to pyrrho

[CPLains]

Well. First of all. Thanks for your replies. :) And yes, that was a dry joke. Not without merit as it seems to communicate exactly what i wanted.

Let me note two points. First, it's an overly broad definition that subsumes more than it has any right to. Secondly, it is circular in the way "people want happiness, happiness is what people want" is often circular. Now these are not logical objections, but rather comments.

[CPLains]

To explicity conquer pragmatism we can show how what is pragmatical is to not believe in pragmatism. This is implied as a possibility in the "joke", and something i think is very real. It doesn't necessarily beat pragmatism, but it beats being a pragmatist. (I know this is quite a strange way to reason; one that i learned from Parfit - but extremely interesting ain my mind!)

[CPLains]

So why is it not pragmatical to be a pragmatist? By being a pragmatist we narrow down our view much like the utilitarians do. Not because their "calculus" cannot include everything - it can be modified to whatever degree, but because our way of thinking is not inherently challenged by its decree.

In formulating my above thoughts i think i see what seperates us. I'm in desperate need for challenging thought, utterances that shake me to the core, that drives my questioning further.

[CPLains]

By limiting myself to scientific method and conventional moral philosophy, and pragmatism in general, i feel as if the impetous to break through and see new novel phenomena is too weak to surpass the huge inertia and bias we are born with. "Happiness" and "Scientific Method" and "Pragmatism" share in common the unusual (or all-too usual) property that most people are very comfortable with them; everyone agrees with their "obvious" nature, and nuances between approaches get buried beneath them.

[wonderist]

I read through your comments but cannot seem to find the meat of the argument.

Is it that 'thinking like a pragmatist' is unsatisfying? I would challenge that with, "To find satisfaction, you must find techniques of thinking that achieve better satisfying outcomes. To find those techniques, you must compare which ones work better, i.e. predict higher satisfaction. This is an inherently pragmatic process. Therefore, try harder at pragmatism. Keep going, don't stop."

[wonderist]

I think most people who do not consider themselves pragmatists have not really thought through how deeply pragmatism permeates reasoning. They envision a superficial, straw man version of 'pragmatism', and then reject that. But in rejecting it, they are using pragmatic reasoning. Some other idea seems 'better' than the superficial 'pragmatism' they envision.

[wonderist]

Pragmatism is not a large set of ideas. It is one or a few very simple ideas that allow you to build your own larger set of ideas. Those larger sets of ideas are supported by pragmatism, but they are not pragmatism per se. Each pragmatist develops his own set of ideas based on pragmatism. In fact, I have many deep disagreements with most of the classical pragmatists. But I agree with them on the deeper, simpler, smaller set of pragmatic principles. That small set of ideas is what I'm defending.

[wonderist]

"Secondly, it is circular"

Not my version, because I rely on prediction. Whatever makes the better predictions is supported under pragmatism. Any attempt to show that you can achieve a 'better' outcome with some other method requires an inherent prediction. If the prediction actually is better, then it is subsumed by pragmatism. If not, then it's not actually 'better'.

[wonderist]

Also, remember that prediction says nothing about desire. Physics makes good predictions whether I want to believe in it or not. If I desire a better cannon, I should use physics to achieve that goal. If I want a better wall to protect me from my enemy's new cannon, I should also use physics to achieve that goal. Regardless of the goal, the best predictions come from physics. That is what truth is. The ability to predict. It says nothing of what goals you apply the predictions towards.

[wonderist]

"I'm in desperate need for challenging thought, utterances that shake me to the core, that drives my questioning further. "

I find 'truth is prediction' to be highly fruitful in that regard. I have searched and not found any prior statement like that. In my experience, people find it extremely counter-intuitive.

Here are others I like: God is the Unknown; we are star stuff; there is no such thing as race; all people can experience wonder; we all share one reality; the Earth is our foundation.

[CPLains]

I'd like to think i've moved beyond all that; i've had all those thoughts. Perhaps i went too far somewhere. Time will tell.

"Prediction's all-too easy if you generalize your predictions all-too much."

[CPLains]

I agree with most of what you say about skepticism. It's only a first step. I got it with the milk, and found it sour; on to something new is my call!

About pragmatism i always think; "pragmatism is all well and good, but does it work?".

Sorry if i intruded too much here on you two, but the contrast was fascinating! :)

[wonderist]

Of course pragmatism works. I wonder if you're using dry humour there.

The way I understand pragmatism, it is literally an unbeatable philosophy. To any critic of pragmatism, my immediate reply is, "Have you got a better idea?" Because, obviously, if they *do* have a better idea, then it is justified by pragmatism and becomes subsumed under pragmatism. And if they *don't*, then they have failed to 'beat' pragmatism. Pragmatism is self-correcting and eclectic. It is the foundation of knowledge.

[CPLains]

You can talk about information, and how it is integral of science, but the truth of the matter is that the introduction of information into physics represents a profound shift we have not yet understood the implications of. To define information at the lowest level in regards to discussions about second law of thermodynamics is rather simple compared to the project of introducing "formal" terms into the very ontology of science. Science is descriptive, and talking about itself a huge conundrum.

[wonderist]

I agree that the ontology of 'information' is a huge shift. Information has always been part of physics, but it has mostly been described in relation to other things like matter/energy and spacetime. Consider, however, that the 'speed of light' is more accurately named as the 'speed of information'. Electromagnetic light is only one mechanism of transmitting information. So, information has at least one physical property unique to it: All information propagation is limited by the speed c.

[wonderist]

I don't think 'science talking about itself' will remain a conundrum for much longer. Science is, in fact, a process -- specifically, a cultural process of knowledge generation and learning.

'Meta' discussions can get heady, but they are by no means impossible, nor necessarily useless. There may be fundamental limits to how deep science can understand itself (Goedel's incompleteness, Turing's halting) , but to say that it cannot reach *any* understanding would be very short-sighted.

[wonderist]

Just look at the tremendous advances in neuroscience. Brains understand science. Eventually science will understand brains. Science will eventually understand itself. It is more or less inevitable. Information is a key concept in developing this understanding.

[CPLains]

You say in your video that science has various concepts that "exists" because they are included in theory and theory minimizes these by occam. I'm okay with allowing occam, and even having concepts like "electron" symbolize something "real".

But where do you draw the line here? As you said yourself, some concepts are more useful than others. But does this mean that some concepts exists more than others? Is there a sharp line here anywhere? If you admit number, form, etc. There is no end?

[wonderist]

I don't believe there is a sharp line. But I do think there can be very clear distinctions. It largely depends on the amount and quality of the evidence and the theories that are available to explain it. Before much evidence is collected, the existence of X vs. Y may be unclear. Consider 'phlogiston', for example. But as the evidence builds, it will inevitably point in one consistent direction. I think more in terms of probabilities and Bayesian predictions than in binary True/False.

[wonderist]

Also, I'm a reductionist in the sense that I look for the minimum number of necessary concepts in order to describe a phenomenon. This is why I lump form, process, state, structure, etc. all under the rubric of 'information'. They are all different words that point in the same direction.

I actually prefer the term 'foundationist' to describe my position, rather than 'reductionist'. However, 'foundationism' as I use it is quite obscure, and I'll have to explain it better before I use it much.