اعتراض مولانا عبدالحمید به سیاستهای دولت علیه اهل سنت

[mehdijannn]

@kapisa123 kapisa, kafir madare jendat hast ke yek omar parast omad bahash zena kard to be donia omadi, tokhmse sage madar jende valade zena, bar pedare padare tiro tabare harchi soniye lanat, inshala roozi miad ke shia tak take shomaro nabood mikone be haghe emam zaman

[shahin7001]

والله ایشون حرفش درست بود .چه فرقی بین شیعه و سنی هستش.

مرگ بر اسرائیل

[MrToobitter]

Marg bar khamenei

Marg bar khamenei

Marg bar khamenei.

[TheShingami]

This shows freedom of Islamic Republic of Iran!

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

if what you saying is true so why did they confiscated his passport and banned him from traveling ?



[TheShingami]

@molazehi Your Proof? Exactly you don't have one. It's just lies people say to make Iran look bad.

My friend in Islamic Republic of Iran especially where this Sheikh lives; Sistan Baloochestan, Sunni and Shia people live, work, marry and even die together.

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

i am from balochistan and i know molana abdulhamid personally . and i know whats going on there better than you . what kind of proofs do you need ?

you did not listen to his interview with medias about banning him from traveling?

you did not read the news from his official website (the official website of sunni community in iran) sonnionline ?

[TheShingami]

@molazehi - Exactly you have no Proof... "I know him personally".

He did not get arrested or banned from traveling because I was reading about this Story on FarsNews.

The fact that this video has so many views is just the Freedom of Islamic Republic of Iran because 'Iranian Cyber Army' could delete the video from youtube. Many sunni groups in Iran plant bombs and murder Shia people, you tell me how the government should act?

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

what a great and certified news agency you are referring to (Fars News). really i don't know which one to believe , Fars news or what i see by my own eyes in Baluchistan .

for your information , youtube have been blocked in iran long time ago !!!

به روباه گفتند شاهدت کیه گفت دمم (شاهد شما هم فارس نیوز هست ) یک منبع معبر و جهانی

من چشمان خود را ببندم و حرف فارس نیوز و ذوب شدگان در ولایت  را گوش کنم؟

[TheShingami]

@molazehi Why didn't you answer my question about the bombs? He says we are your good brothers..

Which good brothers kill women and children?

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

تو که فارسی می دانی چرا با با فارسی نمی نویسی یا شاید رفتی اونجا زبانت هم یادت رفته

تقصیر مولوی عبدالحمید چیه که عده ای اومدند بمب گذاری کردند ؟

آیا خبر داری که ایشون همیشه بعد از چنین حوادثی این اعمال را محکوم می کرد؟

این بمگذاری ها از زمان حضور احمدی نژاد پس از فشارهای شدید و کشتار جوانان بلوچ شروع شد

این یک امر طبیعی هست که عمل خشونت آمیز باعث عکس العمل خوشنت آمیز تر می شه . اما  علمای اهل سنت به هیچ وجه این اعمال را تایید نکردند

[TheShingami]

@molazehi - What Rigi the Terrorist has done accompanied by many other Sunni people in Iran is congratulated in the Arab world because of them killing Shia. The last terrorist attacks on Ashura when many died including a 4 month old baby.... TAKING ANGER ON A BABY? Obviously this guy is happy about it.. his not going to announce it to everyone.

من انگلیسی مینویسم تا حرکت‌های تررریستی بعضی‌ از گروه‌های اهل صنعت را تمام مردم جهان بفهمن

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

انگلیسها مغز خر خوردند که بیایند کلیپ  با زبان فارسی ببیننند؟

اون کسی که این کلیپ را می بیند حتما فارسی می فهمه

بیخودی هم خودت را زحمت نده تو حتی یک دلیل هم نمی توانی بیاوری که علمای اهل سنت بمبگذاری در بلوچستان تایید کردنداگر ریگی در طول مدت فعالیت خود طی چند سال 200 نفر را کشته باشد حکومت جنایت کار شما در همین 6 سال اخیر 20000 نفر را کشته از جوان 20 ساله گرفته تا پیرمرد 70 ساله ... دیگه این امور بر دنیا مخفی نیست .

[TheShingami]

@molazehi Check this out: شهید عبدالمالک ریگی

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

این کلیپ را مولوی عبدالحمید ساخته؟

[TheShingami]

@molazehi نخیر برادر، طرفدار‌هایش ساختن.

بحث داره عوض میشود، من کلا می‌خوام بگم که برادر‌های سنی و شیعه در ایران باهم زندگی‌ می‌کنن و خوش هم هستند.

[molazehi]

.ما که اهل منطقه هستیم بهتر می دانیم یا شما که در انگلیس نشتید ؟

چرا ما حق ساختین یک مسجد در تهران نداریم ؟

چرا در رادیو و تلویزیون به ما حق فعالیت مذهبی نمی دهند؟

چرا در فعالیتهای مدارس دینی ما دخالت می کنند؟

چرا هنگامی که برای اشتغال اقدام می کنیم از مذهب ما سوال می کنند و به سنی ها در بلوچستان شغل های خوب نمی دهند؟

چرا استاندار بلوچستان با 98 درصد اهل سنت یک فرد غیر بلوچ و شیعه هست؟ ..چرا علمای ما را زندان می کنند؟ ...چرا حق آموزش و تدریس زبان بلوچی را نداریم؟

[molazehi]

@TheShingami

شما از انگلیس بیایید ایران با هم می گردیم در بلوچستان و اوضاع را به شما نشان میدهم و رفتار غیر انسانی ماموران دولت با شهروندان بلوچ را خواهی دید

و گرنه بدون دلیل حرف نزن .. شاید شما بتوانید با این حرفهای خود یک شخصی خارجی را گول بزنید اما من که خودم اهل این منطقه هستم و همه چیز را از نزدیک لمس میکنم گول نمی خورم

و السلام ..........................

[MrToobitter]

@TheShingami Goh khordi afe dorugh gofti

Marg bar khamenei .

Marg bar khamenei.

[TheShingami]

@MrToobitter This shows the same respect you show to Shia Iranians.

[farideh1231]

may allah (swt) bless ahl sunnah muslim.

[44499944]

بارك الله لكم يا اهل السنه

وفقكم الله لما فيه خير للاسلام والمسلمين

[Anis1888]

Мошоаллох

[winskovable]

PLEASE MAKE TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH OR ARABIC

[HIWAAZAD]

درود بر شما مولانا عبدالحمید سلام از كردستان بر شما هموطن گرامی

[mnasseri]

He is a cool Muslim...........

[hmt111]

You must have understood, by now, that the West (Gharb) has brought this regime into power to protect its Oil & other strategic interests in the Middle East, & now the West- 5+1 countries, wants to keep this regime in power, for as long as possible by any means, Lies, Ruse, Deception, Gangesterism, Charlatanism, Insidious daily War of Deception & Propaganda against the people of Iran, the West ultimate long-term goal is to break-up (Tajzieh) Iran by the hands of their own IRI puppet regime.

[hmt111]

SEE BELOW A VERY IMPORTANT - WIKILEAKS REVELATIONS - ABOUT THE BLOODY FRADULANT ELECTION OF Puppet REGIME of brutal dictator and traitor rapist-tyrant Zahhaak Khamenei & his butler rapist Ahmadinejad puppet of the 5+1 countries (US, UK, Russia, China, France & Germany + Oil Consortium) & the Organized Crime Mafia Regime in Iran of IRGC-Thugs (Arab-Pasdaran Bassijie-Jaani-Jenaayatkar Jenssi) JUNE 2010 IN IRAN, IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS; FROM THEIR SOURCES IN IRAN, TRANSMITTED TO US-BAKU, EMBASY

[NovakNY]

Im an iranian and im christian but I love him. we all are iranian and they have right to have a Mosque everywhere in Iran. God Bless Iran And Iranian

[omid8een]

Long Live Balochistan

[hmt111]

Question #3: Why was reaction so intense?

----------------------------

Answer: (SBU) Interlocutors cite two reasons for the intense

public anger:

First, pre-election openness raised hopes for change even

among the skeptical. The perceived election fraud cynically

and brutally dashed these hopes, making people feel like

[hmt111]

fools. Many people felt swindled, and others humiliated

because they had actively worked to produce a large voter

turnout. One of the latter related that he had led twenty

people to the ballot box. He tearfully asked "how can I face

these friends?"

[hmt111]

Second, the perceived blatancy of the fraud added insult to

injury. All post-election Baku watcher interlocutors were

angered by the fraud, but many were positively boiling over

its crass "in your face" magnitude. As one furious contact

commented, "they didn't even try to pretend that the count

was real" (e.g., by making the official results closer).

[hmt111]

One interlocutor argued that the fraud's blatancy was

deliberate, designed to send a message to Iranians that "we

are nothing, and should forget about changing anything."

Comment: This sense of personal insult maybe central to

understanding the staying power of the public protests and

continued widespread anger. End Comment.

[hmt111]

Question #4: Are the protests broadly-based?

Answer: (SBU) While Tehran was the epicenter, interlocutors

(including some on the scene) reported large protests over

several days in Kermanshah, Isfahan, Rasht, Karaj, Shiraz,

Ahwaz, and other cities (including smaller towns such as

Gulshahr and Najafabad). Several Tehran-area sources

[hmt111]

stressed that Tehran protests were not limited to (middle and

upper class) North Tehran, asserting that large numbers of

people from South Tehran also protested, and that there was

considerable post-election violence in South Tehran. Baku

Iran watcher has heard no reports of significant rural

protest activity.

[hmt111]

Question #5: Why weren't protests larger in Tabriz?

Answer: (C) Public protests in Tabriz were relatively less

intense and frequent than some expected, given Mousavi's

Azerbaijani nationality, and Tabriz, long history as a

center for protest activities. Four Tabriz interlocutors

[hmt111]

explained this by claiming that many Azerbaijani cultural

nationalists and intellectuals are unenthusiastic about

Mousavi personally and diffident toward what they saw as an

intra-regime power struggle with little relevance to their

most keenly-felt regional interests (e.g., recognition of

Azeri as a language of government, authorized use of Azeri in

[hmt111]

local schools, teaching of Azerbaijani culture, etc

(S) Former Republic of Azerbaijan Ambassador to Iran Nasib

Nasibili, who maintains broad ties to the Iranian Azeri

cultural leadership, told Iran watcher on July 10 that many

Azeri intellectuals now realized that continuing to maintain

[hmt111]

this distance from the issue "is probably a mistake." He

predicted that Iranian Azeri participation in election

protests will increase, should these opposition activities

continue in Tehran and elsewhere, but asserted that "the

drifting away" of Iranian Azerbaijan from the center is

likely to continue.

[hmt111]

Question #6: What is the impact of Khameini?

Answer: (SBU) Several Baku interviewees related that they

took part in large protest demonstrations until hearing

Ayatollah Khameini's June 19 sermon, and observing the

related security build-up. All of these (ranging in age from

[hmt111]

twenty to sixty-nine) cited fear of arrest and physical

BAKU 00000575 003 OF 006

violence, not respect for Khameini, as their reason for not

marching. In the week after the Khameini sermon several

contacts predicted that public protest would continue but

focus on off-street and passive resistance.

[hmt111]

(SBU) Over the longer term, many Iranian interlocutors saw

the destruction of Khameini's long-cultivated image as an

independent, ethical "father figure," and fit successor to

the Ayatollah Khomeini was the most important impact of his

sermon. Comments to this effect began coming in within hours

[hmt111]

of the sermon, and continue to this day. As one Iranian

observed, Khameini is now seen as "just another faction

leader within the regime."

Question #7: What is the impact of Rafsanjani?

Answer: (C) Baku commentators (including one who attended

[hmt111]

the Tehran Friday prayer service) dwelled on the

"re-galvanizing" effect of Ayatollah Rafsanjani's July 17

sermon on protesters. An Iranian businessman who is closely

following the protests and returned from a (self-described)

"fact-finding" visit to Tehran on July 18 noted that the

Friday prayer venue was a green light for a massive turnout,

and that Mousavi aides had signaled his desire for a large

[hmt111]

turnout through diverse media (see item #14 below).

(C) He added that similar alternative media was used to

prepare the prayer attendees -- don't wear green armbands

until you get there, assemble peacefully, and chant "the

opposite" of whatever regime slogans are recited. He claimed

to notice an alleged change in mood among the protesters,

[hmt111]

from a belief that resistance is dwindling, to a renewed

confidence and willingness to engage in resistance. All

contacts praised Rafsanjani's speech for its barbed nuances

and evidence of support for protesters and continued pressure

on the regime. One commented that "(Rafsanjani) showed us

that there are still deep splits" in the regime.

[hmt111]

Question #8: What regime cracks have appeared?

Answer: (S) Well-sourced information on this topic is hard

to come by. A senior figure in the Melli Mazhab movement

told Baku watcher on July of Rafsanjani's alleged efforts to

replace Khameini with a Council ("Shura") of religious elders

[hmt111]

(ref A). A wealthy Iranian businessman who has just returned

from Iran claimed on July 17 that many in the lower and

medium levels of the security establishment are also opposed

to Ahmadinejad, and/or the repression of protests, and are

prepared to look the other way to facilitate opposition

activities, including (he claimed) overlooking sabotage.

[hmt111]

Question #9: Are there splits among the Basij?

Answer: (C) Two Tehran sources claimed to know Basij whom

they said were not supportive of Ahmadinejad, however, one of

these had nonetheless seen her "anti-Ahmadinejad" Basij

acquaintance repressing post-election protesters. The bottom

line, sources felt, is that whether for reasons of

[hmt111]

discipline, brainwashing, or money most Basij members are

reluctant to defy official orders, whatever their purported

private opinions may be.

Question #10: How involved are Iranian clerics?

A: (SBU) Baku Iran watcher contacts, including those

[hmt111]

resident in Iran, do not seem to be waiting in anticipation

for guidance from the clerical establishment. That being

said, support from this quarter is regarded as tactically

necessary, and is actively welcomed when it emerges (e.g.,

from Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sanei).

(SBU) Some sources have observed that the majority of

[hmt111]

Ayatollahs and Grand Ayatollahs have taken no public position

on the election and subsequent protests. While most saw this

BAKU 00000575 004 OF 006

as a positive signal, others cynically dismissed it as

reflecting an alleged clerical focus on self-preservation,

and holding back comment until the smoke clears.

[hmt111]

Question #11: What is Sistani's position?

Answer: (S) Najaf-based Ayatollah Sistani, originally from

Isfahan, reportedly has the largest personal following of any

Ayatollah in Iran. A contact close to Sistani's circle

strongly doubted that either Sistani, or his Qom

[hmt111]

representative Jamal Shahristani, are participating in the

ongoing Iranian political debate. The source, formerly chief

of staff to Ayatollah al-Khoei, explicitly dismissed press

reports that Shahristani participated in recent meetings of

senior Qom clerics that reportedly discussed post-election

political issues.

[hmt111]

(C) The source emphasized that Sistani is extremely judicious

in determining when and how he personally engages in

political matters. That being said, he speculated that

individuals trusted by Sistani, but lower profile than

Shahristani, may be actively monitoring the Iranian situation

for him.

[hmt111]

Question #12: What will happen next?

Answer: (C) Most Iranian contacts (some more nervously than

others) admit that they don't know what will happen next

(though one predictedc an anti-Khameini coup led by the

Revolutionary Guard leaders "who will then be allowed to keep

all their money."). At the same time, most thought that

[hmt111]

widespread resistance (on and off-street) will continue,

arguing that "there is no going back" to the pre-election

tacit acceptance of Khameini's and Ahmadinejad's rule. "All

our old caution and fear of civil war is gone" insisted one

businessman. "Both sides hope to wear down the other,"

another commentator observed.

[hmt111]

Question #13: What off-street protests will occur?

Answer: (C) While most interlocutors said that they have

stopped participating in public demonstrations, all expressed

continued anger and resentment toward the regime, and several

added that their friends are still going to rooftops at night

to shout "Allah Akbar." Others also claim to be launching

[hmt111]

green balloons, and flashing their car lights while driving

on main streets. Two interlocutors asserted that other

"passive resistance" and similar strategies will be deployed,

including work slowdowns and turning on all power in homes to

cause blackouts during Ahmadinejad and Khameini speeches.

(Note: According to reports, this actually happened in

[hmt111]

several Iranian cities including Tehran during Ahmadinejad's

televised July address -- well after the preceding interview.

End Note). In an new development, two contacts just

returned from Iran told Iran watcher on July 20 and 21

separately related that a campaign is underway to boycott

Russian and Chinese consumer products.

[hmt111]

Question #14: Is there a protest "organization"?

Answer: (C) According to four separate but complementary

sources (one inside Iran), protesters look to Mousavi (e.g.,

his facebook homepage) for specific guidance on what to do,

not a local leadership cadre or organization. Sources

[hmt111]

explained that people communicate information on upcoming

protests and strategies by utilizing email networks, land

lines, and word of mouth. An Iranian businessman just

returned from Iran explained said that most protest guidance

is released by Mousavi aides through known intermediaries

several days before the planned event.

[hmt111]

Question #15: How does the word get out?

Answer: (C) Interlocutors asserted that the use of diverse

information media as outlined in item #14 above works

BAKU 00000575 005 OF 006

[hmt111]

effectively in getting the latest word out to potential

protesters. A businessman said that he uses his 120-plus

email Iranian contact list to forward information that he

receives, in the expectation that recipients in turn will

forward the information to others. "After three days, a huge

[hmt111]

number of people are informed," he noted. A source in Shiraz

said that people without access to internet can usually get

information at bus stops, public parks, and in taxis (often

shared by several people). (Note: Use of Twitter and other

internet media by protesting Iranians has noticeably

increased since about July 10. End Note.)

[hmt111]

Question #16: How is the regime responding?

Answer: (SBU) When pressed, most Baku contacts assert that

the army and most of the Revolutionary Guard will never fire

[hmt111]

on election protesters, but no one seems completely sure of

this. One interlocutor commented that unlike the past,

people are not focusing on regime response -- "we are fed

up," he said. (S) Some contacts suggest that the regime may be stripping

smaller towns of Basij and police forces in order to

[hmt111]

confront the protests in Iran and other large cities. A

source from Gulshahr (near Tehran) described July 11 marches

there as proceeding in a peaceful holiday-like atmosphere,

with only a handful of police or Basij to be seen. Another

source provided a similar picture of July 17 protests in

Najafabad, near Isfahan.

[hmt111]

Question #17: Are there plans for a General Strike?

Answer: (S) There are widespread assertions that a General

Strike is planned as a "final bullet" against the regime, to

be deployed immediately and without further guidance should

Mousavi be arrested. This was initially heard by Iran

[hmt111]

watcher from Baku-based contacts, but is now also appearing

on Twitter. A businessman with contacts in the Mousavi camp

told Iran watcher shortly after the election claimed that

this strategy originated with Mousavi, whom he said wanted to

hold off on a general strike as a last resort, which may be

called even if Mousavi is not arrested.

[hmt111]

Question #18: Are there signs of a work slowdown

Answer: (S) There are many assertions that work slowdowns

are likely, planned, or already occurring, but little

evidence. An energy sector businessman, described slowdown

as an interim step that would increase pressure on the regime

[hmt111]

short of a general strike. This source also predicted that

sabotage and work stoppages at oil and other energy

facilities will also occur if the regime continues in power.

(C) Reports from Baku and inside-Iran contacts of

intermittent bazaar closures and short hours in several

cities (including Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Kermanshah)\

[hmt111]

have recurred since the beginning of the post election

period. Others have complained that customs clearance and

normal truck delivery distribution has been disrupted,

negatively affecting their businesses. It is still unclear

whether some or all of these problems reflect temporary

[hmt111]

responses to an unsettled situation, bureaucratic disarray,

or political protests.

Question #19: Is the nuclear program affected?

Answer: (S) Former Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Vafa

Guluzadeh and former GOAJ Ambassador to Iran Nasib Nasibili

separately told Iran watcher that as a result of

[hmt111]

post-election developments in Iran, the

Khameini/Ahmadinejad-led Government of Iran will seek to test

a nuclear device as soon as possible, i.e., even before

weaponization or delivery systems are ready, has

significantly increased. Guluzadeh and Nasibili explained

that, whatever the original (probably mixed) objectives

[hmt111]

motivating the Iranian government's pursuit a bomb, it is

BAKU 00000575 006 OF 006

driven by domestic political objectives, as "the only card

(Khameini and Ahmadinejad) have left to play" to win support

from the Iranian people, and regain some legitimacy.

(S) Nasibili pointed out that Ayatollah Khomeini famously

[hmt111]

used the Iran-Iraq war to eliminate enemies and consolidate

power, and speculated that any ensuing international uproar

and pressure would be used in a similar way by Ahmadinejad

and Khameini. Guluzadeh speculated that the two may believe

that even a worst-case scenario would make them into heroic

figures.

[hmt111]

(C) Baku Iranians are not knowledgeable about the nuclear

program, but several speculated that the current regime will

try to do something "dramatic" to regain the initiative:

testing a bomb, provoking a war, or faking domestic terrorist

attacks are among the possibilities mentioned.

Question #20: Should the West still seek dialogue?

[hmt111]

Answer: (C) Former Presidential Advisor Guluzadeh, formerly

a strong supporter of U.S.- Iranian dialogue "without

preconditions" (ref D), told Iran watcher that recent events

have completely changed his thinking on this issue. "They

have no interest in dialogue with you, or any concessions,

[hmt111]

you may offer" he said flatly; "their only interest is their

survival." He added that "their only reason for talking to

you would be to claim a 'victory'" in front of the Iranian

people, "and to stall you while continuing to do what they

want." (S) Guluzadeh nonetheless said that the U.S. and the West

must continue to be seen as extending every opportunity to

[hmt111]

the regime for compromise "in order to show the rest of the

world that you have done so," prior to eventual punitive

action. Guluzadeh said, the West should begin planning now

for dealing with a defiant, uncompromising, nuclear Iranian

regime -- with a view towards permanently removing this threat.LU

[hmt111]

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

.Introduction

¶1. (C) Baku Iran watcher has conducted approximately thirty

interviews since the June 12 Iranian presidential elections

with Iranians (both Baku-based and resident in Iran) and

[hmt111]

Azerbaijani Iran experts. Interviews dealt with reactions

to, and analyses of, the election results; subsequent

protests; protest mechanics; faction maneuvering; and/or

predicted geopolitical implications. Most sources were

ordinary Iranians (students, business people and

professionals) with involvement in and/or credible knowledge

[hmt111]

of the matters discussed, and a story to tell. The following

attempts to summarize the information and insights garnered

from these interviews in ways that respond to some of the

most frequent questions being raised by Washington policy

makers and analysts. While the following incorporates

comments from many Iranian residents, it is ultimately a view

[hmt111]

from Baku, with all of the advantages and limitations of

distance that this suggests. The aim of this cable is to

assist in assembling the larger post-election Iranian jigsaw

puzzle together by putting a view of many of the pieces in

one place. End Introduction. ¶2. (S) Begin Questions and Answers.

[hmt111]

Question #1. How great was Mousavi's support?

Answer: (SBU) Out of a pre-election survey of about thirty

Iranians, all but three told Iran watcher that they and most

people they knew would support Mousavi. Well before the

election itself, Baku Iran watcher repeatedly heard comments

[hmt111]

from Iranian sources (most resident in Iran) to the effect

that "Mousavi will win the election unless it is stolen" (see

refs B and C). However, other interlocutors asserted that

"Ahmadinejad will be unable to steal the election" if Mousavi

won by more than four million votes ) an outcome

increasingly predicted as Election Day approached.

[hmt111]

Question #2: Why did the fraud occur?

Answer: (SBU) Baku interlocutors provide two possibly

complementary explanations:Explanation A: "The fraud was a desperate defensive move, in the face of Mousavi's surge, by Supreme leader Khameini, his

son Mojtaba, and their immediate circle."

[hmt111]

The upshot is that both sides were engaged in a game of

political chess in which Khameini's circle ordered the fraud

because it perceived its political survival to be at stake.

In support of this explanation, an Iranian academic related

that before the election a friend with access to Khameini's

circle told him that Khameini suspected that a Mousavi

[hmt111]

victory would be followed by the sidelining and/or removal of

Khameini by Rafsanjani and Mousavi, due to "illness." The

pre-election source added that "while Rafsanjani can possibly

remove Khameini, Khameini cannot remove (the politically

entrenched) Rafsanjani."Explanation B: "The fraud was organized to protect the vested interests of cliques tied to the Revolutionary Guard, the

[hmt111]

Basiji leadership, and Ahmadinejad."

This, more common analysis relegates Khameini to a supporting

role, and suggests longer pre-election fraud preparation and

planning. Since the 2005 election, "second generation"

Revolutionary figures, many Iran-Iraq war Revolutionary Guard

[hmt111]

or Basij veterans, have taken over all security agencies and

most lucrative positions within the state and key

parastatals. The core of this network allegedly planned the

fraud well before the election, as a calculated step to

permanently consolidate their dominance.

BAKU 00000575 002 OF 006

[mraoufi9]

In old regime they would put you in jail, torture you and in some cases you would disappear without trace for criticizing the regime. Confiscating passport is a common practice to prohibit one from leaving Iran, it was common during the old regime and it is common now and it is done for many different reasons. You just saw Karoubi’s addressing his followers a few days ago.

Freedom of expression in Iran is as goog as if not better than any western country that I know.

[elabela1000000]

This fellow sounds so nice. I am a shia Iranian and would rather have him as supreme leader instead of hypocrite khamenei who neither believes in God nor Islam. I hope Iranian parliament and the body responsible for appointing supreme leader use a bit of brain for a change getting rid of Khamenei and appoint him as supreme leader. What Iran needs is honest descent smart people to lead and this fellow satisfies all those requirements. I have a lot respect for him whereas for Khomeini I have none

[esfuni]

rast migeh! dorood!

[mraoufi9]

Clear example of freedom of speech in Iran. As long as you do not burn public property and respect constitution you are absolutly free for expression of your view.

[molazehi]

@mraoufi9

if you knew what happened to him after these speechs you will change your comment .

his passport confiscated by Iranian authorities and they did not allow him to go to hajj and to attend any conference outside Iran .

[longliveturkish]

@maroufi 9 i dont understand what did he said but in Iran there is no freedom speech ,this man is sunni imam and famous in islam world, any time if he want to say some thing he will say ,sunni is very brave and true religion they dont need to get permission from Khamney,but you gay run away like rat from your country and tell to world in iran there is a freedom speech, iran is dirty corruption country about human right

[longliveturkish]

@maroufi 9 Go and fuck your religion until yesterday you was under my cock, just fuck your self and khamney and don't make any nuclear weapon to bring another war to middle east,because you coward and easy to surrender

[LifeisX]

@mraoufi9 Clear sign of you being a Sundiskhor. Good thing you mentioned Karoubi because as we all know he has been threatened numerous times to death by autorities, his house and office has been raided multiple times and his political party has been banned

[abtini1998]

man sihe hastam, amma sohbahai iashan kamelan manteghi ,matin v zyiba bood. kash iashan rahabre keshvare ma bood. be omide irani abad o azad.

[666x1]

من سنی نیستم ولی درود بر این مرد بزرگ.

.

کشورهای اسلامی خیال میکنند که جمهوری اسلامی یک کشور اسلامی است

.

شما سعی کنید که جمهوری اسلامی را افشا کنید و آبروی این رژیم ننگین را ببرید.

.

ما همه با هم هستیم.....

[sepehr1390]

من بعنوان یک شیعه صددرصد به برادران اهل سنت حق می دهم.

یک دلیل منطقی دیگر برای جدایی دین از دولت و سیاست

[mehraner]

من به ایشان حق می دهم .این که نمی شود یک عده آدمی که جزو مالکین این آب و خاک هستند نتوانند در خانه خودشان آزاد باشد .سهم همه مردم از کشور سهم برابر است . هیچ ایرانی نمی تواند دیگر ایرانی ها را از رفتن به شهری منع کند چون ایران ملک مشاع ماست همه گوشه گوشه این خاک متعلق به همه ماست و با هم برابریم . حالا سنی هائی که می آیند و ساکن تهران می شوند کجا بروند نماز بخوانند خوب می خواهند با سنی های دیگر با هم نماز بخوانند خوب به شما چه ، کشورشان است می خواهند پول بدهند زمین بخرند و مسجد بسلزند به شما چه

[88jamshid]

قربان شجاعتش

زنده باشی

[kuwait64]

ببينيد شجاعت و اعتمادش به ذات لايزال را

[zolkefl2005]

درود بر علمای بلوچ و بلوچستان درود به اهل سنت ایران

[khadsfg]

فداك روحى مولانا عبدالحميد

[haqseeker]

translation pls

[AbuMuslimKhorasani]

@haqseeker

The govrnment is interfering in their affairs. The representatives of Wilayat Faqih (or supreme leader] make decisions on Ahl-Sunnah religious institutions. However, this scholar is saying that only the Ahl-Sunnah scholars have the right to control and administer the Ahl-Sunnah religious institutions. He further says, that we obey the govrnment but we can't and will not give our deen [faith] to be controlled by the shia scholars and the govrnment.

[AbuMuslimKhorasani]

@haqseeker

Part2:

He is also saying that "I don't fear the prison nor the death". Furthermore, he is saying "leave us free like the institution of Qom. Don't pressure us and don't arrest our scholars.

[Barakzay]

as afghan wee support you 100%.