MONISM VS DUALISM & PSYCHIATRY 4/4 DENNET & SEARLE

[Heissenburger]

but what if monism works at a higher level: if the universe is a simulation (like The Matrix or The Sims Game), then "brain" and "mind" are just part of the bigger System?

[Heissenburger]

he could have said "brain" is the hardware, "mind" is the software; it would be silly to treat them as the same, and to ditch the hard-disk if the computer is infected by a computer virus.

[robert56371]

It took until the last slide to discover what the point of all this was. I found it a poor, shallow treatment of consciousness (even granted its shortness). Dennett is unfairly represented here (even though I don’t think he has the answer yet). What needs to be grasped is the nature of “matter”. We need to truly understand that actually we don’t understand matter, and in fact the distinction we make between “natural” and “supernatural” is itself a product of our senses and our brains.

[jockmclaren47]

@robert56371 So far, "matter" is a brute fact. We have to start somewhere. I distinguish very forcefully between physical matter/energy, and the informational states that control the physical universe. Information arises from but is not the same as the matter/energy realm. There can be no disembodied informational states, i.e. supernatural is absurd.

[robert56371]

@jockmclaren47 Thank you very much for your response to my comment. It’s impossible to adequately comment of course within the allocation of 500 characters. If you’re interested, a fuller treatment of my position can be found at guernseywalker.me.uk/Mind_and_­God.html.

[mrrobertfair]

@jockmclaren47 I see this thought pattern that you are expressing here played out so frequently. You say more or less that if Dennet and Searle would only have given naturalistic dualism a fair look, they might have seen that dualism can describe the phenomenon better. Then you make the same kind of exclusionary write-off of supernaturalism using the strong emotive word "absurd," without giving the supernatural a thorough look thus providing a nice example of Piaget's notion of assimilation.

[jockmclaren47]

@mrrobertfair The problem with any element of the supernatural is that there is no innate restriction on it, i.e. no demarcation criterion between "reasonable" supernaturalism and unreasonable. if you allow any such element, you have to allow them all. I choose not to allow any because the program becomes absurd the moment we admit any non-naturalist factors in the equation.

[mrrobertfair]

@jockmclaren47 thanks for writing back. To me, given your assumptions, your conclusions follow,e.g., you assume there can be no inate restrictions on a supernatural explanation of the extra stuff that Chalmers alludes to regarding conscious experience, therefore, exclusion of a supernatural explanation is warranted. You want to stick to the Quantitative Method to explain the "why there is even experience at all" question. I get that. But, you will remain stuck at this level of understanding.

[jockmclaren47]

@mrrobertfair My goal is a naturalistic explanation of human mental life. Conceptually, it is enormously difficult but what is the alternative? A supernatural explanation? That has no limit so the prize would go to the person with the most vivid imagination. Stick to the real world, deal with the difficulties and see what emerges BEFORE giving in to the temptation of the supernatural. If I can't find my cat, I don't assume he has been abducted by aliens.

[mrrobertfair]

@jockmclaren47 Thats fine, but my point is, if I can help my clients with OCD/intrusive thoughts or who hear derogatory command voices to recognize that there is a "self" that is separate from "brain" (brain being the source of the negative automatic thts or perceptual distortions/delusions), then, we can begin to lesson the power that those negative thoughts/perceptions have on the system. A client who is a follower of Christ has the added psychological advantage due to Colossians 1:27b.

[Jestlow]

I was really hoping this lecture would be informative.

[Andizottel]

This is so pointless. You're in effect only arguing (over the course of 4 videos) that they are using the wrong terms. So what?

The arguments that the mind is not supernatural still stand, and that's the crux of the whole discussion.

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel No. The true question is whether mind is a biological entity or not. They say it is, I say it is not. The problem for them is that as they formulate it, they cannot show how information can get from mind to body and back again. Their attempt at sorting out mind and body has totally failed. That is not "Pointless."

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

So, what is the mind in your opinion?

The mind is not different from the body but just a function of the brain, so the "information" never leaves the body. You assert that this is not shown, but never have any arguments to back that up other than "I don't believe that".

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel The mind is an informational state generated by the brain, it is no more biological than the software I am using now is physical. For the detailed arguments, you would have to see my publications, these videos are only brief summaries of a complex and detailed account of mind-body interaction.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

So what? Dennet and others don't argue that the brain and the mind are exactly the same, so your criticism is just about semantics and such, like I said, pointless.

Strength is not the same as a muscle, but we don't need anything magical to explain strenght.

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel Dennett and Searle both explicitly and repeatedly state that the mind is biological, as do Kandel and so many others. They are wrong. They mistake the provenance of the mind (i.e. the brain) for its nature. You will need to check my publications, every objection you raise has been dealt with in detail. Mind is a natural informational state but it does not obey the laws of the time-space continuum, it follows its own semantic laws which cannot be reduced to biology.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

"... explicitly and repeatedly state that the mind is biological" citation please.

"Mind ... does not obey the laws of the time-space continuum" that's a bold claim (funny even, and in no way better than "it's supernatural") Prove it.

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel All the citations are in my published works, there are hundreds of them, open Dennett's so-called "Explanation of Consciousness" at practically any page. The proof of the second claim is being finished now, but will probably not be published before next year. However, a moment's reflection will show that the mind does not obey the same laws as the brain. Gravity affects the mind? I think not.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

Can you give an example (with page number) where he says "the mind is the brain"?

Can't wait for your "proof" that there exists something outside of space and time. You'll win the Nobel Prize!

This gets more funny every post! Gravity doesn't affect strength or color or software; it must be outside of space and time!!

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel You will need to read the material first. For example, generosity is not constrained by laws of physics. If, however, you are a committed reductionist, then nothing will convince you. But that is not science.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

Then strength is not constrained by laws of physics. It sure isn't easy to explain just with physics, but it can be explained by biology (muscles) which is explained by physics. Equally generosity can be explained by evolutionary biology - there's nothing miraculous about it. Try to be generous faster than light!

I don't care much about labels; I'm ready to be convinced with facts and evidence. "Proofing" something "outside space & time" is not science, get real

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel No. Strength is the wrong example. Logic is not controlled by laws of physics, just as muscle action is not constrained by the laws of logic. There are two realms to consider, the time-space realm, and the informational realm generated by the brain. That informational "space" runs according to rules but they aren't the rules of the time-space continuum. They are ontologically separate and distinct and can be mimicked on a digital computer.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

More bold and laughable claims. You're talking about the "laws of physics" as if they were real laws, not just descriptions of how the world works. Equally "laws of logic" are mere images in language or mathematics of how the world is. Information is never "outside" these "laws" because it's a part of this world. "Outside of space and time" is per definition supernatural, but you claim that you don't argue for the supernatural. So, what are you trying to accomplish here?

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel Are you trying to tell me that logical and/or semantic systems are subject to the same constraints as physical bodies in space? If so, you are wasting my time. Read the full work and then comment.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

Don't be silly. You can put 3 potatoes near 2 potatoes and then you have 5. 2+3=5 is the generalized idea of that and thus you can apply it to other things or can even work with it without handling objects. But that still doesn't mean it's outside of anything, it's a way to describe reality. Nothing spooky there!

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel Only a creature with mental capacities will be able to recognise that there are 5 potatoes, another potato can't do that. The nature of mentality is NOT biological, it is informational. e.g. Norbert Wiener, 1949: "Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day”

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

Here are some things that are neither matter nor energy: a swarm, unicorns, weather, the idea of an elephant, outside, north, ...

Do they exist in another realm?

Some animals can count - do they have a mind outside of space and time?

Information is always bound to something physical - a book, a hard disk, a brain - and doesn't just float around. You give some words more meaning than necessary because you want the mind to be something amazing so badly. It's sad somehow.

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel Correct. So where do they exist? In an informational space generated by the brain, which we call the mind. I thank you for conceding my case, now if you would only read my detailed work, you will find that I have answered all of your possible objections, and more. The mind is a real informational space generated by the brain via connections I have detailed: a solution to the mind-body, problem, if you will. End of discussion.

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

"informational space"? Otherwise do you seem to agree with me, but this sounds nothing like the "outside of space and time" stuff (I still like that one) you postulated before but is the position Dennet and others are arguing for. Like I said, you are just arguing about semantics and I suspect that you don't understand their position. So where do unicorns exist? They don't! They are nothing more than printer's ink, sound waves, bits, connections of brain cells, ...

[jockmclaren47]

@Andizottel Will this do?

Dennett DC 1991. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books (1993): “Somehow, the brain must be the mind” (p41).

[Andizottel]

@jockmclaren47

"somehow" is the keyword here. You can accuse him of formulating it sloppy, but his position is not that they are exactly the same, he explains it shortly before that as opposed to "the idea that a brain cannot be a thinking thing ...". That doesn't mean that thinking IS the brain, but that the brain is thinking, i.e. the brain does the thinking. I could say that "somehow, software is the hardware" meaning that it's nothing independent from the hardware.

[dlbattle100]

For a long while, I have considered that the concept of "mind" has its closest analogy with "software that is running on the brain". In the same way that a computer can be running a program like IBM's "Watson" jeopardy playing program, our brain be coaxed into running different programs through teaching/learning. If that's what you mean by "dualism", brain = hardware, soul = software, then I can agree with you. If you mean something more spooky than that then I can't.

[jockmclaren47]

@dlbattle100 That is exactly what I mean. I am most emphatically opposed to anything "spooky" in this model: it is determined to be scientific, come what may. However, I am aware of gaps in the explanatory chain from brain to experience and back again, see my books for more detail.

[rh001YT]

Dr. M, please don't consider my comments hostile, I merely want to encourage all to think it all through more thoroughly & put some focus on reality & what matters...so an oblique example: Can Dr. M, or Dan Dennet put fear into the seats of power, the way Baba Ram Dev has done in India? How did Baba do it? Who really understands the mind...hmmm? From tv yoga teacher to billionaire - never spent a penny on razors - and now New Delhi tembles...amazing!

[jockmclaren47]

@rh001YT Your comments are not hostile. If you want to see real hostility, have a look at what orthodox psychiatrists say and do to critics. Your concern for these questions is real, maybe you are a bit blunt in your expression but who am I to criticise?

[rh001YT]

@jockmclaren47 You seem like a decent bloke, & I know what you mean about the orthodox psych's reaction to criticism. I think your decency is your weakness - it is not likely you would ever publicly admit to not being good, honest, just, etc since your income depends on that costume. So you debate about "dualism" & Dennet, etc, & lack the courage to strip nude & accuse all those you oppose of masquerade, as nothing else is possible for humans enmeshed in the game. Pretence justifies pretense.

[rh001YT]

I think it most likely that personality type strongly influences an individual's take on anything. And behind personality type are goals - how did those goals get there? Who is not pursuing goals - advantage - in a straightforward or crooked manner? And if anyone says their goal is "the pursuit of truth"...does anyone believe that? Such a statement belongs in the category with "trust me"....usualy means the opposite. Anyway, which "truth"? Was Gandhi pursuing "truth", or advantage?

[jockmclaren47]

@rh001YT I would say that the goals are part of the personality structure, the unstated knowledge base which guides and controls the individual's behaviour somewhere behind full awareness. Adler's notion of fictive goals will not go away.

[rh001YT]

@jockmclaren47 Thanks for the reply. "Personality structure".."unstated knowledge base"..."behind full awareness".. phrases without real referents, except that "personality structure" may indicate one's tastes in others. Would I learn more about "human nature" as a student of Dr. M or (the late) Sai Baba? I say Sai Baba - what a great master of mind control! His charitable trust in the billion$, his public works greater than the gov of India. And he was a short homely man - what a genius!

[rh001YT]

More on "consciousness": is an individual in a state of samsara still conscious? No self-talk, no naming of objects or motions, yet the individual can still walk, drink, eat, operate a door, etc. Of course there is no interpersonal interaction, no communication, or at least not much. Still there can be learning. Most Westerners, except Japanese, can't imagine samsara is possible. And if you try to silence the mind, the trying causes more noise. I think some Oriental ideas are worth pursuing.

[rh001YT]

"Consciousness" is a fuzzy word w/o a clearly defined referrant, for instance, we do not usually consider sleep to be unconsciousness, but we could define it so if we wished. We are not in possession of an imprimatur that declares language to be the perfect tool for the understanding of anything - it may more be the case that language taints understanding, but what is "understanding" : another fuzzy word which if defined, is done so arbitrarily according to goals - where do the goals come from?

[jockmclaren47]

@rh001YT You will notice that I very carefully avoid using the word 'consciousness.' As a word, it has been worn smooth by a million loose tongues. Language is imprecise, I can never understand why anybody would have hoped it could be otherwise. It's a bit like the search for certainty in mathematics. Very old-fashioned.

[rh001YT]

@jockmclaren47 Thanks for the reply. I would differ slightly & say that language can be precise when a word is carefully defined, such as "copper". Words that don't have simple referrants are usually bias/power games. The game is behind all thinking and is likely the cause of all we do. Who can figure out what the game really is, for instance, might it be a noun, verb or other? Mere "survival instinct" seems like a poor explanation of the game, as any pro athlete or billionaire will atest.

[jockmclaren47]

@rh001YT My view is that poorly defined language often conceals bias/power games, rather than necessarily IS such games. Ordinary people assume that everybody is as honest as they are, but in dealing with people who have or want power, that is a dangerous assumption. Sorting out language is an essential part of any philosophy of mind.

[rh001YT]

@jockmclaren47 "Ordinary people" is quite a value judgement. I would say that "ordinary people" are not at all honest, but yes, they do assume others are as honest as they aren't. No one can escape playing the game - no one is above it, the game us ultimate. Language is a rapier, nothing else. Or, do you have a set of stone tablets engraved by the hand of some god that declares humans good, right & just, only going "bad" when traumatized, thus language also expresses everything "good"?

[dfpolis]

I liked your analysis of Dennett and Searle. I think it is sound. I do not see that that we need separate substances as opposed to distinct subsystems in a single person. Peace, DP

[jockmclaren47]

@dfpolis We agree in principle. Cheers, Jock

[psusac]

I guess I want to just throw down one question - When a college student goes out drinking, he/she is doing so for the simple reason that the chemical changes to the body effect changes in consciousness.

Redefining Dennett’s position as dualism and calling it incoherent, doesn't solve the problem of why this is. Clearly there is a relationship between biology and consciousness. The rest is just semantics.

[jockmclaren47]

@psusac There is a close relationship between brain function and mental state but, within normal limits (i.e. blood alcohol of 0%) the mind controls the brain. Outside those limits, disturbed brain function interferes with the mind's smooth functioning. I don't think the problem is semantics but actually a very complex issue of how mind and brain interact.

[psusac]

@jockmclaren47 Which is a complicated way of saying "I don't know." I think that the important position to take for both Monism and Dualism is to admit that you don't know, then ask yourself: what is more likely?

Is it more likely that the mind is an emergent poperty of the patterns of matter and energy that make up the functioning brain, or is it more likely that the mind (soul) is a seperate thing that controls the brain?

"I don't know" is the best answer hands down.

[psusac]

@jockmclaren47 Are you aware of the study that shows that awareness of decisions made appears to happen AFTER brain activity reaches a certain threshold? How does dualism expalin this?

Also, given that monism is an adequate theory of why the mind exists, is there really any reason to engage the more complex idea that there is a soul? After all "Universe -> mind" is clearly more parsimonious than "Universe + Soul ->mind."

Dualism is for chumps!

[jockmclaren47]

@psusac The phenomenon called consciousness is generated by the brain. It is an informational (or semantic, if you prefer) space; the contents of that space depend utterly on normal brain function, which we take for granted. Of course, the physical state of the brain influences the informational space it generates, if it were otherwise, we probably wouldn't die when the brain does. Disembodied consciousness is a joke.

[hlvs44]

Thank you for posting this very intresting video. I do however have some problems with your interpretation of Searle. I think that you may be misreading him when he says "higher level features of the brain". While that term is vacous in the sense that it says nothing about what subjective experience is it is definitively not a dualist view. It is just that we do not know what those higher level features of the brain that lead to subjective experience are.

[jockmclaren47]

@hlvs44 I would have to say that if Searle means something very specific with his expression "higher level features," then he can only mean dualism; if he means something metaphorical, then I would say it is valueless as science and as philosophy. I do not know what the expression can mean if it doesn't mean "something substantively different than the brain," if he didn't mean that, then he should have specified it in brain terms.

[hlvs44]

@jockmclaren47 The problem with specifying higher level brain functions is that we do not know what they are and where in the brain they operate.We can't even formulate wrong theories about consciousness. Therefore I don't think that it is a philosopher's job to answer those questions. Searle and Dennet simply speculate on the best ways to go about finding the answers. (David Chalmers wrote a paper on the distinction between hard and easy problems it is worth reading if you have not done so.)

[jockmclaren47]

@hlvs44 Very familiar with Chalmers' work and rely on his concept of natural dualism at all points. I don't think we need to be able to specify where higher order functions occur in order to know that something higher occurs. My case is that dualism is unavoidable; all attempts to get rid of it either beg the question or end up in inanity. Dualism does not mean magic. It means "of two forms," and information processing vs. physicality are "of two forms."

[psusac]

@jockmclaren47 Not true. "higher level features" usually referres to the properties of interelationshps in complex systems. A simple example of this is the hardness of an iron bar. One cannot find "harness" in an atom of iron. "harness" is not a property of iron atoms.  Harness is a property describing the interelationship of many iron atoms forming a bar of iron.

[psusac]

@jockmclaren47 similarly, mind can be concieved of as a higher order property of the interelationship of the logical pathways and firing patterns of neurons

[AWASHA]

The substratum of everything, minds included, is matter. We can meaningfully talk about systems being informational, functional, or w/e you'd like, but, so long as those systems exist, they are physical entities--viz., they supervene on matter. To say that the mind acts upon its physical substrate is to say the mind acts upon itself ... which is either false or trivial. There is no evidence I'm aware of that the ontology of the mind differs in any way from the ontology of the nervous system.

[jockmclaren47]

@AWASHA I've had to put my response to this entry on my blog , but keep the comments coming.

[AWASHA]

As far as the bit about silicon is concerned, unless one is prepared to fully denounce functionalism, there's no reason to think that the mind can't be replicated with, e.g., silicon chips. That being said, it's quite obvious that you need not be a dualist in order to be a functionalist, so I don't see how this makes your position any more plausible.

[jockmclaren47]

@AWASHA I think it is true that the mind could be run on silicon chips or stem cells, and that proves that if you are referring to the human mind (roughly or otherwise) you are most definitely not referring to the human brain.

[AWASHA]

You said, "under normal conditions, the mind runs the brain." When I refer to an in tact human mind, I am roughly referring to the nervous system. So, to me, the mind running the brain equates roughly to the nervous system running a part of the nervous system ... which seems quite odd. Parts of the nervous system function within the nervous system ... the nervous system as a whole does not produce their function. The nervous system as a whole produces the function of the mind.

[jockmclaren47]

@AWASHA "The nervous system as a whole produces the function of the mind." Agreed. It is the brain's manipulation of its informational content that produces the function known as mind. And mind in turn then acts back upon its physical substrate just because it is an informational function: it can direct part of its information to work on the brain. No contradiction there. But mind and brain are ontologically separate, even though intimately related.

[AWASHA]

Anything, including things which can be said to "simulate" matter, such as some computer programs, supervene on matter. The simulation does not recreate matter, it is nothing over and above matter, and it is not anything which is not matter. To say something is not matter is to say it is nonphysical, and, I insist, to say that "it" does not exist. Physicality doesn't add anything to the universe ... it IS the universe.

[AWASHA]

I take it that the function of reductionism, like any other scientific method, is to get at the salient nature of the phenomenon in question at the most fundamental level which can be quantified. Sometimes, the most fundamental level which can be quantified is more fine grained than scientists/theorists had previously imagined. Such is the case, apparently, with mental states, which appear to be reducible to brain states. What's the issue?

[AWASHA]

Of course there is an appropriate level of reduction. I take it that Ramachandran, Dennett, and most other neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of mind suppose, in light of empirical findings, that the appropriate level of reduction is, roughly, at the level of neural circuitry. Why is this "radical" reductionism? That claim seems theoretically unsupported.

[AWASHA]

I can give you a relatively detailed account about what a unicorn is ... does it not trouble you that there is no such thing as a unicorn? It seems that you would have to endorse some hardcore form of instrumentalism in order to theoretically justify non-caring about ontology. I take it that McLaren does not endorse the claim that the mind does not exist; rather, he claims that minds are not physical. And I claim that there is no coherent concept any of us possess of anything 'non-physical'.

[jockmclaren47]

@AWASHA "I can give a detailed account of what a unicorn is..." No, you can't, because a unicorn ISN'T. You can imagine a unicorn, and that imagining just is your mind at work. Mind is real (acts on the real world) but has no physical properties. Why is that contradictory? Information acts on the world and has no physical properties.

[AWASHA]

@jockmclaren47 Right,; I would just be, roughly, relaying to you the intentional content of my thoughts about unicorns ... and we can find evidence to support the fact that, when most ppl have thoughts about unicorns, their intentional contents are very similar. This was not a point I was making against you. I was just trying to elucidate why ontology matters.

[maplebayou1]

As for the ontologies, I’m not so sure it isn’t the materialists who are trying to add something ineffable to the universe. That something is “physicality.” We have already seen, with very primitive virtual reality systems, that matter, energy, space, and time can be "simulated." A few months ago a paper was published describing an experiment in which information was converted into energy. So what is this “physicality” and what does it add to the universe?

[jockmclaren47]

If your computer doesn't do as it is told, biopsychiatry would have you replace the mother board. The idea of a software problem is outside their model of science. (In psychiatry, the equivalent of replacing the mother board is pumping the unhappy person full of drugs or even shocking his brain with electricity). It is ideology, nothing else. No biopsychiatrist in the world has ever produced an argument to show that mental disorders are brain disorders, but that is the basis of their approach.

[Roenazarrek]

@jockmclaren47 never heard of the term biopsychiatrist, but neuroscientists and psychologists agree that the brain is indeed the root of a great many mental disorders, such as anti social personality disorder autism

[maplebayou1]

We used to have DOS. Now we have Windows. Which is simpler, more effective, for interacting with the virtual machine we call a running computer program? When I move a mouse on a screen and click on an icon, I am interacting with a virtual object. It works. No doubt radical reductionists would have me put away my mouse, break open the computer, and start fiddling with the circuitry.

[jockmclaren47]

I agree totally. A radical reductionism will fail to account for human beliefs, wishes, fears etc., but Nobel-Prize winner and pin-up boy of the biopsychiatry industry, Eric Kandel uses exactly that expression: "Radical reductionism will transform psychiatry," he says, "giving a biological account of mind." This is pure ideology, totally unsupported by any argument of any sort, yet he gets away with it. Appalling.

[jockmclaren47]

I am saying that the mind is a real thing and that it controls the brain and thence the body. Beliefs, emotions, fantasies have a reality; western science couldn't handle them, hence behaviorism and biological psychiatry, but we need a new model of science, one that can incorporate the human element. My work is committed to humanizing psychiatry by means of a new, interactive model of mind.

[Roenazarrek]

@jockmclaren47

the mind and the brain are different things to be sure, but that doesn't mean that the mind does not fully arise from the brain.

[jockmclaren47]

@Roenazarrek The mind most certainly does arise from the brain, it is the product of data manipulation by a high-speed, distributed parallel processor. If the processor goes kaput, so does the mind. But, under normal conditions, the mind runs the brain. It has to, otherwise I wouldn't be able to write this and you wouldn't be able to read it.

[Roenazarrek]

@jockmclaren47

I think you and dennett are just opperating under a different definition of dualism. If i'm correct, dennett's idea of dualism is that there is a different substance to consciousness, something altogether special and it just inhabits the brain. He would agree that free will (the mind truely making decisions) exists i know for a fact as ive listened to hours of him explaining this.

[jockmclaren47]

@Roenazarrek No, Dennett vehemently denies that he is a dualist. He is very antagonistic about this, perhaps because I told him he is just a closet dualist. He equates dualism and supernaturalism. I say there is a natural form of dualism, that the mind supervenes upon the brain by a law-like process, meaning we can duplicate the mind in silicon. That, surely, is the definition of dualism.

[Roenazarrek]

@jockmclaren47 If i'm right your idea of dualism is that the mind arises from the brain and there is therefore an very deep causal relationship between them, but the mind ultimately is not the brain, therefore there is the mind, and then there is the brain, two different things, hence dualism?

[jockmclaren47]

@Roenazarrek Right.

(Except the order is brain first, mind second, and then the mind acts back upon the brain).

[maplebayou1]

Similarly, it should be apparent that many issues of the mind are going to be best understood at the level of thoughts, desires, neuroses, etc. That does not mean that reductionistic approaches don’t have a role. It merely means that a radical, encompassing reductionism is unlikely to succeed. I would think this would be obvious.

[maplebayou1]

Suppose I want to explain to you how a virtual airplane in a flight simulator works. Instead of getting bogged down in questions of whether it exists, how about I describe concepts like angle of attack and wing stall? You may protest that I am describing things that don’t exist for an object that doesn’t exist, and demand that I talk about the movement of electrons through circuits. I think you will find that my explanation is simple and effective.

[AWASHA]

Thank you for having this conversation with me. I will read your books and consider your arguments.

My final remarks are as follows:

For reasons already discussed, I deny the claim that if the mind "is a virtual machine", it is not material.

I am not prepared to make a case against natural dualism, although I take it that if a state of mind is identical to an informational state, it does not necessarily follow that the mind is nonphysical, as informational states supervene on the physical.

[jockmclaren47]

My case for the mind being an informational state realised in the semantic space generated by the brain is set out in detail in my books, you would have to see those to follow the case.

If mind is material, it isn't virtual; if it is virtual, it is dualist. I can't see any escape for Dennett. Can you raise a case against the idea of a natural dualism, where the mind is pure information such as, e.g., the informational state of your computer?

[AWASHA]

You describe the mind as an "informational state" and merely assert that it does not supervene on physical objects. I am interested interested in why you believe so.

I don't agree that Dennett so much as believes the mind is non-material. He obviously would claim that he doesn't believe the mind is non-material. Regarding his beliefs, why take your word and not his?

[AWASHA]

If I describe the mind as a virtual machine, I don't mean to say that the mind doesn't supervene on physical objects. Others might describe the mind as the central nervous system, a collection of atoms organized in the functionally relevant way, etc., without making commitments to anything nonphysical. Such descriptions should only be thought of heuristically as purporting identities as some of the relationships described are more fine grained than others, though all supervene on matter.

[jockmclaren47]

How could Dennett say the mind is a virtual machine "capable of generating other virtual machines" yet insist that it has no virtual properties? Doesn't make sense to me. The mind is not physical in any meaningful sense of that term, it is an informational state, and that leads directly to a resolution of mind-body problem, but it is not physical-biological IN NATURE. Its ontology is non-material, meaning dualist. Dennett knows this otherwise he wouldn't have used 'virtual.'

[AWASHA]

I have not read your books, so I am not aware of your arguments or evidence cited for your positive claim, but I have never come across a compelling argument or so much as evidential support for a realm other than the physical. Positing another realm is a tall order to fill, unless with realm you're merely describing the physical in some representational way, which doesn't seem to me to be dualism at all.

[AWASHA]

I assume Dennett was referring to the mind as a "virtual machine". In doing so, he is merely describing the mind as such and he is in no way ascribing to the mind nonphysical or virtual properties. I don't even think such ascriptions are coherent. I think minds can be subject to empirical investigation because they are systems of physical and--in the case of animals--biological objects which can themselves be empirically evaluated.

[jockmclaren47]

We need to be able to conceputalise what it is we are subjecting to scientific study. Dennett says "virtual machines." What does that mean? How can they be subject to empirical investigation? What does he mean by biological minds? I criticise him on the basis his theory is merely dualism in disguise. I say there are two realms, the physical and the informational, the latter is emergent and irreducible, therefore irredeemably dualist in nature. My computer is dualist but he won't accept that.

[AWASHA]

You say that he cannot give his monism substance, and you question his account of the nature of the mind. I think Dennett would reply that all that exists is matter, so when we talk of minds or anything which we purport to exist, we are either talking about physical objects which do exist, or we are not talking about anything at all. This leads me to the question I asked before. I am interested in what your account of dualism posits in existence and why we ought to believe in those objects.

[AWASHA]

You speak of something more than magic being potentially "buried in the word". This signals to me that you consider the study of the mind to be a matter of "conceptual engineering" as regards the relevant concepts. I think Dennett would deny this, and claim rather that the study of the mind should be conducted like any other scientific inquiry. I fear that critiquing Dennett on merely conceptual grounds could potentially lead to a solely semantic and unproductive debate.

[jockmclaren47]

I don't think this is a minor point. My opposition to Dennett is his antagonism to dualism en bloc, without (apparently) any awareness that there might be something more than magic buried in the word. If he opposes dualism, and triunism, etc, then he surely leaves himself only monism. But this doesn't work. What is the nature of his monist mind? Virtual? Not so, the very word means "of two natures."

HIs monism is ersatz, he cannot give it substance. See my blog for more detailed answer. JMcL

[AWASHA]

On a minor point, if you are a dualist and Dennett is indeed a "closet dualist", then what is your issue with Dennett beyond the fact that he doesn't call himself a dualist?

On a more important point, if dualism doesn't imply the existence of natural as well as supernatural substances, then what ontological claim is implied by dualism? That minds as well as bodies exist? I don't think Dennett, Searle, or virtually anyone else would deny this. But you surely must mean something else ...