Daniel Dennett - Freedom Evolves - a Dangerous Idea Part 2

[rawrock24]

I wish I didn't have a hang over right now.



[lazmindotcom]

Thanks for your great feedback. I believe I am now starting to understand. According to Dennett, and I assume to you, free will means:

The (sense of) the ability of an agent to respond to its environment.

But I can't see where this is an observation of fact. It seems to me just a choice to redefine the meaning of the words as they are taken together. I'm feeling so far is that this is all an issue of motivation.

[lazmindotcom]

It seems to me, and correct me if I'm mistaken, that those who choose Dennett's definition of free will are going through the following narrative:

-Knowledge of scientific concepts, including evolution, is a subset of experience

-Scientists despise religion as silly and potentially harmful

-They also see, however, that religion has cornered the market on moralism

-Dennett wants science to devour the moralist subset of experience GULP! like a victorious bacterium.

-Dennett redefines "free will"

[82abhilash]

Taking morality away from the grasp of religion. Yes, I am sure Dennett would love to do that. His definition of free-will can achieve that. Freedom comes from being responsible for yourself. Being responsible for yourself is how you are moral. No imposed morality, no coercion as a method to make people responsible. I am tempted to call it perfect.

[lazmindotcom]

"His definition of free-will can achieve that."

-Yes, because he's redefining the word "will" to mean the opposite of what "will" means to the rest of humanity. I've looked this up in dictionaries, and they all seem to imply that "will" needs conscious intent.

"Being responsible for yourself is how you are moral"

-Okay. How is this a new concept, and how does it require a redefinition of "free will" to validate it?

"No imposed morality"

-Aha! IMPOSED, as in imposed by the nasty pope?

[82abhilash]

'I've looked this up in dictionaries, and they all seem to imply that "will" needs conscious intent'

So that is what was bothering you. To will something requires intent. And you think free-will does not require intent? There is no intent to avoid harm? Is the intent a conscious intent? I would say yes, but that would lead into another discussion, about what consciousness is. Which I think is best left for a different time.

[lazmindotcom]

"And you think free-will does not require intent?"

-I would in fact equate them: will = intent. Therefore "free will" could be "unimposed intent." The reflexes, in a sense, impose their intent on me, because they act before I have time to generate conscious intent. Maybe there's free will there, but not by any agent I'd call "me."

"That would lead into another discussion, about what consciousness is."

-and another Youtube video, I hope. I don't have a copy of Dennett's other books. :)

[82abhilash]

'How is this a new concept, and how does it require a redefinition of "free will" to validate it?' Only because he re-defined free-will.

'Aha! IMPOSED, as in imposed by the nasty pope?' No imposition, period. You understand the constraints you are in, the opportunities you have, etc., and decide for yourself what the best course of action is, even if your decision is to let someone else act on your behalf. This freedom is truly inalienable.

[lazmindotcom]

Again, nicely answered. :)

I feel like we're about to transition to Nietzsche.

Now, I'd ask you this-- to what degree is our "narrative" imposed on us by our parents and our respective cultures? Might not a highly patriarchal society create non-brick-duckers, assuming the brick is perceived to have been thrown as punishment for violating the cultural morality narrative (can I say it that way?)?

What if the reality is that victims would most benefit by revolution, but they remain victims?

[82abhilash]

'To what degree is our "narrative" imposed on us by our parents and our respective cultures?' Take this example. In Islamic societies, there is no concept of individuality. There is the concept of the community or 'Ummah' and every muslim is supposed to treat those of their ummah as part of their own body. Dividing the ummah is a high crime and is compared to a person severing off his own limbs.....

[82abhilash]

...Now if human being did not have an innate sense of individuality, no one would have to artificially impose a communal narrative. And even in the narrative it is the implicit to the individual and his sense of identity with his body. So, I think we are born that way.

[82abhilash]

'Might not a highly patriarchal society create non-brick-duckers... What if the reality is that victims would most benefit by revolution, but they remain victims?'

Sam Harris has referred to this situation. Once institutions that assume our lack of individuality takes over our society, then the people who run it will conspire to suppress and if possible even weed out that sense of individuality, that sense of myself....

[82abhilash]

...Lot of North Koreans may never know that the extent of their oppression because they have never known and have never known how freedom tastes, they do not have information about its absence. When the US defeated Japan in WW2, lots of Japanese soldiers committed mass suicide. These victims will in fact fight and die for their way of life, because it is the only one they have ever known. May I recommend George Orwell's Animal Farm. The inalienable rights can be indefinitely suppressed.

[lazmindotcom]

Okay, I'm attracted to this example. I'm actually in South Korea, so I know a little about the extent of the oppression. Apparently, they believe that Kim Jeong-il was a great Olympic athlete, that he invented the airplane, stuff like that... really goofy.

Now, You've expressed the idea that the agent has to be making a reasonable reaction to a "real" environment for "free will" to occur. However, their social environment is horribly twisted.

-Can they act freely, in a social sense?

[82abhilash]

Can they act freely, in a social sense? Well, those who are also using their free responsibly have to tow the party line, or they get killed. Getting yourself killed is not very responsible. The trick for successful totalitarianism is to artificially remove all but one option when for being responsible, the one option that you have power over. In time people will forget that there was a time when you had many options. Read Animal Farm and 1984.

[82abhilash]

'The (sense of) the ability of an agent to respond to its environment.' by itself does not constitute free will, even though free will requires it. Dennett's defenition of free-will would require the agent to respond in such a manner that would avoid harm for its person and enhance its well being.

[lazmindotcom]

"Harm" and "well-being" being subjective assessments, as processed through the complex narrative of self? i.e. not just survival, avoidance of pain, etc?

[82abhilash]

"Harm" and "well-being" being subjective assessments - yes, it means different things to different people, that is why people use their freedoms differently. Those are the right words to use. You may for reasons that you know best decide that enduring pain enhances your well-being. What if you are taking a flu shot?

[lazmindotcom]

Thanks for your (very) many comments. I don't agree either with Dennett's definition of free will or the need for it yet, but I think I understand it better, and you certainly seem knowledgeable on the subject.

I'm going to go on to part 3 now. I'm sure I'll have more questions if you'll take them. :)

[lazmindotcom]

Let's say it's Dennett. He's the agent. I throw a brick at him, he ducks. The many neurons in his brain have cleverly worked together to formulate the awareness that he is about to be clubbed, and he chooses to duck, an act of free will by Daniel Dennett.

Dennett is greater than the sum of his neurons. This is because they encode INFORMATION about the abstract narrative, and this information has an identity beyond what the neurons themselves can comprehend. So the narrative is ducking?

[82abhilash]

The Center of Narrative Gravity in this context is the self that we recognize undergoing the experience of ducking. Dennett experiences ducking not his neurons. The neural activity is responsible for his sense of self and contributes to his ducking action. That is what the brain does, the same way that breathing is what his lungs does. But of course, the brain is responsible for much more than our sense of self or our impulses to duck.

[lazmindotcom]

Ok, this post got preempted by a more interesting thread you started just after I sent it. Let's talk rocks! :)

[paradirob]

Tossing bricks reminds me of a game involving two players tossing quarters (it also reminds me of the movie 'Meet the Fockers.') In this game you and a friend toss quarters and as you toss--one of you calls either 'odds' or 'even.' If the results of the toss show that the caller was wrong, the other guy gets to keep both quarters. This is repeated over and over. I used to be pretty good at it and would accumulate plenty of quarters. Misunderstanding determinism is this game without players.

[marsh8472]

But if you say that it could not have happened any other way then by my definition of freewill, we just don't have it :) If it boils down to physical laws controling my every thought and action then I'm more of an observer of my own life rather than an actual participant. I don't have my freedom of will in that respect. It's kinda like watching recordings of people playing atari then changing over to the nintendo wii. Then saying I have freewill from an appearnce of more options. I'd rather play

[82abhilash]

'If it boils down to physical laws controling my every thought and action then I'm more of an observer of my own life rather than an actual participant.'-you seem to think that a determinist entity cannot control itself. Not true. Think of a thermostat. It is deterministic. Yet it can adjust its own behavior based on external circumstances. So can you. And in your case you can choose those behavior that avoid harm and enhance well being.

[marsh8472]

I still would define freewill as the power of choosing one's own actions. Whether or not I am determined or designed to try to stay alive and better my physical health doesn't enter into the equation for me. To be able to choose, I need the option to choose. But if there is only one predetermined outcome then I did not have a choice afterall. If a choice of ones own actions does not really exist then I do not have freewill (by this more accepted definition of freewill I think)

[82abhilash]

The type of free will you described, Dennett would say is perfectly definable, but not worth wanting. The type of free will that is worth wanting is the type that helps us be responsible. So in the way it really matters, we do have free will.

[marsh8472]

Can atoms control themselves? A determinist entity cannot control itself by definition of control. Which I will define control as "to exercise restraint or direction over". When you knock over dominoes, do the falling dominoes have control? Put simply, to have freewill the entity must be able to conquer its own deterministic behavior whether it be temperature control, falling dominoes or the laws of causes and effect in general.

[82abhilash]

A determinist entity cannot control itself by definition of control-not correct. A thermostat is one determinist entity that can control itself. So is a plane on auto-pilot, so is an unmanned space probe. While it maybe true that not all deterministic entities can control themselves, there are those that can.

[marsh8472]

It cannot control its ability to not adjust the tempurature though is what I'm saying. It cannot defy it's deterministic behavior. It's doing what it was designed to do by the laws of cause and effect. That's what a thermostate does not have freewill. What Dennett called "absolute freewill" is what people are wanting and he says it would be a miricle to have and it's wanting more than we need. So then he goes back to what I would call an illusion of absolute freewill and calls it real instead.

[82abhilash]

I understand where you are coming from. So does Dennett; even better than me, I am sure. The type of free will you have described, though perfectly definable does not exist. The type of free will that Dennett describes does exist. I think it is better because this type requires us to be responsible. It is the type of free will that is bounded, with the added capacity to extend the boundaries over a period of time. It is like we are a thermostat that can program itself to do other things as well.

[82abhilash]

People seem to make the mistake time and again with equating free will with having more options. Having more than one option may or may not help enhance one's well being. I would recommend 'The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less by Barry Schwartz', Free will does not require you to have too many options, although sometimes it would be nice. All that is required is the capacity to avoid harm and enhance our well being. Something that we are getting better and better at.

[lazmindotcom]

If the (probably deterministic) mechanisms that allow us to duck a brick are a product of DNA and our current (i.e. experienced in our own life) environment, and if our DNA is the codification of a long-running interaction between generations of life and their environment, then how do we arrive at a human ducking-agent? It would seem that newly-encoded interactions (i.e. learning and memory), and old-encoded interactions (i.e. lizard-man instincts), make the environment itself the agent. No?

[lazmindotcom]

In other words, what's the purpose of asserting humanity at all? It seems assuming a human agent, rather than just calling a person a (totally deterministic) cog in the cosmic machinery, is essentially begging the question. As soon as you define a subset of that machinery as "a human being," you've already taken the leap of anthropocentric faith that implicitly includes, as givens, the existence of both consciousness and free will. Cheaters! :p

[82abhilash]

An agent with consciousness and free-will does not require a leap of faith. You can have little deterministic parts acting in their deterministic ways creating a being that has both consciousness and free-will, even if the parts that make them does not.

[lazmindotcom]

I think I understand. But if the so-called human "agent" is itself a part of the environment with which it interacts, then to what degree are the "little deterministic parts" of the human agent separate from the environment?

I'm new to forum debating, and to this (very interesting) issue. Perhaps you could explain to me how to determine where "a being" leaves off and the "environment" begins? Because, surely, establishing that duality is required before we can have an "agent." No?

[lazmindotcom]

And by the way, thanks for posting these clips. Dennett is super-funny and entertaining. :)

[82abhilash]

I would think that the boundary between an agent and its environment is the skin on its body. It is just an educated guess. But do you see any problems with that?

[lazmindotcom]

A sensible answer, to be sure. But I'm still struggling with this concept of agency. So you would say all the cells and materials within one's skin constitute (at least for the purpose of determining "a being" which can be an agent) one's self, and all the physical particles outside one's skin constitute one's environment?

Since we're not face, to face, I'll ask a question and give the answer I THINK you will give, and you tell me if I have it, okay? (oops... next post)

[lazmindotcom]

So is food, which is taken from the environment, a part of the "being" of the agent? We would agree that it becomes part of the agent after consumption... probably at the point where the body incorporates it. In other words, if I eat a rock, it will still be (in this case a quite unpleasant) part of the environment, even though it's inside my body, because I cannot incorporate it. If I eat a potato, once it's broken down and in my blood stream, it is now part of "me." Agreed?

[82abhilash]

You seem to be struggling with the concept of self. What place does it have in a materialistic philosophy? Well the sense of self is subtle, but real Try this article:

"The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity"

ase.tufts.

edu

/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm

[lazmindotcom]

First: brilliant link. A very creative and interesting approach to "self." Thank you!

However, you are right to say that I am confused with the definition of self as it applies to an agent of free will. I take it you've decided against the "contained by skin" definition, and that the self is better viewed as an abstract narrative rather than a physical construct. Very promising!

My confusion now is, which would one call the agent of free will: the narrator or the narrative abstraction?

[82abhilash]

The sense of self is experienced by the agent. It is the sense of self that is a narrative abstraction. The agent is not a narrative abstraction, the agent is a physical entity. There can be agents without the sense of self as well (sense of one self and/or sense of other selves).I have no problem in claiming that this agent (with or without a sense of self) is "contained by the skin".

[82abhilash]

I agree that a digested potato has become part of me, while an undigested rock is not. But the rock is now contained within my skin, so is my agent hood, that is contained within my skin too. Does that mean the rock contributes to my agent hood? Of course, very unpleasantly might I add. That is why I (I is used as the center of narrative here by me the self conscious agent) would probably like to have the rock taken out of my body.

[lazmindotcom]

If the rock is seen as separate from the unburdened, rock-free agent, then can we say that the rock, even though it's contained within the skin, is part of the "environment" from the perspective of both the agent and the I-narrative?

[82abhilash]

Well,we can see our stomach, liver, kidney or any other organ separately from us (and we do, that is what makes organ transplant possible). Yet they contribute to our sense of agent hood, in the sense that they are part of this agent. So why not the rock this agent has swallowed? Of course the organs are useful, the rock is not. That is why I (I is used here (and always) as the center of narrative) want it removed.

[lazmindotcom]

So anything that contributes to the sensations of the agent and the resulting "sense of agent hood" is part of the agent? What if the rock, rather than grinding away inside my ribs, is grinding away outside my ribs? Still a part of the agent? Is the brick flying toward my head itself also a part of the brick-ducking agent? Or are we to insist that only sensations which are clearly located within the skin count?

[82abhilash]

I am claiming here that only sensations within the skin can contribute to your "sense of agent hood" and to the extent they contribute to the agent hood they are part of the agent. Take the case of conjoint twins. They have another body within their skin. This contributes to each of their agent-hood and that is troubling for them. So here we have a situation where one agent is contributing to the agent hood of another by being within its skin. A situation we try to correct by surgery.

[82abhilash]

I am claiming here that only sensations within the skin can contribute to your "sense of agent hood" and to the extent they contribute to the agent hood they are part of the agent. Take the case of conjoint twins. They have another body within their skin. This contributes to each of their agent-hood and that is troubling for them. So here we have a situation where one agent is contributing to the agent hood of another by being within its skin. A situation we try to correct by surgery.

[82abhilash]

Here is another example. A pregnant woman. The fetus inside contributes to her agent hood and to the extent of its contribution is part of that agent. So this is another example of an agent with your skin contributing to your agent hood. The woman correct this situation by giving birth. Once the baby is out, it is no longer within her skin so it is not part of her agent.

[82abhilash]

Now if its outside your skin and you are impacted by it, but I won't call it part of your agent. It has to do with the way you sense this. You sense what happens outside of you as what happens separate from your body. To be part of your agent hood, you must sense it as a part of the internal environment that is you associate with, your body.

[lazmindotcom]

What if I have a straw stuck up my nose?  Is half part of my "agent," and half part of the environment? :p

[82abhilash]

I think in the case of a straw stuck up your nose, you have an gent being impacted by something outside its skin and you sense it as such. Now suppose when you try to take the straw out, a piece of it gets stuck in your nose and then scar tissue grows around it and covers it completely, now that is within your skin. Now the piece of straw contributes to your agent hood.

[lazmindotcom]

Well met!

"you sense it as such"

So if I was unaware of the straw, either upon insertion or upon its getting stuck during the extraction process and therefore being incorporated (literally), and it was therefore unable to affect my perception of my internal (self) environment or my external (flying brick) environment, then would we say that for the purpose of agent hood, the straw does not actually exist?

[82abhilash]

Well consider this. You have a liver and a spleen, both oh which are literally incorporated into your person; it does not impact your perception of internal or external environment, unless of course they stop working properly. Does that mean that your liver and spleen does not exist? All it tells you is that your sense of perception is not fine tuned to acknowledge its existence.

[lazmindotcom]

Okay, let me try another approach. Now, I'm just summarizing what I think I've heard, not trying to formulate any new ideas.

It is the sense of free will, essentially, that makes your highly-complicated response to an income brick truly free, right? Now, since my perception of self, and my ducking ability/choice, can be affected by:

-the health of organs which I can't perceive

-the physical brain structure, which I cannot control

-my internal chemical environment, like the lack of LSD (now)

[lazmindotcom]

Since so many things AFFECT the agent as well as the sense of self, and the resultant behavior, then how can either the agent or self have free will in any meaningful sense?

Take, for example, a motor. The causes of its behavior are: an imposed organization (basically, its DNA), a controller (my eternally-located foot on the gas pedal), and energy (the gas).

For free will to be real, I'd say the controller, which functions after the DNA but BEFORE the physical parts, must be the "self."

[82abhilash]

The kind of free will you describe, is the biblical kind that Dennett points to at the end of the lecture. That type of free will is perfectly definable but not worth wanting (and probably doesn't exist). Because it is the kind that frees us from our responsibility to ourself. The kind of free will that really matters, we have.

[lazmindotcom]

Does wanting something make it either valuable, real or intrinsically useful?

I'm confused-- why would a material philosopher introduce the concepts of moral responsibility and "want" as important supporting features, when there's already religion to handle that? Presumably the role of science (via "evolution") is to eliminate subjective distortions, replacing the ideas we WANT with ideas that represent observable reality.

Sooth my tortured soul, here. Are we starting the Church of Dennett?

[82abhilash]

'Does wanting something make it either valuable, real or intrinsically useful?'

Well, if we want something, the presumption is we want it because we feel we are better off with it than without it. This statement does not make any intrinsic value of what we want. I mean if you are a drug addict, you might feel you are better of with LSD than without it. But one thing we can all agree is that from the perspective of the agent with the want he is better off getting what he wants.

[lazmindotcom]

(aside: LSD is not addictive, but does affect the mechanism of response on a cognitive level)

So we want a definition of free will that doesn't give us an escape from the (super-duper highly subjective and arbitrary) senses of moral behavior and responsibility?

Can I put it in so small a nutshell, and say Dennett's main purpose is to reconcile moralism with physical philosophy, and that his definition of "free will" is a necessary bridge between those traditionally-separate worlds?

[82abhilash]

'Can I put it in so small a nutshell, and say Dennett's main purpose is to reconcile moralism with physical philosophy, and that his definition of "free will" is a necessary bridge between those traditionally-separate worlds? '

That is where he is pointing to yes.

[lazmindotcom]

I'd say the flip-side of this process is that of religious folk who define science as the search to understand God's world and our purpose in it through observation and experiment. Wouldn't you just say, "That's nice. But science doesn't need your religion to be useful to me."

Couldn't (religious) moralists equally well say, "Thanks for playing, Dennett, but when it comes to morality, leaders like Jesus or Buddha do just fine without any need for a material rationale for good behavior?"

[82abhilash]

Free will does not excuse us from moral behavior and responsibility, in fact moral behavior and responsibility completes this sense of free-will. If they are super-duper and highly subjective, then perhaps a responsible moral course of action would be to objectively study why they are subjective and arbitrary and then find ways to mitigate it. We won't know unless we tried.

[lazmindotcom]

I would say in evolution, the sustenance of the species first, and individual second, would constitute a sensible morality. But I still don't understand why humans need to separate themselves from the environment with the concept of "free will."

Wouldn't it make equal or better sense to say, "I see now that I'm part of the cosmic machinery, and accept my role?"  And isn't this voluntary death of "self" likely to reduce the animalistic selfishness that leads to "immoral" behavior?

[82abhilash]

'I would say in evolution, the sustenance of the species first, and individual second' Not true. In fact speciation takes place because individual organisms are adapting different survival strategies. And the same is true for humans too. That is why progressive societies are the ones in which people enjoy many freedoms as individuals. I would like to distinguish self interest from its evil twin selfishness. I see selfish actions as ultimately detrimental to self-interest.

[lazmindotcom]

I would say in evolution... would constitute a sensible morality.

I'm not sure I the idea I clumsily expressed and the idea you cleverly answered are the same.

I was attempting to say that morality is an attempt by the running narrative to counteract part of the agent's evolutionary history.

[82abhilash]

'I was attempting to say that morality is an attempt by the running narrative to counteract part of the agent's evolutionary history'

I am not sure what you meant here.

[lazmindotcom]

Our animal instinct, with low-cognition, leads us to fight or flight behaviors, satiation of hunger and sex instincts, etc. Very few bears, for example, would risk their lives to save a greater number of unfamiliar bears. (although I've never surveyed them!)

But a strong moral narrative, if we can coin a new term, found in civilized man, might lead him to throw away a billion years of personal evolution to save another human being, just because his narrative includes the nobility of sacrifice.

[82abhilash]

Man can overcome the agenda of his selfish genes. That is correct. And I think the selfish meme best describes how.

[82abhilash]

So ask yourself, is the kind of free will that makes you morally responsible for yourself worth wanting? In other words do you see value in it. More value than the traditional forms of free will that philosophers talk about? The role of science may be to eliminate subjective distortions, but science does not have all the answers and thus there are subjective distortions, that itself is a fact that you can consider when exercising your free will.

[lazmindotcom]

WORTH implies a judge of worth, which implies an agent/self, which to me is begging the question.

I want a worthy definition of free will, because being free, I naturally define my world through my perspective of freedom.

[82abhilash]

A worthy definition of free-will? Free-will is the capacity for rational agents to make and act upon decisions to avoid harm and enhance well being over the course of their life time. Does that fit with your perspective of freedom?

[lazmindotcom]

Not if you mean avoiding harm to and enhancing well-being of the agent.

According to the "in-the-skin" definition of agent you mentioned, other people are technically part of the environment. However, if I had a chance to sacrifice myself to save many others, I'd say the "moral" choice is to die. No benefit whatsoever to either me, the agent, or me, the narrative.

In this case, my free will acts on the desires of my DNA to sustain the species. This is definitely not personal free will, IMO.

[82abhilash]

Remember the self is a narrative center of gravity, it is not a material. That self can exist in many narratives, even if the body that it refers to is gone. This is as close to life after death that we have, people talking about us when we are gone. If you sacrifice your life to save many others, the well-being of this narrative self is enhanced....

[lazmindotcom]

Interesting take. But it's still an evolutionary failure, so the "free will" involved doesn't seem to meet Dennett's (or Darwin's) criteria of useful behavior, at least in an individual sense.

Is "free will," then, allowed to transcend the limitations of the skin and apply to behaviors of DNA acting THROUGH one's body, agency, mechanism and narrative?

[82abhilash]

'But it's still an evolutionary failure' Not if you consider memtic evolution or cultural evolution. Biological evolution is gene-centric, cultural evolution is meme-centric. Genes are expressed in DNA, memes are expressed in neurons. And unlike genes, memes can be efficiently transmitted horizontally as well. Humans are the only creatures able to transcend the limitations posed by their genes and memes are the way to do it. Maybe with memes I have gone too far. It is not established science yet

[lazmindotcom]

Memes are expressed in the information encoded in neuronal structure, and to me provide a good case for the absence of free will. With DNA, we can say that our minds transcend the sum of our neurons. But with memes, can we say that our minds transcend the sum of our thoughts? If memes are personified (ugh... don't like saying it that way), then our agent-selves seem to be meme-vehicles.

[82abhilash]

Yes our agents are meme vehicles. But that does not mean we do not have free will. These units of information, impacts your decision making. Which is good, this information is how you know whether the action that you plan to take will help you avoid harm and enhance well-being. You can also think about thinking. You can examine how you think and why, what facts you consider and what you ignore, understand its strengths and weaknesses and let that information impact you as well.

[82abhilash]

You can even spread those memes that benefit you and extend the benefit of that information for those whose interests matter to you.

[82abhilash]

... You may not do it for that reason of course. Pure altruism may always be considered admirable, but is it always a responsible act? I would be very very interested in knowing about the people I sacrifice my one and only life.

[lazmindotcom]

Giving them names would certainly increase the narrative value of the sacrifice, wouldn't it? I saved "Bob," and his children still have their "Bob"-Daddy. :)

[82abhilash]

I would think so. That you can identify with them helps a lot.

[82abhilash]

'Sooth my tortured soul, here. Are we starting the Church of Dennett? '

I do hope we are not staring a church. I dread the idea and I think so will Dennett.

[82abhilash]

Here is how. The arrangment of our physical parts creates an agent that is capable of taking actions to avoid harm and enhance well being in an efficient effective manner, free will is just that capacity. Of course the effectiveness of the action is based on our prowess. That would mean people who have greater capacity to grasp reality would be in a position to make better decisions and thus more free.

[lazmindotcom]

Well put.

Basically, you say that Dennett equates the subjective experience of the reacting mechanism (i.e. the parts of the brain that identify the "brick" threat and cause "duck" behavior) with free will. An interesting equation, for sure. I can see why this equation offends moralists, for sure!

Q: What if the mechanism/agent is wrong about the environment? What if I have taken LSD and begin ducking hallucinated bricks. Is this still an act of free will?

[82abhilash]

'What if the mechanism/agent is wrong about the environment?' To the extent the mechanism works improperly, to that extent our free will is compromised. Remember our free will is supposed to make us take responsible actions in the real world. hallucinated bricks exist in a hallucinated world. Looks like the message here is to maintain your physical and mental health.

[lazmindotcom]

Please help me through this. Even by modern scientific, non-new-age-woo-woo standards, we perceive an infinitesimally small portion of the physical events occurring even in the space we occupy. This means that our conception of spatial reality is infinitely imprecise at best. Again, assuming that we are experiencing the "real world" seems like begging the question.

I'd like to meet anyone grounded enough to tell me that he experiences anything even vaguely resembling THE real world.

[82abhilash]

You are right, there is a lot to know and when we know new things by answering old questions, we also get more questions. We are informavores. That is why the enterprise of science is important. That is why free and open discussion is necessary. As for real bricks versus hallucinated bricks, they do fall within the infinitesimally small portion of the physical events that we do perceive. They are part of the real world that we know something useful about.

[lazmindotcom]

I haven't wanted to get into metaphysics, but I'm not sure I can understand all this without doing so. You keep mentioning this fabled "real" world, which involves a tremendous complex of "givens" that I'm not sure I'm comfortable with yet.

First of all, my only mechanism for establishing the "realness" of the brick is my perception. However, given a physical/neural model of the mechanism of perception, and the many physical/mental events that affect the operation of that mechanism... ?

[lazmindotcom]

If the agent and resultant "free-will" are limited by the assumption of an at least fairly-accurate perception of the agent's external environment, his "real" environment, then I don't think I'll ever have the courage to claim that level of awareness, and therefore I'll have to give up my narrative of personal free will.

:(

[82abhilash]

I know what you mean. You know a lot of things, and among what you know is also the fact that that there could be so much more that you do not know than know. So you feel you do not have the level of awareness to claim to be free?...

[lazmindotcom]

ouch! :)

Well, it's starting to feel like nothing can be "real" except that I decree it so. If I'm willing to accept that level of arbitrariness, then debating issues becomes much less fun.

Interestingly, when I have a fever, I'm stuck in a kind of cognitive hell. I'm fully aware of completely lacking control over my awareness.

[82abhilash]

I continued to write. Please read from the '..Well, most people' and you may feel better.

[82abhilash]

'Well, it's starting to feel like nothing can be "real" except that I decree it so.'

Not at all. If your sense of perception fails to recognize the brick thrown at you, the brick is still going to hit you and probably kill you. Reality does not depend on your decree. Also, I do not think of my senses represent reality. It is more like representing (sadly incomplete) knowledge about the real world, always aspiring for completion. Knowledge is king.

[82abhilash]

..Well, most people do not even come that far. Take the fact that you do not know something as an opportunity to learn something new. Do it consistently and your level of awareness will rise consistently and You will remain more free. And if you like doing it, you will also remain happy.

[82abhilash]

'First of all, my only mechanism for establishing the "realness" of the brick is my perception.'

Not true there are the physical properties of the bricks themselves that can be independently verified. Although your sense of perception is good enough in this circumstance.

[lazmindotcom]

Nope. There is absolutely no way to "independently verify" the physical properties of bricks without using my perception.

If I look in a microscope, I must perceive an image and accept that it is a valid representation of something I can't actually see with my naked eye.

If I send samples of the brick to, say, MIT, then I have to read the letter, believe the letter is real, and believe the results are accurate.

[lazmindotcom]

(possible double-post due to lag?)

No. There is no test I can do that doesn't require me to perceive. I have to peer into a microscope myself, or read lab results myself. Unless I let the "brick" hit me, there is in fact no proof that it is a brick at all. Even you shouting "Look out for that BRICK!" means nothing unless I perceive your words.

Perhaps another example of how we can determine whether we are perceiving something sufficiently close to "reality" might be clearer?

[82abhilash]

You are right, no matter how many tests are done, it will all finally boil down to your sense of perception. So there is a risk that you take, because your sense of perception could fool you. But with each properly done test, the risk is mitigated, till you reach a level where you feel comfortable with the risk you take. In the case of a brick though, your sense of perception is good enough. Natural Selection has ensured that our sense of perception matches with reality.

[lazmindotcom]

In my limited heavy-object-ducking expeience, I think I would almost certainly either duck a brick reflexively, with absolutely no high-level cognition and therefore no free will (as the "narrative" requires cognition), or fail to duck it.

Seriously. If I had to consciously identify large objections, formulate "the expectation" that the brick would hit me, and then duck, I'd be hospitalized.

Nice example by Dennett, but I think impossible to do.

[82abhilash]

And that proves , that you and me are a deterministic avoider of harm. Whether you use higher-level cognition or low level reflexes, that remains true. That was his point. Yet that deterministic system is not perfect, even with all these various levels of cognition. Some times you fail.

[lazmindotcom]

"That was his point"

What, that free will doesn't require conscious interaction with the environment? Then any non-conscious entity that is capable of avoiding a brick must have free will!

If "will" is not an extension of the desires of a conscious agent, then it means nothing at all, as far as my limited understanding of that word allow me to believe.

[82abhilash]

You mistake me. The point was that free will requires the agent to be a deterministic avoider of harm to self and deterministic seeker of good for yourself. Even animals try to do that, thought they are not as good as us, so they are not as free as us. To do that effectively, do we need consciousness? It seems so. There is no animal on earth as free as the Homo sapiens. Here it seems consciousness is an extention of free-will than the other way round.

[82abhilash]

What natural selection has not ensured is the prowess of our sense of perception at the atomic level. Is it any wonder the subject of nuclear physics is challenging to both teach and learn?

[marsh8472]

The choice has to be because I made it freely with other options available to me but by the laws of cause and effect and the laws of physics I could not have made any other choice than the one I made. It just appeared as though I had the option.

[82abhilash]

Indeed it is true that you could not have made any other option given the way conditions where at that time. However, that does not mean you do not have free will because all that free will requires is your capacity to take decisions to avoid harm and enhance well being, which you did then. ..

[82abhilash]

And which you can also do now. Only now you have the benefit from past experience, so the condition is not what it was. At least you are different. There could be other changes too. So you could make a better decision. Hence the term 'Freedom Evolves'. And that is true if you look at history. We enjoy more freedoms that our parents did. They more than theirs and so on. Free will is the same, there are more ways to express it. The laws of cause and effect has a bigger sample to act upon.

[82abhilash]

..More causes, more effects. More ways to improve your life and more ways to screw it up. And more ways to learn from your screw ups as well. It is a nice positive feedback loop, that evolution creates.

[marsh8472]

his rant about not being able to change the future would be more clear if he said you cannot change the PREDETERMINED future.

[82abhilash]

You cannot change the DETERMINED future either. Or any other type of future for that matter. But you can do something very similar. Continue to listen.

[marsh8472]

What he says is there is only one possible future as his definition of determinism. I say the future is already predetermined (abstractly/mathematically). If the future is predetermined then it cannot be changed by definition of predetermined. He uses the idea that the future hasn't been written yet (he says hasn't happened yet) trying to seperate determinism and fatalism but the future is already set according to physical laws nothing we do will change that.

[82abhilash]

"the future is already set according to physical laws nothing we do will change that"-this is fatalism. 'there is only one possible future'-this is determinism. But remember that one possible future depends also on what we are determined to do in the present. And we are determined to avoid harm and further our well-being. Dennet's definition of free-will is our capacity to act in that manner - it is the freedom to make that decision without coercion and act on it.

[82abhilash]

So if determinism is true that is what we are determined to do, ' to avoid harm and further our well-being'. If fatalism is true, then it would not matter what we are determined to do. That is probably why most of us try to avoid fatalistic scenarios in our life. We do not contemplate the merit of suicide after jumping off the bridge. Well most of us I would hope.

[82abhilash]

Now if indeterminism is true, we can still, ' avoid harm and further our well-being'. Not all of us may feel the need to act that way. So it does not matter if there is one possible future or many possible futures. In any case we have within us the capacity to avoid harm and enhance our well being. And that is all that is necessary for free will. So what despots and tyrants do, is restrict artificially the means by which we can express our free will, so that in doing so we can only serve them

[marsh8472]

hmm I can make anything exist if I modify the definition enough. The question is when they made the choice to avoid harm did they really have a choice in the matter? or an illusion of choice. Here's a definition of materialism: the theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.

[marsh8472]

Here's a quote: "suppose the universe is deterministic, and we can perform some calculation to predict any future state of an object given the universe's current state. Then, if we have free will, we should be able to subvert these predictions---if physics predicts I will raise my right hand at time T, I may choose not to, and vice versa. There is no reason why the mere process of prediction should restrict my ability to raise or not raise my hand, ...

[marsh8472]

... so I in fact do not possess free will with respect to raising my hand. Since we could perform the same calculations for any action I might perform, I do not possess free will at all. "

[82abhilash]

You seem to have confused the notion of choice with the notion of free will. What you call choice Dennett calls 'Elbow Room'. That is some variety in the course of actions we can take based on how we expect the future to be. In other words not always restricted to one optimal action alone. Which is what choice is all about. In other words not a forced move. Well, there are fewer forced moves today than there where once...

[82abhilash]

Which just shows that humans have the capacity to recognize the reality of their situation and change it for their betterment. The question is did they have a choice in the matter? Perhaps in the conditions that existed then, it was the only choice people had. It might as well have been. That would not prevent one from having free will, according to Dennett, because free-will stems from our ability to act on those choices. We can do much better if we want...

[82abhilash]

We can act, we can know why we act the we act. We can ascertain what we hope to achieve by how we act. We can compare our results with expected outcomes. We can learn from the experience and use that knowledge in a future scenario (which can never be same, only similar). So if cannot do all this, does this mean we have no free will. Yes. It is an evolved capacity. Animals cannot do it. Not as well as us. That is why they do not from animal rights groups and demand their rightful freedoms....

[82abhilash]

Some humans can't either. They do end up living less fulfilling life than those that can. For fatalism to be true, all that you need is a human that believes it to be true. It will remain true for him. He will live as if it is true.