MONISM VS DUALISM & PSYCHIATRY 3/4 DENNET & SEARLE

[Eatthesimia]

You give a dualist conception of thought and then claim that therefore whenever anyone talks about thoughts/ideas they are enacting dualism? It's a relatively simple task to show a case from bottom-up causation for copyright law and see how it is grounded in a single physical reality. You also fail to offer how you would define monism. Regrettably you are unable to do this for the simple reason that you clearly believe that mind and brain are different things.

[jockmclaren47]

@Eatthesimia I do believe mind and brain are of a different order of nature. Don't you? I don't define monism because I believe it is a false idea, like a perpetual motion machine or a square circle. Do you really believe that copyright law is determined by molecules? Please show how the laws of thermodynamics determine that copyright shall now last for 60 yrs when previously it was 25.

[KWrestler21]

McLaren is taking a quite desperate step by labeling Searle's "higher levels" of the brain as seperate from the physcial. There is no way because there are higher attributes of the brain that it necessarily negates something that is materialistic. I assumed since I haven't heard of this guy or his arguements that he was wrong, but now I'm disappointed that I'm right and for wasting my time.

[jockmclaren47]

@KWrestler21 See the full case in books and other publications. These videos are just snapshots. Searle's argument fails as he incorporates dualist elements to complete the causal chain in his putatively monist model.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 So what you're saying is: Let's deal with Dualism, but we can't use dualist language to disprove it.

Yeah, that's reasonable. And I've seen quite a lot of the case, if not know the argument at large. I take a quick easy step in the comments section of the first video to show how your model doesn't work.

[jockmclaren47]

@KWrestler21 I did not say that. The human mind is dualist in the sense that it is an informational space generated by the brain. It is therefore subject to the laws of the semantic realm in which it operates, not the laws of the time-space continuum as the brain is. While you're busy showing why my model doesn't work (and nobody else can but we await your efforts), kindly also apply the same critical attitude to Dennett, Searle et all. They don't come up as well as they and their acolytes hoped

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 Let's focus on this again: "The human mind is dualist in the sense that it is an informational space generated by the brain. It is therefore subject to the laws of the semantic realm in which it operates, not the laws of the time-space continuum as the brain is." And, this means that the human mind is not the brain. I think this should be made very clear to everyone. You think the human mind if not the human brain. I mean, that should be the end of my argument, but I'll continue.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 (continuing) What's truly feeble about all this is that you address not one single argument I presented. Your rebuttal to my argument, which had many points, was that I didn't break down your model. That is like me saying the world is a banana. You tell me how it's not. So, I say "You proved nothing." I didn't present a model or theirs'. I presented how the dualist model does not work. Again, I presented how the dualist model does not work. I did not present how their models work.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 And you must not be familiar with the literature whatsoever if you think that this is the big problem in Searle's argument to Chalmer's hard problem. The argument doesn't rest on language just on the objective/subjective dilemma, which the dualism is supposedly birthed from. And that dilemma is reconciled when you take into account that you can have a subjective experience of the world while certain qualities of the world remain objective in purely scientific forms.

[KWrestler21]

@jockmclaren47 (continuing) Chalmers completely denies the multiplicity of a state of existence if this "gap" is not reconciled. This counterargument insofar as a defect of functionalism, Searle would actually agree with Chalmers. His separating point would rather be that functionalism's problem with being physicalists is that they weren't physical enough. And since Chalmer can't, at the least, reconcile how our consciousness is just a series of neuron firings, then he secedes to failed dualism.

[milsimaustralia]

I think you have misunderstood Dennetts use of the word virtual...and the word mind for that matter. You cannot locate Dennett's virtual mind simply because it is all over the brain...in fact it is the brain- so you can actually locate it. Also reading below I see you are supposing that information is immaterial. A bit of information certainly has mass, as it is various forms of energy and takes up physical space, is compressible, and is transduced by physical systems .

[jockmclaren47]

@milsimaustralia I have most emphatically NOT misunderstood Dennett: 'virtual' just means "different, not the same, not located.." His virtual mind is NOT the brain, he makes that crystal clear. information does not have mass: see Wiener 1949 Cybernetics for the definitive statement of that. Over to you.

[deadgoblin86]

supported only by what is blatently your own unfounded opinion 'I do not believe they can be', you say and offer no more to support it, also saying 'it would be fair to say' which is at best armchair philosophising, at worst ad ignorantium. You have not succeeded in demonstrating how Dennett is a substance dualist, but you have highlighted how he is not explicit enough when he describes the virtual as a construct of the biological.

[jockmclaren47]

@deadgoblin86 You would need to see the full case which is detailed in my latest book, Humanizing Psychiatrists, Chaps. 1 and 2. I think the case is fairly convincing, nobody has sent me a rebuttal.

I didn't say he is a substance dualist but he uses dualist mechanisms to complete his attempt at a monist model. These videos are only brief summaries of quite long papers.

[deadgoblin86]

@jockmclaren47 This was a rebuttal. In the video if not the paper, you say 'Dennett is a closet dualist', if you are not claiming that he is substance dualist your criticism of his monism does not add up to much, only that, like I observed previously, he hasn't fully articulated this model in physical terms. Congratulations that you're printing books and papers, I very much enjoyed that fact's irrelevance!

[jockmclaren47]

@deadgoblin86 Hmm. Can you devise a monist theory of mind that does NOT include elements such as "virtual" etc., because in my view, these just are non-physical. Norbert Wiener said "Information is information, it is not matter and energy." I agree: information does not obey the laws of the time-space continuum, it has its own laws which are totally separate from and not restricted by laws of physics. Also, disagreeing is not rebutting.

[deadgoblin86]

To criticise this video, whilst you highlight an interesting feature of Dennett's claim you do nothing to contradict it, moreover, I think you misunderstand it. The misunderstanding is to take Dennett's 'virtual' as a seperate category, when instead he refers to physical activity INTERPRETED by our brains and thus becomes 'virtual' we cant observe this because we cant interpret brain signals outside of our own (yet). Your counter-claim that brain and mind are not the same is incredibly weak, sup

[mcdonald928]

@jockmclaren47 You've articulated an important criticism of Dennett here. Thank you for putting this together. Most of those criticizing you here appear committed to reductionism beyond argument. These folks should look at themselves and acknowledge that their reductionism is just that: a committed belief and not very reasonable at that.

[allpunkfan]

Searle is not hypocritical in that when he says "dualism" is wrong, he means that the conception of the mind as BOTH a causally & ontologically separate thing from the brain is wrong. Searle thinks the mind is an ontologically separate thing from brain processes, but is causally dependent on them, & is thus consistent. (Digestive tract processes give rise causally to the discrete ontological entity of digestion; H20 molecules give rise causally to the discrete ontological entity of liquidity. )

[jockmclaren47]

@allpunkfan If he says mind is ontologically separate from brain (i.e. can be distinguished by some valid means), then he embraces dualism. That's what dualism means. I don't agree that wetness is an ontologically separate entity, I would say it is a property as interpreted by a being with an ontologically separate mind. Properties are identified by a being with mental capacities.

[allpunkfan]

@jockmclaren47 Yes, Searle is a KIND of dualist, but it's disingenuous to say he is hypocritical. If you read Searle's Mind book, it's all quite clear.  Yes, he believes the mind is ontologically separate from the brain--you may call this "dualism"--but the mind is still utterly dependent on material processes, which makes this nothing like the traditional Cartesian dualism, which is what Searle condemns.

[jockmclaren47]

@allpunkfan I don't recall using the word 'hypocritical,' I say they have inadvertently imported dualist elements to complete their monist explanations. It may become hypocritical if they continue to use this formulation without attempting to refute the criticism. Yes, the mind is utterly dependent on material processes, but that does not make it ipso facto material in itself. Information is not material, as Norbert Wiener said in 1948 .

[allpunkfan]

@jockmclaren47 I understand. But, again, the criticism seems to be 'Searle is using dualist elements to present a monist philosophy of mind,' yet Searle is vehement in his rejection of the traditional terminology. Searle says he finds the traditional frame of terminology debilitating to the discussion, so the criticism is trivial to him. What matters is that, although it is not material because it is dependent on the physical processes, the mind could not exist without physical processes.

[jockmclaren47]

@allpunkfan Norbert Wiener (1948): "Information is information, it is not matter or energy." Info follows totally different rules from the physical processes that subserve it; it drives thermodynamic events in directions that would never happen in nature. But info is still natural itself, not magic. Searle (and others) are stuck on the word 'dualist,' to them, it means magic. Not so: it just means two orders of being that must be explained if we wish to make sense of the universe.

[allpunkfan]

@jockmclaren47 Searle's is a naturalistic dualism, where spacial processes give rise to a seemingly nonspacial entity. In short, it seems that all you've done is called out Searle on his unwillingness to call himself a "dualist," but really, there's no internal hypocrisy in his philosophy. I would imagine that Searle genuinely conceives of his phlsphy of mind as nondualistic, since the mind ultimately is reducible (causally) to the physical. You can contend with the nomenclature all you'd like.

[KWrestler21]

@allpunkfan You must be a dualist yourself if you claim Searle is a dualist (which he is not). I think he is quite clear in Minds, Brains, and Programs. The only reason you would categorize him under any kind of dualism whatsoever is because you are accepting the Cartesian categories in the first place. Searle would tell you that your problem is that you started making categories, i.e. counting, in the first place. We are far past the dark ages in which we're held under a dualistic reign.

[soth3d]

have u ever used a computer? that is profound misunderstanding....

[jockmclaren47]

@soth3d I am using a computer to reply to you.

[soth3d]

@jockmclaren47 You missed the point, replace the brain with computer - that analogy just shows that you are wrong - and maybe you will be able to defend yourself comparing computer to the hammer but not for long, computers are getting smarter - in real sense of this word.

[Vincentaneous]

I don't think this guy has done much computer programming. There are software packages that help you sort through tax laws, etc. A computer program could change the national anthem into different styles. "BUT THAT'S NOT REAL UNDERSTANDING!" Of course it is. The computer itself is not conscious of its understanding, but our own brain is full of these neuron-based computers that understand concepts like these, and they all work together to produce the mind.

[jockmclaren47]

@Vincentaneous A PC is just an extension of our computational capacities like a hammer is an extension of my hand. Taken together, our total computational capacities amount to what we call the mind. These are functional entities, but not physical entities. The computational capacity of the brain is more than the brain itself.

[Vincentaneous]

@jockmclaren47 1) True, a PC is a tool we use to extend the power of our minds. And that is possible because they work in the same basic way that we do: They are computational devices - machines - matter. Your hammer analogy is perfect: Arms are vastly more complex than hammers, but they work in the same basic way: They are levers. And levers and computers are both physical entities.

[Vincentaneous]

@jockmclaren47 2) The distinction between a "physical entity" and a "functional entity" is like the difference between "heart" and "blood pressure". The author of this video confuses the function of a machine for a different substance than the machine. A "drumbeat" is not some immaterial substance that inhabits a drum when I strike it: It is simply the function of the drum.

[jockmclaren47]

@Vincentaneous You misunderstand my position: I am most emphatically NOT saying that mind is a substance. I am the one saying mind is a function, not a substance, and it thereby represents a separate functional entity. Mind is most definitely not of the same nature as any definable substance in the universe.

[Vincentaneous]

@jockmclaren47 So you agree with Dennett: Dennett is the one who claims that the mind is the function of the brain, and not a different kind of substance. OK. I thought you were defending the author of the video. Sorry about that.

[jockmclaren47]

@Vincentaneous No, I don't agree with Dennett. He says "dualism is false." I say: dualism is true. It is NOT a substance dualism but a natural dualism. You would need to see my publications for the details.

[jockmclaren47]

The question Dennett must answer is the nature of his "biological" mind. I say it is not biological, that it does not obey the laws of the physical realm but is driven by semantic laws. This makes it dualist in nature. Claiming mind is biological does not offer any points of contact between mind and body, see my latest talk for details of resolution of mind-body problem from an informational point of view.

[teddywinroth]

closet dualist... my ass

[jockmclaren47]

@teddywinroth : If Dennett claims that the physical brain is controlled by a virtual machine which can generate more virtual machines, then that just is a dualist system. Virtual means 'not of the physical realm.' How could that not be 'of a dual nature'?

[teddywinroth]

@jockmclaren47 arguing on the internet is like the special olympics. Even if you win you´re a retard. I will however make an exeption and point out that a virtual machine is a material thing.

[jockmclaren47]

@teddywinroth I think you're being a bit harsh. All complex issues have to be teased out, whether on internet or in person. A virtual machine by definition is not the same as the machine of which it is a virtual copy. I suggest you are confusing virtual as 'real' with virtual as 'material: my desk is a material thing, a virtual desk has no weight, no substance, etc. It exists in a virtual space, necessarily not constrained by laws of physics. How would a virtual machine interact with reality?

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 "A virtual machine is not the same as the machine of which it is a virtual copy." Could you clarify this point? A computer emulating a computer is the same as the other computer, that's the whole point of emulating it. A java virtual machine is a java computer, na? Perhaps I misunderstand you.

I'm sorry if I've come off as rude earlier. I don't mean to pontificate!

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR Virtual means 'not the same.' A Java computer consists of two parts, a physical machine and the semantic realm generated by that physical machine. The semantic realm can then generate further subsystems but they are all virtual, i.e. non-physical. The clearest example is when a serial machine is used to generate a parallel system. In this, the serial system generates a virtual parallel system, or a facsimile of a physical parallel system.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 Virtual, if I am not mistaken, means "being actually such in almost every respect". You say a Java VM consists of two parts, but this is a mistake methinks. In fact, it consists of one part - a computer. Let's say there is a vibrating string. We can describe it in physical (for these purposes, Cartesian) space, Laplace and Fourier space. How many strings are there? I still count one, personally.

I don't think you think the mind is analogous. Do I understand you?

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR Mind is a real thing, generated by a physical machine which obeys different laws and occupies a different conceptual realm. If one virtual machine on my computer can run one program, while another runs another, they are separate just by virtue of the fact that we can isolate them. they are not the same. The physical hardware is one thing, the program is another. Some programs are better than others; they are thus real, distinct and effective but NOT physical in nature.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 I can see how being computational adds laws, but how could it subtract? An algorithm depending on breaking the laws of physics (for instance, signaling faster than light) is not viable, is it?

The difference, as I see it, is that I'm claiming that the mind is a mapped into a subset (the set of information bearing physical things amongst physical things), while you say the mapping is to a different space (physical things to non-physical "space"). Do I understand you?

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR An informational space is a real thing but it is not a physical thing, even though it is generated by a physical machine with switching capacities. An informational space has no material parameters at all, therefore it is not material. However, the critical point of this theory is to show how information can pass from the physical realm where it is generated to the informational realm where it is transformed. That's what my work is about.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 Let's talk about simpler cases: classic computers - certainly information bearing, na? They work by adjusting boundary conditions so that electromagnetic fields adjust in predictable ways. Maxwell's laws completely determine the behavior of electromagnetic fields.

Then, we add additional constraints, like circuit diagrams. We choose these to cause the electromagnetic fields to be information bearing. So the information laws are in addition to, not in defiance of physical law, na?

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR As I see it, the informational laws are above and beyond the physical laws (as logic) but they make use of the physical laws for purposes which would not occur if only thermodynamic laws prevailed. They can twist nature to work backwards, as it were, by increasing entropy. The results of informational computations are not impossible, just vanishingly unlikely. Nothing can negate physical laws but they can be taken over temporarily to produce highly unlikely outcomes.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 Yes, yes! It is an insight, but it's qualified: Computation speed and energy loss are related in an ideal computer (in actual computers energy loss is higher, obviously). I don't the have space to go into why, but the book "Feynman on Computation" is a clear account of the physics of ideal computers.

By "highly unlikely" I assume you mean some measure over all possible boundary/initial conditions. Am I interpreting you correctly?

[GolumTR]

I'd like to note that McLaren changes the matter at some point. He alters Dennett's claim that the mind is explainable by biological process to the claim that it is explainable by physical ones. What could be less reductionist than claiming that the pattern of DNA is best understood not by examining the quantum mechanics; properties of irregular crystals, but by the fact that it's a female member of the homo genus?

[GolumTR]

In addition, he asks how ideas could be reduced to biology, carefully using rhetorical questions to imply that the bridge can't be gaped. Dennett claims that the concept of the "meme" is the correct way to explain the genesis and evolution of culture. One can attack this, but McLaren doesn't, he lets the audience assume that Dennett never thought of this.

In addition, Dennett's model does make certain predictions about the mind and brain - they are at the back of Consciousness Explained.

[GolumTR]

Oops, repeated myself there. Sorry.

Anyway, this isn't a sufficient argument to knock down Dennett's ideas. It just doesn't present a complete enough view of them to do so. It was nice of you to post it, though! Thanks!

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR the set of biological processes is a subset of the universe of physical processes. In fact, the laws of the physical realm govern the biological sphere entirely; I change from physical to biological so it doesn't sound repetitious.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 The set of differentiable functions is a subset of the set of all functions. This does not mean that they are equivalent.

For instance, all isolated physical systems that are in equilibrium, each of its accessible microstates is found with equal probability. This is a physical truth (in the sense that it follows from uncontroversial physical postulates). It is true in feces, in biology and inside of stars.

[GolumTR]

@GolumTR However, it is a biological fact that mammals have four chambered hearts. The non-necessity of this is shown by the success of fish, amphibians and most reptiles. In order to understand why it is true, the laws of physics do come in - it is for efficiency reasons after all. That said, it isn't true inside of a star or in alien life. It is only there because of particular historical facts accumulating (evolution).

[GolumTR]

@GolumTR And that's why Dennett feels justified in saying the mind should be thought of as a biological system, in addition to being physical. There are extra constraints-like with differentiable functions and general functions.

I don't know if I disagree when you say he's a "closet dualist". He's always insisted the mind isn't completely dependent on how dendrites curl and such (not that anyone deprecates neurology). I just want to be sure people aren't talking past each other, you know?

[jockmclaren47]

@GolumTR Just found this entry. You appear to misunderstand my position, I have never claimed the mind is explicable by the physical processes of the machine (brain) that generates it. By virtue of its physical properties, the brain generates an informational space (the 'mind') but what takes place in that informational space is not physical in any sense of the word.

[GolumTR]

@jockmclaren47 You probably cover this, but could you link me to where you explain how it is that brain injury becomes mind injury?

Thanks for clarifying your point! I think I did misunderstand you.