly as this conversation: Randy:"we know there are selfs and free will because we interact with these selves every day and treat them as if they had free will." Skeptic: "nonsense!!! There's no such thing as selves and free will, its just a useful heuristic we use to deal with what is really atoms and void".
(cont, to mak) I really don't see why we can't use the evidence we gain from interactions with people as evidence that we are selfs and have free will.
hmmm i would would say randy's main empirical challenge is to show that the 'self' interpreted as some sort of neural wiring, is actually involved directly in decision making at the time of conscious decision making. i find it very, very , very unlikely that this is the case - but my intuition means nothing. i claim i do not know how we make decisions, he claims he does know, but he is claiming more than he CAN know. i think agnosticism is the strongest stance that randy can demonstrate.
Hi Everett, your point of agnosticism is very well taken, and I do in fact have no illusions about being able to prove anything at this point. If I can get people to at least allow for the possibility of free will, I think that one of the essential preconditions for the sorts of empirical confirmations/disconfirmations will even be possible. As I've said continually through this series, I'm not doing conceptual analysis, I'm making empirical claims, and I reserve the right to be wrong.
so in other words you have a belief first and go about looking for ways to make it plausible afterwards... i already had the hunch this was the case but im suprised you admit it. you do realize that the history of philosophical dispute has been so wide-ranging that we must conclude most people have been wrong about almost all the issues. When we know that having a belief and looking for evidence is a way to rationalize false beliefs, so why would you go down this road?
"When we know that having a belief and looking for evidence is a way to rationalize false beliefs, so why would you go down this road?"
I've been wondering about this too. imo compatibilists like dennett make a great case for why we don't need libertarian free will, but i think the arguments can be applied to randy's non-radical version of FW too. If we agree with those guys, all we really need is a will, and we've clearly got that already.
It seems like all the objections at this point are stemming from an intuitive, paradoxical conception of free will. It's not possible to satisfy this conception because it is incoherent to begin with. The "will" of the self eg. its' biological and emotional needs are generated by the body- WHICH IS THE MIND, and the satisfaction of those desires is genuinely nondeterministic as illustrated by Randy's nondeterministic neuron model. What more could you want in a plausible theory?
a theory which takes into account the paradoxical intuitions we have about what free will is in the first place. i think its impossible, obviously - thats why i dont believe in free will.
i will translate my argument my argument to strict deductive form, and trnaslate it symbolically as well if i can, and get back to you in 5 hours or so, and show that you have not dealt with my deductive argument.
Ok Everett, it is entirely possible that I misunderstood you. Sorry again for saying grouchy things before my first coffee. Let me give you some insight into my headspace here in order to help you pitch your argument to me: (1) I reject dualism, the self is identical with the body, (2) I embrace the technique of recursive explaination: to explain the self, we need to break it into pieces, each of which is simpler than the self and is therefore _not_ the self, and (cont)
(cont, to Everett) then show how those pieces work together to form the self. This means I reject any notion that there's a subset of neurons in the brain which is the "self". No homonicli!!! (3) arguments for or against my position from subjective experience are going to be treated very skeptically--your videos are an excellent source of information for why subjectivistic evidence isn't persuasive. Please try to use axioms which can be publicly, intersubjectively investigated. (cont)
do you mean i cannot reference my intuition about what free will is? this is the only really we have the idea free will - due to subjective experience.
yes i relied on dualism because it such a simple way of thinking about these things, i assumed that the argument would hold for monism.
Hi Everett, you can reference your intuition about what free will is, but if we disagree about whether an axiom in your argument is true or not, it would be helpful if that axiom could be supported by some public, intersubjectively observable evidence, which could look at and resolve the conflict. (cont)
(cont, to Everett) this is why I have consistently based my argument for free will on publicly observable, intersubjectively verifiable data: namely, (1) the properties of neurons and (2) our observations of how people treat each other. In fact we do ascribe free will to each other in every civil transaction between us. So if you want to really attack my argument for free will, you'll have attack these ascriptions of free will to each other. (cont)
(cont, to Everett) Why is the ascription of free will to each other spurious, even if we could give an explanation for it? I mean, we don't say that "entropy" is an illusion--we don't say that entropy doesn't exists, its just the little atoms get more and more disordered. We don't say "temperature" doesn't exist, its just the little atoms speed up. An explanation for X doesn't necessarily drain X of reality. (cont)
(cont, to Everette) therefore, I have to strongly disagree with the contention that the only evidence we have for free will comes from subjective experience. I say our evidence from free will comes from the simple fact that we get along better with people if we ascribe free will to them. This is the same kind of evidence as you get along better with cliffs if you ascribe gravity to the earth and realize you might fall off of them.
"In fact we do ascribe free will to each other in every civil transaction between us."
I won't presume to speak for everett but according to my intuition about free will, we don't ascribe free will to each other. Nor could we, because the intuition doesn't make sense. For me the ascriptions of free will you say need to be attacked, don't exist.
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. ascribing free will to each other, perhaps I should do another video on this. But you recall my vids on the blue bubbles and the pink bubbles. The blue bubbles are folk psychology, including our respecting others decisions and treating them as if no God, Government, or Force of Nature should stand in their way of self creation. The difference is the pink bubbles, where we put little asterisks and disclaimers, saying its not "really" that way-- (cont)
(cont, to bitbutter) its not *really* this way, its all predestined by god, or predestined by nature, or just a giant computer simulation... Sure, you have a sophisticated world view, and greater knowledge of the more deterministic aspects of the universe, and this inclines you to believe that we're deterministic, but this hasn't changed how you interact with other people one bit--you do it the same as somebody who _does_ believe in free will. We all share the blue bubbles (cont)
(cont, to bitbutter) and moreover, the blue bubbles (folk psychology) is the only thing we _do_ have evidence for. Moreover, the evidence is copious and continual. Folk psychology is the most used, most useful, and best confirmed theory we've got.
"The blue bubbles are folk psychology, including our respecting others decisions and treating them as if no God, Government, or Force of Nature should stand in their way of self creation. The difference is the pink bubbles, where we put little asterisks and disclaimers, saying its not "really" that way"
My blue bubbles would be worded slightly diff from yours, and they would not be contradicted by the pink bubbles.
cont'd We are autonomous agents *and* every aspect of our being flows inevitably from causes that are not us. There need be no dissonance between the two sets of bubbles (i think this is the gist of compatibilism, but i prefer to ditch the 'free will' label).
Hi bitbutter, yeah, I suppose you might self-describe yourself differently, but lets consider it from a 3rd party perspective. Say you were a twin. Your brother has a religious experience and becomes a southern baptist :-) and believes that people have free will. Say we film both you and your twin shopping, talking to your bosses, settling disputes with your kids etc. Could we tell, just by looking at the films, which one believed in free will and which didn't?
LOL bitbutter. But all of these interactions you are ascribing free will (of course, in my bastardized definition thereof) to people, inasmuch as you _do_ treat them as if they have a real choices. If your kids or your employees do something wrong, you do tell them they **should** have done differently, and you are annoyed at them because the **could** have done it differently. Same goes for your boss, or S.O. No?
"inasmuch as you _do_ treat them as if they have a real choices. "
I believe that real choices exist even if the universe is entirely deterministic.
Part of the utility of being angry with someone is that i hope to 'recalibrate' their decision making modules, deterministically ;), so that they will behave in a way i approve of in the future. 'You should have done X, you fool!" == can be seen as a shorthand for: "in similar circumstances in the future do X and you will gain my approval."
Hi bitbutter, I don't think "shouldn't" can be analyzed as "in similar circs in the future, etc". Here's why: If somebody made some stupid mistake which killed both them and somebody you cared about, you wouldn't be angry at them, or you wouldn't think it would be correct to say "they shouldn't have done that?"
"or you wouldn't think it would be correct to say "they shouldn't have done that?""
Yes i would. And i could be using it to mean "If one does X, i will disapprove" (i'm not personally committed to any of these ways of using 'should', i'm just trying to show that these words are not necessarily emptied of meaning in a deterministic universe)
To try to clarify some more: On my view, when i say 'should have' i'm talking about a hypothetical situation--if the do-er could travel back in time, with the benefit of hindsight. I'm not implying that if the universe was set up in exactly the same way as it was at the moment of the do-ers decision, that it was possible that the do-er would do something differently to what he in fact did do (here i'm assuming straight determinism for simplicity).
"Previous neuron resets the voltage of the nondeterministic neuron to zero volts"
You chose the deterministic path. By my criteria one, you must now show that the neural net corresponding to the 'conscious self's choice' is also reponsible for this "Previous Neurons" action. Infinite regress ensues due to this in conjunction with my criteria #2. That is, other neurons must have fired to cause this previous neuron to fire - but then the self had to cause these to fire as well, and so on.
hi Randy: I disagree that in your example the self is the first cause. Rather a neuron is. The self is not identical with the neurons in the patterns it emerges from.
Ummmm....... the faulty spark plug is part of the car. Similarly, each neuron is part of the self, no? Do we go to the same church? :-) This is the nature of recursive explanation: you take a complex system (the self) and try to break it down into simpler component parts, and show how they work together to form the whole. ???
yes. but we do not say the car causes the car to break down. we say the spark plug (part of the car) does. similarly in your example the self is not the first cause, the neuron (part of the self) is. two diff things.
Hi bitbutter, I guess I don't understand this line of objection; I don't really feel that it presses much of a point against me. Sure, a car might not start because of a faulty spark plug; how does it follow that the self is not identical with the body? Perhaps you can rephrase?
What i'm objecting to specifically is that in the vid you seem to be equating a *neuron* being the first cause of a election, with the *self* being its first cause (everett's requirement). Even though the neuron is part of the self, i don't think it follows to say a nondeterministic event in neuron _is_ the self acting as a 1st cause of an election.
Hmmm....lets explore where our intuitions diverge..... say Tony Soprano tells Pauli Walnuts to whack me. Pauli Walnuts isn't sure how he does it, so he flips a coin: heads, I get cement shoes and am thrown off a bridge. Tails, I get choked with piano wire :-) Its heads, and I'm thrown off a bridge. Tony Soprano goes to court, and he offers the "bitbutter" defense: He says he didn't cause me to get killed, the nondeterministic coin flip did. You're the judges--do you agree?
A non deterministic coin flip would not be a cause of the murder, while it might be the '1st cause' leading to a particular murder plan being chosen.
Similarly: the non deterministic neuron is not the cause of the kids being treated well, it is the determiner of the method of treating the kids well.
ive noticed that when we consider the idea of A changing nondeterministically to state B, then B->C, it is tempting to say that "A changing to B" is the 1st cause of B, rather than saying that B (a neuron) is the first cause.
Is "A changing to B" the first cause or is B the first cause? I cannot seem to firmly grasp the difference in my mind.
Hi Everett, very interesting observation. I think most theories of causation today say that it is _events_ which cause other events. The difference between an event and a state is that an event is something that "happens", whereas a a state is something which just "is". Or in otherwords, and event is a change of state. So for example the neuron nondeterministically changes state from A to B--that is an event. That event can cause something else to change from C to D:another event. (cont)
(cont, to Everett) So in your example, it would be the change from state A to state B which was the cause. Putting this all together (with bitbutter's question) on this analysis of causation, the neuron is a part of me, so part of my state is state A. then the neuron nondeterministically changes to state B. This means that my state changes, part of my state is now B. This causes the election. Since it was my state change which caused the election, then I'm the first cause.
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. first cause of part/whole, yes, please keep trying to convince me..... anywhere there's a strong intuition there's got to be something there I need to take into account..
(cont, to Everett) So, events are the causes of other events, i.e. it is the change of state from A to B which is the cause of something else changing state from C to D. Applying this analysis to our present case: the state of my nondeterministic neurons is part of my overall global state. So when the neuron changes state, I change state. Therefore, if the neuron's change of state is the first cause of anything, I am the first cause of it as well.
For a person to have free will, everett requires that the self be the 1st cause of an election, and my intuition agrees.
But if the first cause of a particular election is the non deterministic action of a neuron, that is something different to 'the self' having made that election (since the self is the sum of all the neurons and their interactions).
Or: The car doesn't make the car go, the new spark plug does.
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. your car example, it occurs to me that another name for a car us "automobile" i.e. it moves itself. Sure, it can't move without spark plugs, but it can't move without tires either; are the tires moving the car? Why wouldn't it be most apropos to say that the car as a whole is what is moving itself?
thats cheating.. you didnt satisfy his second criteria, you said there is no physical reason why the neuron fires and then concluded it must be the self.. but show no proof of this.. nor did you really show there was no physical thing that caused it :P
coaxx: well he says that in order for the nondeterministic neuron to fire, another neuron must "start its engine". but by the first critiera this new neuron must be the self. and, by critiera 2, if it IS the self, the self must also cause itself and so on (infinite regress).
Ultimately he took the deterministic path, it looks like, and got himself a regress. the regress obviously satisfies both conditions, but, the problem is, you have an infinite regress.
I don't think however, that I'm cheating. I did show there's no physical thing which caused the firing of the neuron, back in my video series called "Nondeterminsm in the Hodgkin's Huxley equation". And I didn't really think I needed proof that the neurons in our brain are the "self"--- I was assuming we all weren't dualists here...
the problem that i see is that dualism hasn't been proven false yet.
the dualism we see is enough proof that it hasn't been, otherwise why would we even have it in our vocabulary?
it's pretty complex from where i stand, and part of the problem is that the brain has been studied really closely but no one has yet solved anything, especially regarding 'qualia'
Hi coaxx, I agree, dualism hasn't been proven false yet, and I suppose the arguments in this video wouldn't be persuasive at all to a dualist. I did think, however, that Everett's working hypothesis was monism; he said as much in the video I was responding to....
"is that the brain has been studied really closely but no one has yet solved anything,"
If you look at how we thought about being human a century ago, and then look at which questions the study of the brain has answered, or rendered irrelevant, i think we've solved lots. Perhaps it will always be tempting to say 'we know nothing', but comparing what we know to how little we knew before cures it i think ;)
yeah yeah.. i mean specifically in regards to the intuitive dualism of the mind/brain, not all the other science like neuroscience and such.
i would claim that we haven't gotten an inch closer to a solid solution either philosophically nor scientifically in that department, but then again im not a scientist so feel free to prove me wrong :)
Ok, that was uncalled for....sorry Everett, I wrote that before my first coffee, and my normative neurons weren't fully engaged, presenting me with an inappropriate set of responses, and I elected the wrong one ;-(
So you have a brain that works nondeterministically and there's no way we can know beforehand which the result will be in the pie example. How does this fit in with the notion of a "self that causes things" as known in Volk-psychology? :) You've hit a big hole into the deterministic framework (which is quite a feat), which allows for free will but how do you want to fill it? So far the outcome in the pie example is arbitrary, not "willed" in the Volks-sense.
Hi koenichfuerst, good question. Back to the pie story: my kids want a fair share of pie, and I want to treat them fairly. So far, these statements are both normative, saying what the kids think I _should_ do and what I think I _should_ do. So there's many possible ways I can satisfy the desire for fairness. But notice, described in normative terms, this situation isn't arbitrary at all: I'm trying to be fair. (cont)
(cont, to koenichfuerst) so at the level of normative language, there's no arbitrariness at all: I'm doing the fair thing, I'm intending to cut the pie into fair portions, etc. But the way I satisfy that norm is arbitrary, the same way that it is kind of arbitrary what speed you drive at when the speed limit is 55 Mph. Actually, all of these speed limit examples must appear less persuasive to a German, seeing as ya'll have the autobahn......
Hi koenichfuerst, yeah, I try to address this in my video series "Dionysian free will" where i show this very 'arbitrariness' can sometimes be harnessed and used to help us achieve our goals. Another question is: what do you mean by "free", if it isn't he capability to make arbitrary elections :-)
Yeah, that definition of free will is where it's at. I agree that your model shows a way how our brain can be truly nondeterministic and therefore act in a way that can't be predicted based on prior inputs. It opens the doorway to define something like free will by allowing for the free part. I think the will part is the problem I still have. Somehow I doubt it will be solved until we have a satisfying explanation for consciousness. And consciousness still doesn't make any sense to me.
Hi koenichfuerst, consciousness oy vey!! :-) Yeah, I eventually want to get around to that too, but its gunna be another multi-month philoso-fest raking that one over the coals!! :-) One step at a time here.....
Of what use is it, if we can make our own choices without beeing able to imagine or know the consequeces of our choices?
Example: If a zebra goes to a waterhole and gets killed by lions or crocodiles luring there, did it willfully choose its death, or did it choose to avoid death by dehydration?
I would only call something free will when we´re fully aware of every consequence of our choices.... Sometimes we are, a lot of times we´re not.
Hi DeletedDelusion, I talk about what possible use this sort of thing would be in my video series "Dionysian Rationality". UrbanElf challenged me to think of a game in which the winning strategy requires this kind of ability to deviate from the known best path....check 'em out and see how well I've done. I'm going to do a third part to that series soon, so if I didn't address your concerns let me know and I'll include another part just for you :-)
Hi DeletedDelusion, thanks! hmm....your right, I guess the last sermon of those two vids could have put the point more carefullly... Alphie had more than just faith and courage over Bertie --Alphie a random number generator and the freedom to use it in a faithful and courageous way; Bertie was meant to act like hard determinists think we act: as always choosing at each point what we think will yield the best outcome.
Hi DeletedDelusion, sure, the more options we have the freer we are. And sure, choosing failure was an option for Alphie!! As I said in the vid, we often do things which we know are against our best interests! And sometimes that's the right thing to do anyways, even if it doesn't seem so at the time...
Hi blackcrow6667, interesting question, fun to speculate about......try this on for size. There are a set of neurons which are responsible for generating the "correct" series of alternatives, and there are a set of neurons which are responsible for choosing between them. If the "alternative generating" neurons start to decline, you'd see some inapropriate choices start appearing, and the behavior of the person would start to get mroe and more erratic...(cont)
(cont, to blackcroud6667) if on the other hand, the selection neurons start to decline, we would expect to see increasingly inflexible and rigid behavior etc....
Sorry, after AP. The AP threshold is surpassed 300ms before the conscious awareness. So the motor activity is already ready to go by the time you know you made a decision to act.
In NG's "Fight Science" they demonstrated this by showing that a martial artist can react to an attack faster than the fighter can possibly be aware of it.
In Haynes and Libet's work the time-interval was stretched out for experimentation. I.e. a simpler "conscious" task was used.
Rybot9000 3 years ago
Hi Rybot9000, w.r.t. a martial artist reacting to attacks etc, once again, this just proves that conciousness is slow. It doesn't prove that choices arn't free.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
Whatever else you say... how does any of this refute the fact that a seemingly free-decision can be predicted based on frontopolar and pareital lobe activity up to 10s before the conscious sensation of having made a decision at all (Nature Neuroscience 11, 543 - 545 (2008))?
The awareness of having made a decision occurs 300ms before AP of the motor neuron (Libet 1984). The decision can be predicted 7 - 10s before by MRI.
Rybot9000 3 years ago
Hi Rybot9000, you are aware that Libet believes we have free will? He does not claim that his experiment disproves it. think about it this way: sure, you can sometimes predict what a person will choose to do before they are consciously aware of their choices. So what? All that proves is that the neurons which implement conciousness are slow. it takes time to communicate to the rest of the brain what has been decided.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
Ok so when human action can be predicted with 80% accuracy 10 minutes before a choice (either/or) action takes place by looking at the brain pattern will that finally disprove free will? lol Or how long does it have to be man?
regemo 3 years ago
I don't think you could do it from a brain scan--no matter how much earlier, you could always make an argument that the choice was made before then. The only way to show that we are determnistic is to be able to control us by manipulating our inputs. If somebody came up with, say, a sure-fire way to seduce any woman (which I could use :-)) for example, I'd believe that we were deterministic. Prediction is only half the battle--the other half is control.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
I wouldnt want to do that. A satellite would fall out of the sky on me for messing with the deterministic nature of the universe. :D
regemo 3 years ago
*chuckle* well I don't believe in determinism but I do believe in Karma :-)
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
You seem to be saying here that because finite beings cannot know everthing that is effecting them, they are therefore not determined.
I'm sorry Randy, but in my opinion when a being reacts chaotically or weirdly, it is because they are unaware and are becoming ever more so of what is making them act. There is a value-connotation to the word "freedom" here that is misleading.
Kierketaard 3 years ago
Hi Kierketaard, it is important to draw a distinction here between chaotic behavior and the behavior of my neuron. Chaotic systems are unpredictable because of a finite amount of numerical precision: tiny errors are multiplied. This neuron is quite different. The unpredictability of my neuron is not simply due to lack of knowledge: we could know to infinite degrees of precision about it, and still not know when it was going to fire. It is genuinely nondeterministic. crucial difference.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
Okay Randy. Questions at that level does not strike me as especially important to a wounded vet wondering why he can't stand up anymore, or why the funny clasp at the end of his Bush mandated economy-chair doesn't work properly when he squeezes it.
Anyway, I think that you are cool, and smart - and you know that already. Micro particle fleas/nuerons notwithstanding.
Kierketaard 3 years ago
Your last comment implies to me that you are set in your ways. Becuase I'm 27 and your 40ish you know more about this?
I know it's called an "axon" and the depolarization occurs at the "axon hillock". I know the anatomy of nerve cells and of the human brain (to some extent). I've also spent years reading papers on the subject.
Even the yokels at Dana foundation don't suggest we have free-will. Just weirdo philosophers and physicists, people who don't study the human brain/decision process.
Rybot9000 3 years ago
Hi Rybot9000 "because you're 40 and I'm 27 you know more about this?" Uh, that's not what I said at all. Please go back and relisten to it carefully, with a charitable ear, assuming that I'm not a total asshole. You'll see that's not what I said at all.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
You say the "cell" chooses and the other cells just follow suit, but this is patently false. The chain doesn't start with the cell, it starts with external stimuli. Take the visual system for example, well studied by Koch, Crick, etc..
The process "begins" with stimulation of the RGC (Retinal Ganglion Cells) and excite the Opsin/Rhodopsin in the RGCs which causes spiking of the neurons. The RGCs don't "choose" to fire.
Rybot9000 3 years ago
Do you have any other videos on brain stuff? I'm really tired of all the philosophical nonsense.
Here you call it an "axion" multiple times, but it is actually an "axon". I wonder how much you've studied the real and not the hypothetical.
Every neuroscientist (save Hammeroff) says Free-Will is false, and after reviewing the evidence I have to agree with them.
Nothing in the videos actually are philosophical "free-will" and some of it is scientifically false.
For example:
Rybot9000 3 years ago
Hi Rybot9000, "do you have any other videos on brain stuff? I'm really tired of all the philosophical nonsense". Have you watched my two videos entitled "Nondeterminism in the Hodgkin's Huxley Equations?" There's no philosophy in them, only biochemestry and math.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
We use math to approximate behavior in systems like these. The measured behavior of the neuron is a complex interaction of proteins, lipids and ions.
The equation doesn't define these attributes, but instead the range of results, from their probable interactions.
It appears non-determinalistic because information leading to the 'vote', is not observable in this experiment. Your appearance of nondeterminalism, comes from the error range of lost information.
Weaseldog2001 3 years ago
Hi Weaseldog2001, we can describe the behavior of neurons at many levels, as collections of subatomic particles, as atoms, as molecules and ions, etc. At the lower levels, of course, quantum effects hold and there is no need to postulate determinacy. My contribution is this: people used to think that by the time you get to the level of modeling the neuron in terms of ion flows, the neuron would always be approximatable with deterministic models. I've shown that this is not inevitably true.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
(cont, to Weaseldog2001) what I like about your comment is that it points out that when we are talking about whether something is deterministic or not, we tend to confuse two things (a) whether the neuron itself is nondeterministic, or (b) whether our model of that neuron is nondeterministic. (cont)
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
(cont, to Weaseldog2001) What I've shown is that even when you are modeling a neuron as a set of differential equations describing ion flows, the most accurate model for that neuron might very well be nondeterminisitic. Does this mean the neuron itself is nondeterministic? Well, we have many ways of modeling the behavior of neurons, but now we can say that none of them are deterministic in all cases.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
I agree with you.
Weaseldog2001 3 years ago
At the quantum level the same problem arises.
Is quantum mechanics non-determinalistic, or is that an artifact of our models?
Are we simply missing non-observable information.
This get's then into the theory that sub-atomic particles may interact in dimensions that we can't directly detect...
Weaseldog2001 3 years ago
Yes, saw all that. Those equations would violate
physical laws; in order for them to be true, one would have to show why charged Ions behave in a different way than the default mode; that was why I rambled on about Default VS Secondary Mode; Having a physics background, I see this a lot in philosophy; saying new things like self organized, self relplicating, or emergent property, are meaningless unless you show how it is connected to what is known to at least usually be true about +-charges
GodMechanism 3 years ago
Ummm...... nevermind.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
At Dendritic Bifurication Points, Ion Flow is Inhibited or Excited; This is where the secondary mode would be used, where the flow of say-Ions can Come Tgthr or Move A p a r t from a molecule that controls a gate that allow more Ions into one branch and is inhibited going down the other branch towards another neuron, and this would depend not on something that exists, but on what they are being used to build(the intention). Not Free and not mechanical
GodMechanism 3 years ago
Now, If there is a default and secondary mode in which charges behave, we have introduced flexibility; this flexibility is how Intentions explain Charged Ion Behavior in normal body of cells and in the dendritic branches of nerve cells, particullarlly at Dendritic Bifurication Points. But Intentions are not something that exist, nor are they Free. Even if the choice is between 3 ways to cut a pie, there is always a reason we take one way over the other; there is never ambiguity
GodMechanism 3 years ago
Hi GodMech, did you see my video on the Hodgkin-Huxley equation? The HH-equation describes how ions move around in nerve cells. In that video I show that there are nondeterministic solutions to that equation. So I claim that a nondeterministic neuron like this one, can exist. (cont)
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
(cont, to GodMech) Now, as to how our intensions constrain our behavior, you say that there is always a reason why we take one way over the other. I disagree--I don't know how many of the other videos in this series you have seen, but heres the thing--our intentions are NORMATIVE. e.g. I intend to be fair to the boys. But there are many many different ways to be fair to them. No matter how many norms I throw in there still is a wide variety of choices I could make to satisfy my (cont)
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
(cont, to GodMech) intention to be fair to the boys. Norms constrain us differently than causes do. Another example: the speed limit sign says 55mph. But that doesn't cause me to drive at any particular speed, there are a range of different speeds I can choose to drive. What I'm suggesting in this series is that the brain uses a nondeterministic mechanism to select which of the many options is open to it when its making free-will choices.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
the Problem With this, is that how Cahrged Ions behave in nerve cells can be described as opposite charges move Tgthr and like charges move A p a r t; anything extra, must violate this, for this is deterministic. Unless, there are exceptions to this, meaning that opposite charges can also move A p a r t and Like charges can come Tgthr. Such That, there is a default mode and a secondary mode in which charges operate.
GodMechanism 3 years ago
why is there 2 Axonic Outputs in your model of the neuron?
GodMechanism 3 years ago
Hi GodMech, it was meant to symbolize that the output of a neuron could go to more than one other neuron. In the brain, for example, an axion will branch out and typically feeds into many thousands of other neurons.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
So Randy. Do you believe that computers operate deterministically? Can we put a couple of these neurons in a computer?
Also, I record the state of the universe, then watch what unfolds. Then I go back in time! And watch the same events unfold, ie starting from the same initial condition. Do you think (assuming we could perform this experiment) that it is possible for different outcomes to occur?
Do you think this is different from just starting at the same initial condition?
126altf4 3 years ago
Hi 126altf4, let me see if I can answer your qeustions. (1) most computers are indented by their designers to operate deterministically, but of course, all might suffer from random memory corruption :-) (2) I didn't quite understand this question, do you mean can we make some sort of brain-computer hybrid incorporating nondeterminstic neurons as components to a new kind of computer? (3) yes, I think there are multiple possible futures for any present state of the universe
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
(4) didn't understand what you meant??
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
jeeze your fast at answering!
2) you say a neuron is inderterministic, why could I not make a computer nonderterministic?
4) I was asking do you distinguish between recreating the i.c. and watching an event play out and going back in time to that i.c. and watching an event play out.
126altf4 3 years ago
2) nondeterministic out out no organic molecules
126altf4 3 years ago
yeah, I have no life :-) (2) sure, you could make a nondeterminstic computer. (4) interesting question. I suppose theres a difference if you look at it from the viewpoint of 4-dimensional spacetime.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
right is it not just a 4-d structure?
126altf4 3 years ago
LOL, no I think its more than just a 4-d structure, but who knows eh?
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
lol. you know what i mean.
My point with the computer is this: nondeterministic neuron in a computer,
nondeterministic neuron in my head,
what does the nondeterministic neuron have to do with consciousness or the self?
126altf4 3 years ago
If you think the same think would happen in the time travel case(that is the same events as just observed) then arn't you acknowledging that there are properties of a system that can exist which will guarentee an outcome in spite of the nondeterministic behaviour outlined in this video?
If you say something different could happen then I find that a very interesting position for anyone to hold... to say the least.
126altf4 3 years ago
But I don't think the same thing would happen in the time travel case. Lke I said, I think that there are multiple futures for every present
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
Do these multiple futures exist even after one is determined?
Kierketaard 3 years ago
Hi kierketaard I don't think they remain possibilities after one has been fixed.
randyhelzerman 3 years ago
great I marked my own comment as spam, oops!
I also wanted to point out that consciousness is not the cause in the case of a nondeterministic computer. Also, If there are nondeterministic causes then we are creating information all the time. But... we aren't losing information. Too much information, doesn't all fit, eventually new information becomes worthless and unimportant!
126altf4 3 years ago
The example of the delayed firing determining your action is that same of an example I dreamed up yesterday. If I am deciding what to do when I have incomplete and ambiguous data and I am waffling between two or more paths to attain my goal. The "executive function" might determine how long to continue weighing my options as I keep changing my mind. Maybe that "executive function" will stop when your neuron fires leaving me with whatever decision was winning at that moment...
philosophydude 3 years ago
...That still leaves me with a randomized process as opposed to a process that my mind controls. I know from studies of attention that people can change the activity of the brain by focusing on a certain subject. Attention also alters a person's ability to remember the target of the attention. What if we are asked to focus on important, ambiguous information, make an "election" and base the rest of our lives on that decision... I think I'm going in circles at this point.
philosophydude 3 years ago
(part 3) If there is (or ever will be) proof of free will, we need only to show that it happens a small number of times in each person's life. Based on your definition (and my thoughts), the best chance for this is when information is incomplete and there is no physiological compulsion to choose one choice over another. Sometimes those "choices" are big... like staying in school or quitting. Once the "choice" is made, our mind/body are affected by the physical experiences that follow.
philosophydude 3 years ago
Are you aware of the research of Benjamin Libet. Taken from wikipeida "Libet's experiments suggest unconscious processes in the brain are the true initiator of volitional acts, therefore, little room remains for the operations of free will. If the brain has already taken steps to initiate an action before we are aware of any desire to perform it, the causal role of consciousness in volition is all but eliminated."
Mjhavok 4 years ago
Libet finds room for free will in the interpretation of his results only in the form of 'the power of veto'; conscious acquiescence is required to allow the unconscious buildup of the readiness potential to be actualized as a movement.
Mjhavok 4 years ago
Hi Mjhavok, yeah; I think (and as you probably have already lept ahead to surmise) that this picture would be very compatible with Libet's empirical results; surely marshalling all the possible alternative actions and deliberating which one to do is something which, in general, has to be done far faster than what conscious thought allows. There might be enough time for conciousness to do one more scrutenizing pass to double check the option which was elected.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
His results show that it isn't the concious part of your brain that elicits the action. That is interesting.
Mjhavok 4 years ago
Randy or anyone, consider that A is the neural state at 0 Volts, and B is the following 'uncaused state' such that the neuron displays voltage. C is the cause of this new voltage.
A -spooky non-determinism -> B -> C
Now, causality seems to me just as spooky as non-determinism. I only wish to make the following point:
Is the first cause of 'C':
1.)[A changing to B]
or
2.) B
This is actually quite puzzling if you think about it, due to the nature of A changing to be being "uncaused
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
"due to the nature of A changing to B being uncaused"* I cannot find a good reasont to prefer (1) over (2), above.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
Hi Everett, this is a great question. I'm going to try to explain it and answer it in a video, but my wife wants me to go to bed..... *sigh* if you want to get anywhere in philosophy dude, don't get married (assuming this hasn't come too late..)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
LOL prolly too late.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
did you create your own neuron to prove yourself right.. LOL i accept at least we have the idea of free will maybe it does not exist maybe it does. the chaotic ness of the universe makes me think so, but other than that i dont know..
x71isnwor 4 years ago
Hi x71, you bet :-) Somebody has to do something dramatic to move the debate forrward. And yes, I think your answer to the question "I don't know" is about the best answer we can expect :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
Brilliant!
Shanella28 4 years ago
Everett's conditions also imply another obstacle to your argument: to believe in Free Will, you must first prove the self, but to believe in the self, you must first prove Free Will. If a self is fully determined, it is not a self, but a part of the universe; if a free will is self-less, it is mere randomness. You must therefore prove both self and Frew Will at the same time.
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
You're right....in fact, I can't prove that you exist either. Therefore, I'll just ignore this comment :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
I know that I'm stepping in metaphysics here, but I think this question has an empirical relevance, since we are assuming the self: an additional axiom that is not at all a basic assumption of empiricism.
However, I think we can skip this problem for the sake of the discussion.
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
mak, I confess dude, I don't understand your point here at all. You've totally confused me :-(
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
To satisfy the Everett's first conclusion, FW must come from the self, but what is an non-free self? it would be one that is completely determined; part of "the machine" and therefore not a self at all.
therefore the self is no more basic than free will: neither can exist without the other, so if one is proved wrong the other follows and to prove one right, both must be proved true.
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
So your contention is that we can't really be selfs if we don't have free will? I actually would agree with that; although I suppose I'd offer as a proof that there are selfs the same kind of proof I offer for free will: we treat each other as if we are selfs, peoples with free will.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
But many of us still disagree with you that we _must_ treat people as if they had FW. I think it is only folk psycho-causality.
Take Dentrophilian's last video: all but you is the same machine: your body, your car, you guinea pig... I quite agree with that when taken from a first person perspective (if we should take a 1st persone perspective is another question)
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
Hi mak. "only" folk psychology. Yeah, I get that a lot :-) By that logic we would have to say there's no such thing as water, there's only H20. Wait!! There's not really any such thing as water molecules, there's just atoms doing their thing. But wait! There's no such thing as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, its just electrons, protons, and neutrons doing there thing. But wait! Its really quarks, or strings, or branes....ANYTHING but whater!! ANYTHING but persons with free will!!
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
I was typing my answer to that, and I found myself talkign about ontology for what could have taken many times 500 caraters so I think I'll make a video response when this house gets less noisy i.e. when everyone's asleep i.e. very late in the night.
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
but! I was so busy answering that I did not realised that I do not see what is the link between your comment and mine you were replying to. Taking the whole universe as a machine has nothing to do with what there is relatively to reductionism.
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
Hi mak, I'm just saying, suppose we _could_ analyse people and free will in terms of simpler components. So what? that wouldn't mean that people and free will didn't exist, any more than analyzing water in terms of simpler components means that water doesn't exist. Consider the following two conversations: (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to mak) A: "we know there's water because we can see it, drink, it take a swim in it". B: "nonsense!!! There's no such thing as water; its just a useful heuristic we use to deal with what is really h20".
(cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
I think that's as silly as this conversation: Randy:"we know there are selfs and free will because we interact with these selves every day and treat them as if they had free will." Skeptic: "nonsense!!! There's no such thing as selves and free will, its just a useful heuristic we use to deal with what is really atoms and void".
(cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to mak) I really don't see why we can't use the evidence we gain from interactions with people as evidence that we are selfs and have free will.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
hmmm i would would say randy's main empirical challenge is to show that the 'self' interpreted as some sort of neural wiring, is actually involved directly in decision making at the time of conscious decision making. i find it very, very , very unlikely that this is the case - but my intuition means nothing. i claim i do not know how we make decisions, he claims he does know, but he is claiming more than he CAN know. i think agnosticism is the strongest stance that randy can demonstrate.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
I agree with you: I do not have the impression that the non-det neuron solves the "not mere randomness" problem.
If the non-det neuron is said to cause FW, would it still be FW if we replaced it by a little guy flipping coins in the cells?
maksiiiskam2 4 years ago
Hi Everett, your point of agnosticism is very well taken, and I do in fact have no illusions about being able to prove anything at this point. If I can get people to at least allow for the possibility of free will, I think that one of the essential preconditions for the sorts of empirical confirmations/disconfirmations will even be possible. As I've said continually through this series, I'm not doing conceptual analysis, I'm making empirical claims, and I reserve the right to be wrong.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
alright... but god is possible as well! admit it randy - you believe in free wilL!!!
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
LOL Everett, sure, I believe in free will! That's why I spend so much time looking for mechanism, etc :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
so in other words you have a belief first and go about looking for ways to make it plausible afterwards... i already had the hunch this was the case but im suprised you admit it. you do realize that the history of philosophical dispute has been so wide-ranging that we must conclude most people have been wrong about almost all the issues. When we know that having a belief and looking for evidence is a way to rationalize false beliefs, so why would you go down this road?
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
"When we know that having a belief and looking for evidence is a way to rationalize false beliefs, so why would you go down this road?"
I've been wondering about this too. imo compatibilists like dennett make a great case for why we don't need libertarian free will, but i think the arguments can be applied to randy's non-radical version of FW too. If we agree with those guys, all we really need is a will, and we've clearly got that already.
bitbutter 4 years ago
hehe
touchingstoves 4 years ago
It seems like all the objections at this point are stemming from an intuitive, paradoxical conception of free will. It's not possible to satisfy this conception because it is incoherent to begin with. The "will" of the self eg. its' biological and emotional needs are generated by the body- WHICH IS THE MIND, and the satisfaction of those desires is genuinely nondeterministic as illustrated by Randy's nondeterministic neuron model. What more could you want in a plausible theory?
spawnfan101 4 years ago
a theory which takes into account the paradoxical intuitions we have about what free will is in the first place. i think its impossible, obviously - thats why i dont believe in free will.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
i will translate my argument my argument to strict deductive form, and trnaslate it symbolically as well if i can, and get back to you in 5 hours or so, and show that you have not dealt with my deductive argument.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
Ok Everett, it is entirely possible that I misunderstood you. Sorry again for saying grouchy things before my first coffee. Let me give you some insight into my headspace here in order to help you pitch your argument to me: (1) I reject dualism, the self is identical with the body, (2) I embrace the technique of recursive explaination: to explain the self, we need to break it into pieces, each of which is simpler than the self and is therefore _not_ the self, and (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) then show how those pieces work together to form the self. This means I reject any notion that there's a subset of neurons in the brain which is the "self". No homonicli!!! (3) arguments for or against my position from subjective experience are going to be treated very skeptically--your videos are an excellent source of information for why subjectivistic evidence isn't persuasive. Please try to use axioms which can be publicly, intersubjectively investigated. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) Again, very sorry for making presumptions against you. :-( Looking forward to what you've got to say.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
do you mean i cannot reference my intuition about what free will is? this is the only really we have the idea free will - due to subjective experience.
yes i relied on dualism because it such a simple way of thinking about these things, i assumed that the argument would hold for monism.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
Hi Everett, you can reference your intuition about what free will is, but if we disagree about whether an axiom in your argument is true or not, it would be helpful if that axiom could be supported by some public, intersubjectively observable evidence, which could look at and resolve the conflict. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) this is why I have consistently based my argument for free will on publicly observable, intersubjectively verifiable data: namely, (1) the properties of neurons and (2) our observations of how people treat each other. In fact we do ascribe free will to each other in every civil transaction between us. So if you want to really attack my argument for free will, you'll have attack these ascriptions of free will to each other. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) Why is the ascription of free will to each other spurious, even if we could give an explanation for it? I mean, we don't say that "entropy" is an illusion--we don't say that entropy doesn't exists, its just the little atoms get more and more disordered. We don't say "temperature" doesn't exist, its just the little atoms speed up. An explanation for X doesn't necessarily drain X of reality. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everette) therefore, I have to strongly disagree with the contention that the only evidence we have for free will comes from subjective experience. I say our evidence from free will comes from the simple fact that we get along better with people if we ascribe free will to them. This is the same kind of evidence as you get along better with cliffs if you ascribe gravity to the earth and realize you might fall off of them.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"In fact we do ascribe free will to each other in every civil transaction between us."
I won't presume to speak for everett but according to my intuition about free will, we don't ascribe free will to each other. Nor could we, because the intuition doesn't make sense. For me the ascriptions of free will you say need to be attacked, don't exist.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. ascribing free will to each other, perhaps I should do another video on this. But you recall my vids on the blue bubbles and the pink bubbles. The blue bubbles are folk psychology, including our respecting others decisions and treating them as if no God, Government, or Force of Nature should stand in their way of self creation. The difference is the pink bubbles, where we put little asterisks and disclaimers, saying its not "really" that way-- (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to bitbutter) its not *really* this way, its all predestined by god, or predestined by nature, or just a giant computer simulation... Sure, you have a sophisticated world view, and greater knowledge of the more deterministic aspects of the universe, and this inclines you to believe that we're deterministic, but this hasn't changed how you interact with other people one bit--you do it the same as somebody who _does_ believe in free will. We all share the blue bubbles (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to bitbutter) and moreover, the blue bubbles (folk psychology) is the only thing we _do_ have evidence for. Moreover, the evidence is copious and continual. Folk psychology is the most used, most useful, and best confirmed theory we've got.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"The blue bubbles are folk psychology, including our respecting others decisions and treating them as if no God, Government, or Force of Nature should stand in their way of self creation. The difference is the pink bubbles, where we put little asterisks and disclaimers, saying its not "really" that way"
My blue bubbles would be worded slightly diff from yours, and they would not be contradicted by the pink bubbles.
bitbutter 4 years ago
cont'd We are autonomous agents *and* every aspect of our being flows inevitably from causes that are not us. There need be no dissonance between the two sets of bubbles (i think this is the gist of compatibilism, but i prefer to ditch the 'free will' label).
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, yeah, I suppose you might self-describe yourself differently, but lets consider it from a 3rd party perspective. Say you were a twin. Your brother has a religious experience and becomes a southern baptist :-) and believes that people have free will. Say we film both you and your twin shopping, talking to your bosses, settling disputes with your kids etc. Could we tell, just by looking at the films, which one believed in free will and which didn't?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
no. not unless i was wearing a 'free will free' tee shirt..
bitbutter 4 years ago
LOL bitbutter. But all of these interactions you are ascribing free will (of course, in my bastardized definition thereof) to people, inasmuch as you _do_ treat them as if they have a real choices. If your kids or your employees do something wrong, you do tell them they **should** have done differently, and you are annoyed at them because the **could** have done it differently. Same goes for your boss, or S.O. No?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"inasmuch as you _do_ treat them as if they have a real choices. "
I believe that real choices exist even if the universe is entirely deterministic.
Part of the utility of being angry with someone is that i hope to 'recalibrate' their decision making modules, deterministically ;), so that they will behave in a way i approve of in the future. 'You should have done X, you fool!" == can be seen as a shorthand for: "in similar circumstances in the future do X and you will gain my approval."
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, I don't think "shouldn't" can be analyzed as "in similar circs in the future, etc". Here's why: If somebody made some stupid mistake which killed both them and somebody you cared about, you wouldn't be angry at them, or you wouldn't think it would be correct to say "they shouldn't have done that?"
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"or you wouldn't think it would be correct to say "they shouldn't have done that?""
Yes i would. And i could be using it to mean "If one does X, i will disapprove" (i'm not personally committed to any of these ways of using 'should', i'm just trying to show that these words are not necessarily emptied of meaning in a deterministic universe)
bitbutter 4 years ago
To try to clarify some more: On my view, when i say 'should have' i'm talking about a hypothetical situation--if the do-er could travel back in time, with the benefit of hindsight. I'm not implying that if the universe was set up in exactly the same way as it was at the moment of the do-ers decision, that it was possible that the do-er would do something differently to what he in fact did do (here i'm assuming straight determinism for simplicity).
bitbutter 4 years ago
Brilliantly done Randy. Reminds me of your non-deterministic Newtonian Physics vid and how the marble can randomly decide to descend down the dome.
mistawulf 4 years ago
:-) Thanks mistawulf! BTW, you've got to know 10,000 times more about ion tranport than I do too :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"Previous neuron resets the voltage of the nondeterministic neuron to zero volts"
You chose the deterministic path. By my criteria one, you must now show that the neural net corresponding to the 'conscious self's choice' is also reponsible for this "Previous Neurons" action. Infinite regress ensues due to this in conjunction with my criteria #2. That is, other neurons must have fired to cause this previous neuron to fire - but then the self had to cause these to fire as well, and so on.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
the sermon: woah!?
Novelty is great, but it counts for nothing if your arguments don't add up.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bittbutter, w.r.t. the sermon, yeah I know; I just think we can expect to see some very interesting ideas from Everett :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
hi Randy: I disagree that in your example the self is the first cause. Rather a neuron is. The self is not identical with the neurons in the patterns it emerges from.
bitbutter 4 years ago
So you'd rather embrace dualism than say we have free will?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
I don't understand how you get to that. I hoped that this would be uncontroversial; The same pile of neurons does not guarantee the same self.
bitbutter 4 years ago
to clarify:
The same pile of neurons does not guarantee the same self.
While the same *pattern of neurons*, and inter neural processes, might.
The 1st cause you show is not the self, it is a neuron, which is part of the 'self' pattern.
The faulty spark plug causes the car to break down. The car does not cause the car to break down.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Ummmm....... the faulty spark plug is part of the car. Similarly, each neuron is part of the self, no? Do we go to the same church? :-) This is the nature of recursive explanation: you take a complex system (the self) and try to break it down into simpler component parts, and show how they work together to form the whole. ???
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
yes. but we do not say the car causes the car to break down. we say the spark plug (part of the car) does. similarly in your example the self is not the first cause, the neuron (part of the self) is. two diff things.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, I guess I don't understand this line of objection; I don't really feel that it presses much of a point against me. Sure, a car might not start because of a faulty spark plug; how does it follow that the self is not identical with the body? Perhaps you can rephrase?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
What i'm objecting to specifically is that in the vid you seem to be equating a *neuron* being the first cause of a election, with the *self* being its first cause (everett's requirement). Even though the neuron is part of the self, i don't think it follows to say a nondeterministic event in neuron _is_ the self acting as a 1st cause of an election.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hmmm....lets explore where our intuitions diverge..... say Tony Soprano tells Pauli Walnuts to whack me. Pauli Walnuts isn't sure how he does it, so he flips a coin: heads, I get cement shoes and am thrown off a bridge. Tails, I get choked with piano wire :-) Its heads, and I'm thrown off a bridge. Tony Soprano goes to court, and he offers the "bitbutter" defense: He says he didn't cause me to get killed, the nondeterministic coin flip did. You're the judges--do you agree?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
No i don't agree of course, good question.
A non deterministic coin flip would not be a cause of the murder, while it might be the '1st cause' leading to a particular murder plan being chosen.
Similarly: the non deterministic neuron is not the cause of the kids being treated well, it is the determiner of the method of treating the kids well.
bitbutter 4 years ago
ive noticed that when we consider the idea of A changing nondeterministically to state B, then B->C, it is tempting to say that "A changing to B" is the 1st cause of B, rather than saying that B (a neuron) is the first cause.
Is "A changing to B" the first cause or is B the first cause? I cannot seem to firmly grasp the difference in my mind.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
Hi Everett, very interesting observation. I think most theories of causation today say that it is _events_ which cause other events. The difference between an event and a state is that an event is something that "happens", whereas a a state is something which just "is". Or in otherwords, and event is a change of state. So for example the neuron nondeterministically changes state from A to B--that is an event. That event can cause something else to change from C to D:another event. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) So in your example, it would be the change from state A to state B which was the cause. Putting this all together (with bitbutter's question) on this analysis of causation, the neuron is a part of me, so part of my state is state A. then the neuron nondeterministically changes to state B. This means that my state changes, part of my state is now B. This causes the election. Since it was my state change which caused the election, then I'm the first cause.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"Since it was my state change which caused the election, then I'm the first cause."
Well, one of the parts of your 'self' was the cause. I'm trying to think of other ways to make it clear why this doesn't sit well with me!
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. first cause of part/whole, yes, please keep trying to convince me..... anywhere there's a strong intuition there's got to be something there I need to take into account..
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to Everett) So, events are the causes of other events, i.e. it is the change of state from A to B which is the cause of something else changing state from C to D. Applying this analysis to our present case: the state of my nondeterministic neurons is part of my overall global state. So when the neuron changes state, I change state. Therefore, if the neuron's change of state is the first cause of anything, I am the first cause of it as well.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
For a person to have free will, everett requires that the self be the 1st cause of an election, and my intuition agrees.
But if the first cause of a particular election is the non deterministic action of a neuron, that is something different to 'the self' having made that election (since the self is the sum of all the neurons and their interactions).
Or: The car doesn't make the car go, the new spark plug does.
bitbutter 4 years ago
Hi bitbutter, w.r.t. your car example, it occurs to me that another name for a car us "automobile" i.e. it moves itself. Sure, it can't move without spark plugs, but it can't move without tires either; are the tires moving the car? Why wouldn't it be most apropos to say that the car as a whole is what is moving itself?
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
You're right, the metaphor doesn't work. I'll try to put it a different way..
bitbutter 4 years ago
thats cheating.. you didnt satisfy his second criteria, you said there is no physical reason why the neuron fires and then concluded it must be the self.. but show no proof of this.. nor did you really show there was no physical thing that caused it :P
coaxx 4 years ago
coaxx: well he says that in order for the nondeterministic neuron to fire, another neuron must "start its engine". but by the first critiera this new neuron must be the self. and, by critiera 2, if it IS the self, the self must also cause itself and so on (infinite regress).
Ultimately he took the deterministic path, it looks like, and got himself a regress. the regress obviously satisfies both conditions, but, the problem is, you have an infinite regress.
I cried at his sermon, though.
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
Everett, are you a dualist? All these neurons form the self.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
coaxx, correct. Everett really doesn't want to believe I'm right :-) its creating a mental block in his brain.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
lol :P
coaxx 4 years ago
I don't think however, that I'm cheating. I did show there's no physical thing which caused the firing of the neuron, back in my video series called "Nondeterminsm in the Hodgkin's Huxley equation". And I didn't really think I needed proof that the neurons in our brain are the "self"--- I was assuming we all weren't dualists here...
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
the problem that i see is that dualism hasn't been proven false yet.
the dualism we see is enough proof that it hasn't been, otherwise why would we even have it in our vocabulary?
it's pretty complex from where i stand, and part of the problem is that the brain has been studied really closely but no one has yet solved anything, especially regarding 'qualia'
coaxx 4 years ago
Hi coaxx, I agree, dualism hasn't been proven false yet, and I suppose the arguments in this video wouldn't be persuasive at all to a dualist. I did think, however, that Everett's working hypothesis was monism; he said as much in the video I was responding to....
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"is that the brain has been studied really closely but no one has yet solved anything,"
If you look at how we thought about being human a century ago, and then look at which questions the study of the brain has answered, or rendered irrelevant, i think we've solved lots. Perhaps it will always be tempting to say 'we know nothing', but comparing what we know to how little we knew before cures it i think ;)
bitbutter 4 years ago
yeah yeah.. i mean specifically in regards to the intuitive dualism of the mind/brain, not all the other science like neuroscience and such.
i would claim that we haven't gotten an inch closer to a solid solution either philosophically nor scientifically in that department, but then again im not a scientist so feel free to prove me wrong :)
coaxx 4 years ago
Ok, that was uncalled for....sorry Everett, I wrote that before my first coffee, and my normative neurons weren't fully engaged, presenting me with an inappropriate set of responses, and I elected the wrong one ;-(
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
nah dont worry it wasnt your fault, we dont have free will :)
EverettsVLOG 4 years ago
My neurons made me do it!! Thanks for being a good sport.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
You are your neurons. :-D
Mjhavok 4 years ago
What I'm still curious about is this:
So you have a brain that works nondeterministically and there's no way we can know beforehand which the result will be in the pie example. How does this fit in with the notion of a "self that causes things" as known in Volk-psychology? :) You've hit a big hole into the deterministic framework (which is quite a feat), which allows for free will but how do you want to fill it? So far the outcome in the pie example is arbitrary, not "willed" in the Volks-sense.
koenichfuerst 4 years ago
Hi koenichfuerst, good question. Back to the pie story: my kids want a fair share of pie, and I want to treat them fairly. So far, these statements are both normative, saying what the kids think I _should_ do and what I think I _should_ do. So there's many possible ways I can satisfy the desire for fairness. But notice, described in normative terms, this situation isn't arbitrary at all: I'm trying to be fair. (cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to koenichfuerst) so at the level of normative language, there's no arbitrariness at all: I'm doing the fair thing, I'm intending to cut the pie into fair portions, etc. But the way I satisfy that norm is arbitrary, the same way that it is kind of arbitrary what speed you drive at when the speed limit is 55 Mph. Actually, all of these speed limit examples must appear less persuasive to a German, seeing as ya'll have the autobahn......
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
Hmm... Wouldn't that then mean that (playing devil's advocate here) we are arbitrary at the execution of our intention, rather than free?
Btw. we have more than enough speed limits in Germany. :)
koenichfuerst 4 years ago
Hi koenichfuerst, yeah, I try to address this in my video series "Dionysian free will" where i show this very 'arbitrariness' can sometimes be harnessed and used to help us achieve our goals. Another question is: what do you mean by "free", if it isn't he capability to make arbitrary elections :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
Yeah, that definition of free will is where it's at. I agree that your model shows a way how our brain can be truly nondeterministic and therefore act in a way that can't be predicted based on prior inputs. It opens the doorway to define something like free will by allowing for the free part. I think the will part is the problem I still have. Somehow I doubt it will be solved until we have a satisfying explanation for consciousness. And consciousness still doesn't make any sense to me.
koenichfuerst 4 years ago
Hi koenichfuerst, consciousness oy vey!! :-) Yeah, I eventually want to get around to that too, but its gunna be another multi-month philoso-fest raking that one over the coals!! :-) One step at a time here.....
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
If your work at free will is any indicator, I can't wait so see that. :)
... but
koenichfuerst 4 years ago
I guess I have no choice. :)
koenichfuerst 4 years ago
Let´s say we de have free will.
Of what use is it, if we can make our own choices without beeing able to imagine or know the consequeces of our choices?
Example: If a zebra goes to a waterhole and gets killed by lions or crocodiles luring there, did it willfully choose its death, or did it choose to avoid death by dehydration?
I would only call something free will when we´re fully aware of every consequence of our choices.... Sometimes we are, a lot of times we´re not.
DeletedDelusion 4 years ago
Hi DeletedDelusion, I talk about what possible use this sort of thing would be in my video series "Dionysian Rationality". UrbanElf challenged me to think of a game in which the winning strategy requires this kind of ability to deviate from the known best path....check 'em out and see how well I've done. I'm going to do a third part to that series soon, so if I didn't address your concerns let me know and I'll include another part just for you :-)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
Those are two great videos.
Thing is, you said that both Alphie and Bertie have the same goal, but one just lacks faith and courage. Sounds like that one is set to fail ;)
So here I am, asking if we can choose to have no faith or courage.
I´m not arguing that the world is absolutely random or deterministic, but for a dualism, like, I will die one day, but how might not be set yet.
I think there are things that change from a random stage into a deterministic one and back.
DeletedDelusion 4 years ago
Hi DeletedDelusion, thanks! hmm....your right, I guess the last sermon of those two vids could have put the point more carefullly... Alphie had more than just faith and courage over Bertie --Alphie a random number generator and the freedom to use it in a faithful and courageous way; Bertie was meant to act like hard determinists think we act: as always choosing at each point what we think will yield the best outcome.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
I think in my case it´s just a question of the definition of free will.
How free is our will when our possible options are narrowed down?
Also, Alphie could have choosen to fail, but was that realy an option for him? ;)
DeletedDelusion 4 years ago
Hi DeletedDelusion, sure, the more options we have the freer we are. And sure, choosing failure was an option for Alphie!! As I said in the vid, we often do things which we know are against our best interests! And sometimes that's the right thing to do anyways, even if it doesn't seem so at the time...
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
That was passionate lol!
Boucrate 4 years ago
:-) couldn't help myself, Boucrate.
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
In neuroscience, executive function declines with age. How is both "will power" and its studied decline, represented in your model?
blackcrow6667 4 years ago
Hi blackcrow6667, interesting question, fun to speculate about......try this on for size. There are a set of neurons which are responsible for generating the "correct" series of alternatives, and there are a set of neurons which are responsible for choosing between them. If the "alternative generating" neurons start to decline, you'd see some inapropriate choices start appearing, and the behavior of the person would start to get mroe and more erratic...(cont)
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
(cont, to blackcroud6667) if on the other hand, the selection neurons start to decline, we would expect to see increasingly inflexible and rigid behavior etc....
randyhelzerman 4 years ago
"I must be more Free because I make more correct, coherent and less random (erratic) choices"! :)
blackcrow6667 4 years ago