Remote Vote Tampering Attack on a Sequoia AVC Voting Machine by Argonne National Lab

[TheBRADBLOG]

@gesmache "Things can go wrong"? So it's okay to count votes in secret w/ no way to verify them? If the process is 100% transparent, things needn't go wrong, and nobody need be "trusted". Our system is not built on trust, but rather, checks and balances. As to "you have to trust somebody or something", that's almost exactly what Tony Anchundo 18-yr Registrar of Voters in Monterey, CA told me. Then this happened: [DOT] bradblog [DOT] com [SLASH] ?p=4362 -- So, um, no thanks.

[r902179]

Why dont you just writing the person you want as president on a slip of paper and drop it in a bock. KISS keep it simple stupid.

[Benanov]

Can you get this in WEBM?

[NeverForget1776]

IMPORTANT: The presidential race is like a shell game run by a con man. No matter who you vote for you lose. This is because both choices are controlled by the manipulator of the game. In the presidential race this is done by limiting the winner of the primary to someone who is owned by the real power brokers behind the scene.

So long as the winner of the primary (in both party’s races) is owned by these people then it does not matter who the public votes for in the final race.

[NeverForget1776]

@killzzz18 and anyone else asking how this is an issue..

Its not outside hackers using this exploit thatr should be alarming but the fact that anyone with the right connections can implement this for so little moeny and in little time as long as they can get private access to the machine.

The only way to avoid voting fraud is to be %100 open. The only item that should be descreate is the individuals voting. Otherwise every step shoudl be open and easily seen by the public.

[mdblack98]

And...you could also put your ticket in another box which would then be sampled by the voting authority to ensure all check out OK.

My guess is that many voting systems would show errors with this method.

And the receipt would contain the results of your vote (although without your name on it).

[zapdude1]

The republican party must be banned for any needed changes to the voiting can be done.

[mdblack98]

Election officials either think everything is hunky-dory or don't want to tell you how insecure the whole process is.

The most secure method is for you to get a receipt for your vote that can be checked post-election to ensure it got registered the way you intended. That would give 100% confidence but even then you raise the possibility of cheating taking place and being detected. The only solution being to toss out an entire voting machine, or voting place from the results (rightfully so).

[greatfulkitteh]

@mdblack98 If you mean that people should be contacted at the end of the day and asked whether they really voted for "X," this is insane...paper ballots would be faster and provide the same purpose. The whole reason for electric machines is faster counting, and with this method to "verify" them, one would be counting the slow way, twice, and that's assuming that you could reach everyone who had voted quickly and that they remembered who they voted for (and didn't change their minds)...

[kilzzz18]

@scoobydoobydoo72

You think the hackers are going to have access to the secure storage? Can get into the locked machines, locked inside a cabinet, with seals on them?

If you think they can then I ask one question, name a fool proof way that elections can be held without any possibility of cheating.

[greatfulkitteh]

@kilzzz18 "Gaining access to the inside of the Diebold touch-screen is as simple as picking the rudimentary lock, or using a standard hotel minibar key, as all of the machines use the same easily copied key, available at most office supply stores." Sept. 27 2011 article in Salon titled "Diebold voting machines can be hacked by remote control" (Google it, youtube will not let me post a URL)

[TheBRADBLOG]

@kilzzz18 Hand-marked paper-ballots, hand-counted in front of the public and all parties and video cameras at the precinct, at the end of the Election Day, with results posted decentrally at each precinct before ballots move anywhere. "Fool proof"? Nothing, of course, is full proof. But the system I've just described makes it extraordinarily difficult to get away with manipulation without detection or otherwise in a way that could have much chance of flipping the results of an election.

[KhabalGhoul]

@TheBRADBLOG

That would never work as it would take to many hours for that to be done and board of elections have trouble getting people to work the day of election as it is. plus no one would ever have access to this stuff like you are showing that is not how it works with election boards

[TheBRADBLOG]

@KhabalGhoul Actually, works fine in NH where handcounts are done BEFORE Diebold counts. Moreoever, never a prob getting hand counters. Remember, counting is AFTER a work day (unlike poll working). Finally, yes, election officials ABSOLUTELY have the type of access to these machines as discussed. As well as the e-voting vendors.

[kilzzz18]

Exactly when is there going to be time to disassemble a unit and do the modifications necessary? This isnt going to happen in a polling place with election judges are other people looking.

[scoobydoobydoo72]

@kilzzz18 , they explain when the hardware can be installed at about the 5:28 point -- behind the curtain, during storage, during shipment, ...