Interesting about Longstreet v Lee. Both agreed that the Army of Northern Virginia should take the strategic offensive. Where they differed was tactics. Lee advocated the tactical offensive, and the Army lost 30 to 40 percent in a series of battles that will live forever in the annals of military history. Longstreet advocated the tactical defensive but Lee thought that the morale of the army required that it attack. The only time Longstreet's method was adopted was at Fredricksburg.
@lebara sky Why would Lee attack Cemetery Hill while the main feature on that particular part of the battlefield was Culp's Hill which over-looked the former, Besides was there not two Union army corps 1st and 11th dug in on Cemetery Hill.And Old Baldy had an under strength corp. Ewell knew that Culp's Hill was the hill to be taken. In my opinion Lee over-looked this position purposely for what reason?
@noleybo56 I thought that is what hill he meant. I am not an expert; I am only an avid reader and student. Just finished "A Glorious Army" by Jeffry D. Wert, who is a very competent military historian. What is remarkable about the ANV is that they kept attacking at Lee's behest while taking such high casualties. An amazing group of men. If you go to Gettysburg and stand where Pickett's Charge started you would realize how remarkable it was. Not good ground for attack in 1860s.
@lebara sky Yeah, this is the strange assumptions surrounding "Gettysburg".Remember Lee's admonition to General Ewell, "take the hill if practicable but do not bring on a general engagement until the army is up". Now the hill that Lee was referring too was Cemetery Hill which was in the hands of the 1st and 11th corp Union.If Ewell would have disobeyed Lee's discretionary order and attack Culp's Hill he would have with one swoop out manoeuvred the Union troops on Cemetery Hill......
@noleybo56 And accomplished Lee's orders quite handsomely.This turn of events would have meant one of two actions for the Union troops. Attack the Confederate defensive position on Culp's Hill or quit Cemetery Hill thus Lee could have maintain his defensive offensive stratagem in a very strong position. But for some reason unbeknown he over-looked the importance of Culp's Hill. WHY?
Pickett's Charge should have never happened, instead of attacking Cemetery Ridge Lee should have renewed his attacks on the flanks where Mead was weakest and flanked around Big Round Top.
What a waste this war was, one of those people could have invented the car 60 years early, created a vaccine or what not. I mean who knows what genius fell in the Civil War
Cant count on the 11th Corps to do much. Gettysburg offfered Hancock the opportunity to again bail them out with his 2nd Corps Fighting men from the midwest on the 2nd day on Cemetery Hill.
@1967mustanggta Worse was the fact that, as Reynolds was dead, Howard was senior officer on the field, so he reported to Hancock when he arrived, claiming that I Corps gave way compelling the XI to retire. The complete opposite was true. The I Corps stand was an epic, they took heavy losses while holding most of the day whereas XI Corps. collapsed in less than two hours. Doubleday, because of this, was relieved of I Corps command and replaced with John Newton. Doubelday never forgave Howard.
@darling67 Don't forget that Meade commanded with utter competence, anticipated Lee's every move (even told Gibbon that on July 3 they'd hit his lines in the center and reiforced it....and Lee didn't disappoint), addressed problems with rapid-fire decisiveness (like sending in V Cosprs reserves to link up with Sickles' ill-advised slaient). Meade was supported by his Corps commanders and they respected him. No intercine squabbling. The AoP fought with the mettle of any southern army there.
lee lost the battle after day 1. longstreet was right, the union army was beaten, but they had the advantage going into day 2. if lee had gone around, lincoln would have compelled meade to attack and the confederate army would have had the ground of their choosing.
This argument always amuses me. "Well, actually a large number of them turned and fled, not actually making the charge".
Really? So they weren't able to contribute to the battle? They were essentially combat ineffective? The artillery did its job demoralizing the charge causing a significant portion to turn around or stay where they were? Leaving the braver and more experienced to die/get captured and be lost to Lee up to and including generals? Leaving those with far less resolve?
I would hardly call the Union performance on Day 1 a "collapse of the lines." This was an orderly withdrawal, done in accordance with a well-conceived battle plan.
@TheLoyalOfficer AP Hill even admitted to Fremantle the yankees fought with exceptional tenacity. The I Corps stand was a true epic and they held off superior numbers for most of the day before finally succombing to relentless--and costly--Reb flank attacks. The XI Corps was routed again as they were at Chancellorsville which didn't help. But the Rebs suffered heavy casaulties (especially the brigades of Archer, Davis, Iverson and O'Neil) and the union held the high ground south of town.
as said in the book (The Killer Angels) longstreest was very hardheaded and didn't believe in everything lee did...and in the foreward at the beginning of the book, Michael Shaara said he wrote this book not on cold facts but on letters written by the people engaged in the battle
@sjbaseball6 After the battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet wrote to his Uncle and in that letter, Longstreet wrote that General Lee should have put in double the men into "Pickett's Charge". Now that is odd, because here the "Hollywood" movie, makes it look like Longstreet was against the attack. So as you can read, Longstreet got caught in lies. Between his Uncle's letter, his 1896 " From Manassas to Appomattox" book and Hollywood, all differ.
Longstreet outlived all the Confederate high command
@rebel2276 Longstreet didn't want to attack He wanted to defend or withdraw.. He certainly didn't want to attack that position with only 15000 men. Longstreet probably figured that they needed, at least,15000 to breach the Federal line AND then another15000 to fully exploit that breach. Lee was nuts to hang around after the second day.
@warager37 Refer to my last post above. Now John Michael Priest, in the North&South Magazine, Volume 1, Issue 6, pages 42-55. Proved that half the Confederates either ran back to the woods or got down and found any cover they could. That only 6,000 marched on to Emittsburg Road and that those 6,000 were the main "Casualties". Mr. Priest listed the total loss, at "4,802".
You may as well count people that run, in a given battle, as a "casualty" for that specific instance. Are they fighting? No. Are they contributing? No. Is their act demoralizing? Yes. If you're uncertain and you see your own guys running, meaning less people with you, you start to feel heavy doubts because you know there'll be more people looking at you.
So yes, taking into account the people that fled, you'd need a significant number to offset that and the actual casualties.
@Mahbu This IS a fact. Because the casulaties (killed, wounded, captured) occured in enemy territory, the Pennsylvania campaign cost Lee over 17,000 men that had to be permanently struck from the rolls of the Army Of Northern Virginia...the vast majority of them trained infantry or artillerymen. This out of an army that had a total (everything from teamsters to blacksmiths to foot soldiers) of ~80,000. From a nation already suffereing manpower shortages. Yet Reb says Lee "won" the campaign.
@Mahbu Exactly. One dictum in combat is to shoot to WOUND, not to kill if you can. Because the 1-4 men required to evacuate a wounded man are that many less enemy combatants in the field. Same applied at Pickett's Charge. The 6,000 or so who never got within a football field of the union lines because of the topography, the Emmitsburg Rd. fence and the artillery field of fire were as good a casualties in terms of efeectiveness. The union men holding the line did their work well that day.
@rebel2276 I still don't know what your point is here other than to prove the impregnable nature of the union position on Cemetery Ridge that was such a killing firing line that half of the assaulting Rebs turned around before even getting close to the yankee lines. Seems to me you're just supporting the case that Pickett's Charge never should have been made in the first place.
@Shafeone Had the Confederate artillery barrage been more effective and cleared more Union artillery pieces and soldiers off the ridge, great I am all for the charge. Using hindsight we know the artillery barrage did not work, thus it was a bad idea. I don't know why there is so much hype on Pickett's Charge when the total loss was 4,802. Seems everyone wants to forget about Fredericksburg and the Union's Marye's Height's charge, for a total loss of 8,000. The worst charge during the war.
@rebel2276 Don't forget Malvern Hill, Reb. Or the horrific losses Lee suffered at Chancellorsville. The Union could afford ten Marye's Heights. Pickett's Charge matters because these were casualties Lee could ill-afford. Tell me, who could afford 17,000 absolute lost men during the PA campaign? The Union or the CSA. C'mon Reb. Oh, and only Southern Boys trapped in a delusion of antebellum bliss call it "The War Of Rebellion" Anyone who lives in the present calls it THE CIVIL WAR. Sheez.
@rebel2276 Cold Harbor was the worst charge of the war.
In any case, the Army of the Potomac of 1863 was not going to be defeated at Gettysburg. They had been improved in every conceivable way - especially with their cavalry coming from the fresh victory at Brandy Station.
They were far better than they were at any point earlier in the war - leadership, weapons, logistics, doctrine, and morale.
@TheLoyalOfficer Cold Harbor was not a SINGLE charge, it was a three day battle. Fredericksburg was a one day battle in which Seven Union divisions attacked in a single day. None of the three days at Cold Harbor produced over 8,000 casualties. It has long been disputed of the AOP losing 7,000 men in 10 minutes. Several historians have proved that wrong. Brandy Station was a tactical draw, neither side winning. So that was not a "Victory".
@rebel2276 You are off on Brandy Station. The only reason why the Rebs were not beaten badly was that the main body of Confed infantry showed up in the nick of time. The Union cavalry, for the first time in the whole war, got the "jump" on Stuart's horsemen. Perhaps a draw, but a very embarrassing one for the South. Union morale skyrocketed. This key battle was viewed as an ill omen by the Army of N. Virginia as they invaded PA.
@rebel Fredricksburg was not a single charge, either. The Union came up in waves. I think Cold Harbor was worse because the Union, by 1864, should have known better. Perhaps lower in terms of lives lost, but certainly higher in stupidity. It was Grant's worst mistake - one that he regretted bitterly - in an otherwise underrated and stellar career.
@TheLoyalOfficer I call it a "Single Charge" for the overall loss. Eight Union divisions did attack. First French's division which attacked at 11AM, French lost 30% of his men and 33% of his officers. Hancock's division was next, out of 5,500 men he lost 2,000 men. Howard's division was next and then Sturgis' division. Griffin's division then came up and then Humphrey's division, then Getty and Sykes. A grand total of 35,000 Union soldiers attacked and lost 8,000.
@TheLoyalOfficer Cold Harbor in no charge on any of those days, produced higher loss then the charge at Marye's heights. No Confederate attack ever lost 8,000 men. Pickett's Charge (4,802). It was not that the "Union" should have known better, it was "Grant" should have known better. Grant was an idiot by attacking Lee's breastworks and finally on June 18th, 1864, Grant finally stopped that. From then all it was dig, dig, dig. Grant had learned that after losing 55,000-60,000 men.
@rebel Fair enough, but the Vicksburg Campaign, under the command of Grant, was a work of pure genius. Grant should have known better at Cold Harbor. But I don't think it took him 60,000 losses to figure it out.
Grant is one of the most underrated Generals in American military history.
@TheLoyalOfficer First off, Grant faced Lt. General Pemberton who was promoted far beyond his rank and skill. Pemberton ended up in Richmond demoted to Lt. Colonel in command of the inner artillery. In the majority of battles: Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, MS, Champion's Hill, Big Black River, the Confederates were either outnumbered 2-1 or 3-1.
I feel Grant is one of the most overrated generals, not in any major battle was he ever outnumbered 2-1. Imagine, 80,000 Confederates at Shiloh......
@rebel2276 So? He maximized resources. When you look at the tactical situation, it took much more that just 2-1 to win on the attack.
Also, in many of those battles, Grant was against shit troops. But, I guess you don't think that any of the units of the Confederacy were shit, huh? Well, I am here to tell you that they were total crap - especially in the West.
The Confederacy did not have the necessary strategic resources to win. The war was over from its first day.
@rebel2276 I felt Grant was overrated too...right up until the point where he WON the war. LOL. Give it up Reb. Grant did in eleven months what six other generals hadn't been able to do in 3 years. Grind down Lee's army to the nub while coordinating efforts agains the entire CSA to bring the war to an end. And then he was so magnanomous in victory, so embracing of his one-time enemy, that he laid the seeds of a lasting, if still imperfect, peace--despite Booth's efforts.
@rebel2276 And who the f**k did the "brilliant' Lee face Reb? McClellen? Pope? Burnsides? A concussed Hooker? In his first battle against a solid AoP commander in Meade--who was only in command for four days mind you and was on the verge of mental collapse--was at Gettysburg and he was thoroughly outgeneralled. Then came Grant and a mere eleven months later his surrendering at Appomattox after putting up the highest % casualities of any major commander in any CW theater.
Lee is a good general but, yeah, perhaps not the greatest. Most of his opponents were incompetent or only in their position out of politics, not tactical/strategic brilliance. None of them had an idea of how to effectively use their superior numbers which was very disappointing.
@rebel2276 And Lee fought the brilliant McClellan, Pope, McClellan again (who somehow couldn't destroy Lee at Sharpsburg?) Burnsides and then Hooker who was concussed as Jeff down there says. Lee suffered horrendous casualties relative to the size of his force, never quite grasped that the days of Napoleanic tactics were negated by rifling and threw his men into buzzsaws At Malvern Hill then Cemetery Ridge. He also almost lost his entire army at Antietam but for facing an incompetent oopnent.
@rebel2276 And Grant acknowledged it had been a terrible mistake in his memoirs. Did Lee ever acknowledge that about Malvern Hill or Pickett's Charge? And who could afford more? The AoP -8k or the ANVA -6k? Grant could afford the casualties and he knew it. Lee could not. By dig dig dig, denying the inferior Lee the flexibility of manuever but pinning him down to waste away, Grant did the exact thing he should have. "He knew how to beat Lee and he did it." Shelby Foote.
@rebel2276 Actually Grant outfoxed Lee by moving on Petersburg rather than Richmond after that and but for a botched assault may have carried the town. The Reb reinforcements got there in time after that. Grant dug in because Lee did. But that was fine. He knew it was just a matter of time then. The war was effectively over. Just a matter of when. Grant forced Lee into Grant's kind of fight.
@rebel2276 YOu have an interesting definition of "victory". Sure Brandy Station was a "draw" in the sense that neither cavalry force was destroyed. But it was a damn near run thing for Stuart (his aides offered this was the first time they ever saw him flustered). It gave the Union cavalry the confidence they needed, and set the hyper-sensitive Stuart (criticized in the papers) hell bent on redemption which is probably why he persisted in his ride around Hooker despite the warning signs.
@rebel2276 "Battelfield Detectives" concluded roughly the same in its investigation as to why the casualties on July 3 weren't much higher for the South. (July 2 was the bloodiest day of the three-day battle).
@MrJeefry1 Yes, duh, July 2nd had the highest losses. I have been in this business for Thirty years and your 21, oh no wait, 25. It does not matter what you type, I already long have read, wrote and covered it.
Instead of wasting your time, typing on here, take another twenty years and do more reading on the Civil War.
@rebel2276 Maybe in twenty years you, too, Jeffry can conclude that Lee "Won the PA campaign" as this Ken Burns wannabe claims. He mistakes reading and reciting useless data with understanding. He's a pedantic buffoon masquerading on the net as an historian. (And an 'army man' too).
@rebel2276 4800 casualties makes perfect sense. Most of them probably hoofed it when they got stalled at the Emmitsburg Road fence and cried uncle. (I would have too. No shame. The thought of climbing over that obstacle literally was the Union guns stare down at you from 100 yards or so away is terrifying even now). But that is just a testimant to the strength of Meade's line and further vindication of those who feel the assault never should have been made. What is your point?
after the first day even. Lee knew that the union had the high ground going into day 2, this movie and killer angels made it seem like lee had some strange concept of fighting the enemy simply because it was in front of him. Had lee acted differently the war might have turned out a lot differently
@byrniemac791 Lee said that if the enemy is there in the morning he was going to strike him. Longstreet's argument was more sound: "If he's there tomorrow, General, it's because he WANTS us to strike him. A good enough reason in my opinion for not doing so."
Yeah exactly, Meade had the better field position on the second day. It's odd because Lee was otherwise such a brilliant general, hahayou're almost wishing for Lee to see and understand that so he can outsmart the Union Army
Yeah exactly, Meade had the better field position on the second day. It's odd because Lee was otherwise such a brilliant general, you're almost wishing for Lee to see that so he can outsmart the Union Army
@rebel2276 Reb. Why do you insist on twisting words to form-fit you Lee worship? Longstreet was making the point that without at least 30,000 men that position could never have been taken and thus the assault never should have been made. Longstreet was not just against this attack but fighting offensively at Gettysburg period. He only went along with Lee's invasion under a specific understanding that though their strategy would be offensive, once the battle was on it would be defensive.
@rebel2276 How is that a lie? I too believe that Lee should have put in 30,000 men. But, like Longstreet, I know he only had 12,000 available (and of them only one fresh division). So therefore the attack was foolhardy. That is completely consistent. Obviously Longstreet given his performance at 2nd Bull Run and Chickamauga was not against any offensive tactics at all. But he knew what any good military man knows. Attacks are more costly than defense so you better have sufficient numbers.
@sjbaseball6 I agree with you 110% that soldier's letter are the primary source. But all soldiers wrote what they saw and heard, so most have a different story to tell. Micheal and Jeff Shaara are not professional historians on the Civil War. Micheal left out characters he felt were "Non-Important", but who was he to judge who was "Important and Non-Important?" I have to ask why they base Civil War movies off of one single book writer, why not the top 25 experts on Gettysburg?
Nobody knows what was said between General Lee and General Longstreet, it was never recorded by anyone. General Lee after the war, never wrote about much on the war and he died in 1870. So all of this is from Longstreet's pen. So of course, Longstreet is going to write that, we should have done this and I would have done that, etc. Longstreet was using "Hindsight". Just as we do in our time period.
Nonsense! A order to do something if it is practicable is very clear and very precise; and every officer must know by instinct that it means to do it with the given means to the full extent, safe destroying the given troops in the attempt to do so; as the order demands the occupation of a certain position the commander can expect zealous attempts to have this position occupied by the officer ordered to do it; anything else would put the whole command structure of the army in question!
@The2ndFirst General Lee could not be all over any battlefield and he left it up to the area commander to judge for himself "If Practicable" to attack or not. If General Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill, he would have lost and suffered many casualties. Gordon and Smith two brigades would not have been in the charge, they were guarding the York Pike (Extreme Left) of the entire ANV. So that left Hays and Avery's Brigade. Those two brigades were in Early's division.
@The2ndFirst Between Hay's brigade and the Hoke/Avery brigade they had a total of 8 regiments. Rodes' division fought hard and was not going to be in the attack, Heth and Pender's divisions were hit hard, so that only leaves 8 regiments to make the attack. But they were busy gathering up thousands of Union prisoners running all around Gettysburg streets. Ewell made the right decision by not attacking.
@Proudnewfoundlander1 If Longstreet moved around the right flank of the AOP that was on the field, they would have run into BG. Merritt's Cavalry Brigade on the extreme left. Longstreet wanted to "Get between the AOP and Washington City". What Longstreet did not know, was the 6th Corps had not come up yet. The 6th Corps arrived at 4:30PM on July 2nd. So the ANV would have been hit from behind and the front, strung out in a long column. Lee would not have had a "Rear". Game over.
@Proudnewfoundlander1 Another problem was Pickett's division was still back at Chambersburg, PA. It is not easy to move an Army of 70,000 men. Lee would have to collect all of his wounded from July 1st, bury his dead, collect thousands of rifles on the field, care for the Union wounded and do all that in one night? I have been in the US. Army for Twenty-Eight years and in no shape or form would that ever work. Lee should have pulled back to Herr's Ridge, then go on the defense.
@Proudnewfoundlander1 After the battle on July 1st, General Lee actually wanted to pull General Ewell's Second Corps back from where it was positioned. But General Ewell said, "I can hold my position". Sure, Ewell could hold it, but attacking wise, he was in no position, as we have read on July 2nd (Culp's Hill). General Ewell's last division (Ed Johnson) arrived "At dusk" on July 1st. Rodes's division was hit hard, Early not bad and Johnson fresh.
Interesting stuff guys !! As a British soldier and a keen military historian i find the whole American civil war fascinating. Battles always come down to the decisions of commanders and also when they leave the field ( Napoleon at Waterloo ). Lee was a great commander who had some bad luck at Gettysburg. Paton was probably the best modern day General. And bye the way UK & USA ALL THE WAY !!!
The man responsible for this defeat at Gettysburg was Robert E. Lee and he was enough of a general and man to take the blame. After day 1, once he realized that Culp's Hill was not taken and he did not have the high ground the Confederate Army should have redeployed per Longstreet's suggestion. Instead the Confederates suffered the fate the Union Army did at Fredericksburg,
What, both sides at fault for the war? Of course. Never said not. It takes two to tango, after all. But it is important to understand the reasons and what led up to them.
Unfortunately subscribers of the lost cause (which seems to be a lot of youtubers on these videos), like to rewrite history and live in denial because they're terrified their beloved south will look bad.
Lee should have never taken his army north of Washington...They did not have the resources to "take" the fight to north...biggest mistake of the war...
Lee permitted his army to engage in the seizure of Black Pennsylvanians, who were forcibly marched South to slavery. Whites who tried to interfere with the ANV's slaving efforts were threatened with death or property destruction...yes...Lee WAS the epitome of a true Southern 'gentleman'.
@UnionStatesHeritage Well some people on here want to live in the fantasy world of the southern gentleman. What they were fighting for not only enslaved blacks but impoverished poor white southerners who didn't know any better. 90% of whites did not own slaves yet they fought for the system anyway.
Johnnies don't like to talk about the massive numbers of poor white conscripts who deserted Lee's army. Seems kind of strange that the CSA, which claimed to be fighting for "Southern Independence", had to start forcing poor whites to fight, just one year into the war...until you look at the passage of the Twenty Slave Law, which exempted slave-holding planters from military service...the very people who started the war.
fascinating events, but I have to say the acting in this (not so much the main characters, but all the cameo roles) is very wooden - it's almost like there are 2 directors...one of them could have directed the school play I did when I was 16, it's that bad. what a shame.
Meade should get credit for empowering his Corps commanders with picking the batlefield in his absence--even though he wanted to defend the area of Big Pipe Creek to he south. But once Reynolds chose to fight there and then Hancock later decided "well sir, I choose this as the battlefield" Meade tossed out his plans and ordered all units to concentrate at Gettysburg asap. Meade was decisive and determined. And once on the field his tactics were those of a composed confident genl.
@noleybo56 Well. It was Reynolds who sent to word to Meade that he intended to fight a holding action and hold the town, saying he would barricade the streets if he had to "Good," said Meade down at Taneytown. "That is just like Reynolds!" (Not realizing the man who'd sent the message was already dead.) Reynolds picked the battlefield, Hancock confirmed it declaring it excellent ground. Buford, the Reynolds, the Hancock (and even Howard to some extent) all saw the advantages of the position.
@Shafeone And so did Longstreet. He was the architecht of the Union massacre at Fredericksburg on Marye's Hieghts and now could envision his corps suffering a similar fate before Cemetery Ridge. On the night of July 1 he was not optimistic, knowing that they had punished two union corps severely but failed to take the high ground and now were left with exterior lines and few options other than to fight uphill or cede the field in the face of Meade's superior tactical advantage.
@Shafeone As to John Reynolds choosing the battlefeld [ Gettysburg ] I have to disagree with you. Simply because the facts are some what different to how you would make us believe. Fristly Reynolds actions off that day 1st July was to support Burford's cav with his 1st Corps where upon he sent two missives one too Howard to bring up the 11th Corps and the other to Meade to inform him that serious fighting had broken out west of Gettysburg. cont
@noleybo56 Meade give Hancock two assignment on that day 1st July. First to take command off all forces present ,Secondly to choose whether or not to fight a major battle at Gettysburg. upon Hancock's observation of the site it was he who informed Meade that Gettysburg would be a good place to fight. Meade reply was "i'll send up the troops". So in my estimation it was Hancock how chose the battlefield not John Reynolds.
@noleybo56 What chose the battlefield was the same thing that chose the battlefield at Sharpsburg ten months before also in northern territory...it was where the roads came together. Hooker had ordered the calvary to reconnoiter as far as Gettysburg based on the maps he saw. And even Lee had indicated to Ewell well before they even knew of the Army Of The Potomac's presence nearby that a battle may be fought "Gettysburg or Frederick's [sic] City." Hancock confirmed officially what all saw.
@noleybo56 In all fairness Reynolds was killed within the first HOUR of the battle. He and Henry Heth have a half share in choosing the field. Heth by recklessly attacking unknown union forces and tasking his to "advance and take the town" and then Reynolds ordering up i, the XI and III Corps. and vowing not to give up the town without a fight. Unlike Heth, though, Reynolds had full authority to make the call. Heth threw down the gauntlet and Reynolds accepted the challenge.
@Shafeone you and I are looking at pre- Gettysburg [Battle] somewhat differently. I am of the school of though that Lee's sojourn north was in all intended purposes a large raid for supplies and nothing more.For if indeed Lee intention was to fight a battle on northern soil he would have kept his best cav with him. As Lee himself said the" eyes and ears of this army". So on that premise ,Lee was never going to fight a battle at Gettysburg neither was Meade. What happen there was a collision.
@noleybo56 It was more than a raid. Lee intended to bring the AoP to battle by stretching it out & attacking it piecemeal with his entire force at a time, thereby neutralizing it's superior numbers. He planned on fighting a battle near the end of summer on ground of his choosing. He approved Stuart's raid under two conditions: 1) he not lose touch with the army and 2) he leave a sufficient screening force. Stuart did neither. Thus was Lee caught unawares when he learned the Union's position.
@Shafeone Ironically, even though it was by accident, the dispositions of the two armies...with two Lee's three corps with an almost 2:1 numbers advantage bearing down on first the I then XI overwhelming their flanks was exactly what Lee wanted albeit it was not of his choosing & without his cavalry he felt blindfolded. The South's best shot at pressing the advantage was to take undefended Culp's Hill (Ewell failed to do). Most historians agree that cemetery hill's artillery was unassailable.
@Shafeone first and foremost. Lee had no idea as to the strength of his foe. for one he had thought he had outpaced the Union army his first mistake Secondly, in your piece regarding Gen'l Ewell lack of action in taking "Culp's Hill"you have omitted a glaring fact in this regard. Lee order to Ewell" attack if practicable" but in the same breath Lee's next order to Ewell.Do not bring on a general engagement until the army is up.It's no wonder that Ewell was some what bewilder......
@noleybo56 lee's orders or lack off. do but don't do, but if you think you can..As too you're point in regards to Gen'l Stuart conduct . Lee give his cav commander wide latitude in his assignment.All this talk about Stuart leaving Lee blind is untrue. Lee had over 1'800 cavarly with his army so this nails the lie.The truth of the matter is, was the absent of Stuart that he felt keenly.
@noleybo56 Lee was referring to Cemetery Hill (and yes he was asking Ewell to start a fight but not a battle which was contradictory). Lee curiously did not offer support of Hill's Corps for any assault so Ewell wisely decided attacking uphill through town against 43 field pieces and an unscathed Union reserve division was not practicable. But Culp's Hill was undefended. Ewell had left orders to Allegheny Johnson to take it but then absent-mindedly left to see Lee and never followed up(cont)
@Shafeone Gen'l Ewell had asked Early to attack Culp's Hill but as you rightly pointed out the excuse used by Gen'l Early was that his men had done all the hard fighting and marching and were tuckered out and suggested that Johnston dIv do there share. Here is were the problem arose. Ewell had as he himself being given a discretionary orders decided not to force the issue and acquiesce to Gen'l Early. Ewell was not blame for not taking Culp's Hill, he had an under strength corps johnston div...
@noleybo56 being several miles from the battlefield. If it is fault finding or scapegoating then is not Ewell, Stuart or Longstreet. The defeat a Gettysburg was Lee's and Lee's alone. A written order to Ewell to take Culp's Hill was all that was needed. And I'm quite sure Dick Ewell would have pitch in with all his vigor. That was the type of soldier and the man Dick Ewell was. A gallant and noble soldier.
@noleybo56 Oh I agree the buck stops with Lee. And he should have never fought on July 2 onward. But it also stops with Ewell who never followed up with Johnson until it was too late. Lee was used to giving Jackson discretionary orders, knowing Jackson would understand the meaning. "If practicable" was a gentlemanly way of saying 'take the hill." I think that Ewell didn't give the Yankees credit for seeing what they saw by way of CH's import. Typical of the hubris by the Rebs on July 1.
@Shafeone The strange thing about Dick Ewell, Lee never wanted him to command 2nd corps infact Lee tried every manoeuvre without directly telling Ewell that he had no use for him at all in the ANV. Beyond damaging the Gen'l reputation [Ewell] he probably thought after loosing his leg at 2nd Manassas Dick Ewell was half the man he was.And I am quite sure Ewell knew Lee's feelings in this regard in a sense that Lee was undermining him and possibly that Lee had penciled in Dick Anderson as.......
@noleybo56 successor to Jackson.so if you put yourself in Ewell's shoe, he would relish the opportunity to prove Lee wrong and seize the moment with both hands which I feel he did on 1st of July. All things consider.
@noleybo56 All great points yes. Ewell acted decisively by bringing on a general engagement when he saw the dipositions of his corps vis-a-vis the Xl and ordered them forward. But it seems when the dust settled he shrank to listening to his subordinates way too much. Also, he dissuaded Lee from shifting his corps to the right, but didn't knwo what to do with his command where it was facing two powerful positions and an town in its way to boot. Strange behavior from a strange man. You agree?
@Shafeone In some points I agree wholeheartedly with your trust and in other I don't. For example, in my eyes the biggest scoundrel from the debacle at Gettysburg was"Old Jube" this guy blamed the usual suspects, Ewell, Stuart and Longstreet. If anyone undermined his commander it surely was Early. Again post Gettysburg he condems JEB Stuart but here again who's guns does he here at Hanover of course Stuart's what does he do ? absolutley Zip Oh!! He could not even send word of a change ....
@noleybo56 Of base if he had Stuart would have been at Gettysburg from day one, but as it happen" Old Jube" just rode away. The same with Longstreet, this guy jump on the bandwagon. Yes mistakes were made but I can't for the life off me pick out three men and blame these men for the confederate defeat. In my estimation. there was plenty of blame to go round.
@noleybo56 No argument there. Earley was a self-serving revisionist to say the least. By all accounts an SOB. Runner up to Gettysburg scoundrel would be Howard on the Union end for falsely reporting to Hancock (just arrived) that the l corps gave way causing Xl's rout when it was the exact opposite. l corps fought superbly. This caused Meade to relieve Doubleday who performed quite well of corps command in favor of John Newton. Doubleday never forgave Howard--or Meade-- for this slight.
@Shafeone Again you are quite correct, the 1st Corps retreat through Gettysburg was as well organized as it could have been. It's as you say the 11th corps troops started the rout when they charge through the town in an uncontrolled mob. Unfortunately the 1st Corps got caught up in it.As to Howard being a scoundrel I concur.
@noleybo56 Culp's Hill, 800 yards east of Cem. Hill dominated the former and Ewell's aids found it undefended. Had Ewell ordered Earley to take it immediately rather than wait for Johnson he could have had it easily. Earley claimed his men were fought out which was bogus since he'd suffered vs. XI corps nowhere near Rhodes' losses vs. I corps. Instead he left it to Johnson and went to see Lee. Johnson neglected it and by the time he tried attacking the remnants of the Iron Brig. was there.
@noleybo56 Lee did not anticipate that Staurt would have allowed himself to be separated as he did. They thought the gaps between the Union corps were much more porous. Allowing for Stuart to slip in and out at will while gathering intel and sowing mayhem. Lee had every intention of fighting a battle north of the MD line and even pointed out to Hood: "Ah general, the enemy is a long time in finding us. If he does not do so soon, we must go looking for him." Hardly a man on a raid.
@MrJeffrey 1 I am not being rude nor disrespectful.Your comments are based on assumptions that come "Hell or High water" Lee was determined to fight a battle on Northern soil, this is the belief held by most commentators which in my opinion is erroneous. Lee moved North for forage and provisions for his army, Stuarts orders from Lee,were too move north, guard the mountain passes,Keep in contact with Ewell's right and collect ALL the supplies you can for the use of the army.So here we have Lee..
@noleybo56 ordering his cavalry chief to collect provisions for the army.The ANV had 7 Brigades of cavalry JEB Stuart took 3 brigades for his mission which left 4 with the army. If indeed Lee was gearing up for a fight why have your best cavalry out stealing chickens when then should be looking for the enemy.Its illogical it makes no sense whatever. The fault here lies with Lee not Stuart, Lee's orders were vague and ambiguous a portent of Lee's performance at Gettysburg's. As to the porous...
@noleybo56 union lines. This info was supplied by Mosby to Stuart who then passed it onto Lee. but here again Lee fall down. For he is off the belief that Hooker "might steal a march on us" and make for the Potomac ahead of us, so on that premise why send your cavarly out to hunt for proviosions? strange!!! Just one further point on Lee busting a gut to fight a battle on northern soil. His letter to Jeff Davis post Gettysburg in which he writes"it had not been intended to fight a general battle
@noleybo56 at such a distance from our base", but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains". moreover, said Lee, collecting NEEDED supplies in the face of the enemy was dangerous". "A battle thus became in a measure, unavoidable". As I always contented, Lee was out hunting for supplies but ended up with a battle instead.
@noleybo56 [cont'd] It was more than a raid. Lee intended to bring the AoP to battle by stretching it out & attacking it piecemeal with his entire force at a time, thereby neutralizing its superior numbers. He planned on fighting a battle near the end of summer on ground of his choosing. He approved Stuart's raid under two conditions:1) he not lose touch with the army and 2) he leave a sufficient screening force. Had Lee known he'd get separated by a less porous AoP Lee wouldn't have ok'd it.
@noleybo56 You are citing Lee's after-battle report. Southern papers were criticizing him harshly and it wounded his pride deeply. Of course he is going to paint it like "well gee I never really wanted to fight at all." YET during the campaign Lee even said to Hood: "Ah General. The enemy is a long time in finding us. If he does not soon we must go looking for him." You tell me if those are the words of a man on a raid or looking for a showdown battle. He even offered that the battle [cont
@noleybo56 [cont'd] he forsaw coming would be either "at Frederick's Town [sic] or Gettysburg." Lee had every intention of fighting the AoP north of the M&D line. What he did not plan on was fighting it so soon on a field not of his choosing. This is where the intelligence blackout was the key factor. Was provisioning part of it? Of course. But his letters to Davis seeking permission for the invasion speak of defeating the Union army and suing for peace afterwards ... from strength.
@noleybo56 The aim wasn't just to hunt for provisions. It was to sow chaos behind the Union lines, cut telegraph wires, and keep them guessing by appearing to threaten Washington DC. Stuart was told to only embark on the raid if he found the AoP's line of march to be porous. He thought there were ten mile gaps between crops. Once he found that the Union lines were indeed solid, he should have aborted. But his pride compelled him onwards. Another effect of Brandy Station. Here Stuart failed.
@Shafer One There is some merit in your comment in regards too Jeb Stuart's pride being hurt. But the fact remains, Lee sent his cavalry chief on foraging expedition. So how can you carry out the task of which the cavalry " the eyes and ears of this army " are lumbered with a wagon train ? Ah you say !!why did he not burn it and ride to Gettysburg. To do so would have been against orders. Just one other point in regards too the wagon train. Without the supplies the train carried Lee could not..
@noleybo56 When Stuart brought Lee the wagons Lee supposedly said to him "General they are an impediment to me now. I ask you to help me whip these people." Think about it logically. Why would Lee invade the North under ANY circumstances, knowing that the AoP would be compelled to follow him (indeed one of his goals was to clear VA of the invaders by drawing them north) and then deny himself the instrument by which he could track Hooker's movements just for the sake of foraging? [cont]
@noleybo56 have fought on the third day "Pickett's Charge". Ironic that provisions that was needed to save the army were used to destroy it. These same wagons were used as ambulances too transport the wounded back to Va.So here we have another reason to castigate Stuart for,"Pickett's Charge".
@noleybo56 [cont] It would make no sense and be folly even if it was just a raid to purposefully blind himself. So Lee approved the raid so long as Staurt remained in contact or left a sufficient screening/tracking force to accompany the army north. Staurt was to abort if it was not feasible. Stuart found that there were not the gaps in the federal columns he thought...but pushed on further south and east anyway. Lee was shocked when he only found out through a spy about Hooker's movements.
@Shafeone you raise a couple of points in your comments which I will answer.you. You are correct when you say Lee's aim was to draw the Union army out of Va. Why ? there was no subsistence for Lee's army.What did he hope to achieve by going North? Revitalization of his army and of course to embarrass the Lincoln's Admin. Had Lee any cavalry with his army? Yes, 1,800 troopers so bang goes the lie that the ANV were without cavalry. As to Lee being shocked to find the AOP hot on his heels...
@noleybo56 The Gettysburg campaign was a disaster for Lee from start too finish. He blunder from one castrope into another. His strategy was poor to say the least. Here is an example of Lee's strategy. The support for "Picket's Charge", that the arty would lumber up and follow the infantry. this tactic comes from the Napoleonic period . Yeah it was a good tactic when the enemy was using smoothbore muskets but not such a good idea when the enemy is using the rifled musket.I guess we will blame..
@noleybo56 As I said. Lee assumed that a) Stuart had broken through with little issue. b) that he had left ample cavalry. c) that he was on schedule to link up with Ewell, d) the alwasy resourceful Stuart would have gotten word to him asap if the AoP crossed into MD. Lee showed an odd complacency during this campaign (it could be that, like Napolean at Waterloo, he was ill). Lee wasn't surprised by the news of Hooker's pursuit. Only not hearing about it from Stuart first.
@noleybo56 Those cavalry though were second rate and were either watching empty passes in the Shennendoah (while Lee's army moved away from them into enemy territory) or were irregulars off to the West plundering and slave catching like Mosbey. Remember the way communications were back then. No radio. So Lee simply thought that having heard nothing from Stuart, it meant he had nothing to report. It was with much disquiet that the spy Harrison told him that Hooker had crossed 48 hrs ago.
@Shafeone First and foremost your comment i have too say is laughable. Second rate rate cavalry in Jeb Stuarts corps i will enlighten you. The cavalry that Lee had with him 1,800 troopers were Jenkins brigade and White's Batt from Jones brigade their purpose to be the eyes and ears of this army. My friend the question that you should be asking yourself why Lee failed to use their services? In stead of looking for a scapegoat scrutinize the actions of Lee.
@noleybo56 The raid was anticipated to last 3-4 days. In that time the brigades of Jones and Robertson--2700--troopers were carefully instructed by Stuart to guard Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. "Watch the enemy. Be always alert. Let nothing escape your observation," he instructed Robertson. Should the Federals move "beyond your reach" he was told to STAY TO THE RIGHT OF LEE'S ARMY. Yet the entire AoP crossed the Potomac without the incompetent Robertson seeing them. Do tell.
@noleybo56 And Albert Jenkins' troopers out in front of Ewell's corps were too busy raiding PA barns and smokehouse to perform cavalry functions. That is a matter of historical record. Same with John Imboden's irregulars, foraging and slave-catching to the west of Lee's advance. Oh please, enlighten me some more. Sorry. The cavalry (so derided by the infantry as flamboyant thieves and showman) lived up to its reputation at every turn this campaign.
@Shafeone The point that I am making is that there was cavalry with the ANV how they were used was a matter for the commander of that army. And yes i do agree with your recent statement in regards to the use of Lee's cavalry.So on that theme how can one blame Jeb Stuart for the failings of the army commander, Lee, on the proper use of cavalry when especially in enemy terr. When Lee said he stumble into battle" blind" because of want of cavalry he is being liberal with the truth.
@aaron 654 First and foremost the order to Ewell from Lee was a discretionary order, thereby leaving the decision up to Ewell.but there are a few reason why Ewell never took up the option of attacking Cemetery Hill. Fristly his corps was under strength, Johnston div was at least three hours away.Secondly he was to attack Cemetery Hill on his own with no help from A.P Hill 3rd corp. And finally,Gen Early div was" tuckered-out and could fight no more" as stated to Gen'l Ewell by Early himself.
@noleybo56 I don't think Ewell could have taken Cemetery Hill. It was just too strong a position and the town made approach and forming up difficult. It was the right call. Where Ewell did drop the ball was not taking then unoccupied Culp's Hill when he could. That position dominated Cemetery Hill, making it untenable. A great missed opportunity.
@Shafeone You are 100% correct in regards to Ewell not strong enough to attack two Union corps entrenched upon Cemetery Hill. Ewell Knew that Culp's Hill was the hill to be taken, here is where Lee fell down as a commander. The most prominent feature on the sky line was Culp's hill which you rightly point out dominated the Union position. Why Lee wanted Ewell to attacked such a strong position with an under strength corps God knows. If you could cast back Lee orders to Ewell.....
@noleybo56 "take the hill if practicable but do not bring on a general engagement" Therefore Culp's Hill should have been the target for Lee's assault. it would have given Lee what he must desire. A strong defensive position without bring on a general engagement in fact killing two birds with one stone. For the Union troops on Cemetery Hill would have too move house or attack Culp's hill in strength to push the confederate troops off this key position. Most commentors blame Ewell but her is the
@noleybo56 thing he knew the strategic importance of Culp's Hill in that part of the battle field. In my opinion there are two men too blame for not taking Culp's Hill that July day. One was with out doubt Gen'l Early and the other was General Lee. It prove one thing, Lee as an aggressive commander was rubbish. If one looks at Lee's performance at Gettysburg there is no other out come one could come to. His plans lack flexibility they were to rigid for the fluidity of battle.
@noleybo56 Lee's problem with Gettysburg was that he was without intelligence yet could sense that his plans of stringing out the Union army and hitting them corps by corps was falling into place regarless. He was aggressive, but was also used to giving he corps commanders (until May Jackson and Longstreet) discretion knowing they would know what to do on the scene. His two new corps commanders proved to be poor subs for Jackson and Longstreet and unsupportive of the offensive tactics.
@Shafeone In my opinion on a defensive offensive stragem Gen'l Lee has no equal anywhere. gettysburg was some what different. Lee took the reins any suggestions were brushed aside there was to be no debate his orders were final. Now if you cast your mind back Lee had penciled in Hood's and Mclaws div to lead the assault on the Union centre until he was reminded by Gen'l Longstreet of the causalties that these two divs suffered. now this to me shows Lee misunderstood what actually had..
@noleybo56 taking place on the 2nd of July. This to me shows his aloofness from the battle or not grasping the amount of blood letting a serious error for a battlefield commander not knowing the extent of your engagement in battle. Where was he?
@noleybo56 For the first time in his command of the army, Lee was actually receiving push-back from his senor commanders. Longstreet was hesitant to fight and kept pushing Lee to disengage and move south to higher ground, and Ewell successfully talked Lee out of moving II Corps southwest to Seminary Ridge, and so stayed in his ineffective posirion around the town and Culps/Cem. Hill. Thus by day three Lee had had enough and was determined to reassert his authority. Thus his stubbornness.
@noleybo56 Ewell dropped the ball on Culp's Hill more than Lee. Ewell was the commander on the field. Instead of ordering Earley to take it immediately when unoccupied, he let Earley convince him to wait for Johnson's fresh division. He ordered Johnson to take the hill but never followed up on it. Johnson never got around to it until very late July 1...by then the remnants of the Iron Brigade had been moved there and dug in.
@Shafeone Lee's discretionary orders to Ewell was to attack the Union position on Cemetery Hill not Culp's Hill.When Lee looked through his field glasses Culp's Hill was the most prominent feature on the terrain and as experienced engineer he should have known the strategic value of Culp's Hill on that part of the battlefield.
@noleybo56 Remember. Jackson had only been dead for 2.5 mos by this time and Ewell had been Jackson's favorite subordinate so Lee trusted Ewell who was actually there at the foot of the hills, not peering through his glass. But the fact that Ewell served under Jackson ironically ill-served Lee here for Ewell had probably never received a discretionary order in his entire time under Stonewall. Lee was used to giving discretionary orders as a courtesy knowing Jackson would read them as direct.
@Shafeone Lee never wanted Ewell to command the 2nd corps and Ewell knew it. Lee tried every move in the book to retire Ewell to desk job with out hurting his feelings. Lee's preferred choice was Dick Anderson. And yes Ewell knew this also. What Lee did manage was to undermined Dick Ewell's confidence.As for as Lee's discretionary orders go, they were with out doubt ambiguous and played out at Gettysburg a disaster for the South.
With that said. Ewell actually handled his first command decision nicely by laying into the XI Corps flanks north of town without getting explicit orders to do so. Unfortunately I think he was swayed by Earley to wait for Johnson and when the adrenaline wore off and things cooled down, Old Bald head fell into some indecision. A direct order to take Culp's Hill would have served Ewell well in this case. He HAD to see its prominence and know that if he did the Yanks would too and soon fortify it.
@Shafeone Just one more point about Ewell and Early. First and foremost It was Ewell who ask Early to attack Culp's Hill not ordered. For Ewell Culp's Hill never came to the fore as far as Lee's orders were concerned he was more occupied upon the Union position on Cemetery Hill and overlook Culp's Hill completely. As far as Gen'l Early conduct is concerned he point blank refused to attack Culp's Hill. But here a question,did Lee over look Culp's Hill purposely?
@noleybo56 There were many reasons for his invasion of course. 1) Give the VA planters a break by removing ravaging armies. 2) draw the union army out of VA and the threat to Richmond. 3) possibly -- unlikely - take pressure off Vicksburg 4) a victory in the east to offset a loss in the west; 5) destroy a large part of the AoP and force Washigntonto sur for peace; 5) live off the PA land-forage. But Lee never doubted that, barring no opportunities at all, he'd fight a battle in PA or MD.
@Shafeone The point I am making is that Lee never intended to fight a general battle so far from his base. if for argument sake, say Lee won a Gettysburg what do you think he would have done? A simple answer, gone back to Va, Why should he do such a thing after winning a victory on northern soil? He would have been annihilated as sure as the sun rises had he stayed. The fact is that the ANV wasn't large enough.
@noleybo56 So when Lee told Hood that he must go looking for the enemy if they didn't find him soon. WHen he told Ewell that the battle would likely take place at Gettysburg or Frederick's Town [sic]. When he cast about for every reinforcement he could get from DH HIll in N. Carolina for his "raid" then what are we to m
Interesting about Longstreet v Lee. Both agreed that the Army of Northern Virginia should take the strategic offensive. Where they differed was tactics. Lee advocated the tactical offensive, and the Army lost 30 to 40 percent in a series of battles that will live forever in the annals of military history. Longstreet advocated the tactical defensive but Lee thought that the morale of the army required that it attack. The only time Longstreet's method was adopted was at Fredricksburg.
lebarosky 1 month ago
Oh well he was a bit too much of a gentleman. He should have told Old Baldy to take the hill or die trying.
lebarosky 1 month ago
@lebara sky Why would Lee attack Cemetery Hill while the main feature on that particular part of the battlefield was Culp's Hill which over-looked the former, Besides was there not two Union army corps 1st and 11th dug in on Cemetery Hill.And Old Baldy had an under strength corp. Ewell knew that Culp's Hill was the hill to be taken. In my opinion Lee over-looked this position purposely for what reason?
noleybo56 1 month ago
@noleybo56 I thought that is what hill he meant. I am not an expert; I am only an avid reader and student. Just finished "A Glorious Army" by Jeffry D. Wert, who is a very competent military historian. What is remarkable about the ANV is that they kept attacking at Lee's behest while taking such high casualties. An amazing group of men. If you go to Gettysburg and stand where Pickett's Charge started you would realize how remarkable it was. Not good ground for attack in 1860s.
lebarosky 1 month ago
@lebara sky Yeah, this is the strange assumptions surrounding "Gettysburg".Remember Lee's admonition to General Ewell, "take the hill if practicable but do not bring on a general engagement until the army is up". Now the hill that Lee was referring too was Cemetery Hill which was in the hands of the 1st and 11th corp Union.If Ewell would have disobeyed Lee's discretionary order and attack Culp's Hill he would have with one swoop out manoeuvred the Union troops on Cemetery Hill......
noleybo56 1 month ago
@noleybo56 And accomplished Lee's orders quite handsomely.This turn of events would have meant one of two actions for the Union troops. Attack the Confederate defensive position on Culp's Hill or quit Cemetery Hill thus Lee could have maintain his defensive offensive stratagem in a very strong position. But for some reason unbeknown he over-looked the importance of Culp's Hill. WHY?
noleybo56 1 month ago
Pickett's Charge should have never happened, instead of attacking Cemetery Ridge Lee should have renewed his attacks on the flanks where Mead was weakest and flanked around Big Round Top.
AUG351 3 months ago in playlist AUG351's favorites
Lee's responses to Longstreet are so stupid...Longstreet understands the Art of War.
projectbrumaire 3 months ago
What a waste this war was, one of those people could have invented the car 60 years early, created a vaccine or what not. I mean who knows what genius fell in the Civil War
cwood4ever 3 months ago
SHOULD OF LISTENED TO LONGSTREET!
projectbrumaire 4 months ago
Lee always referred to Unions forces as "those people" and it is accurately part of the script here.
oneputtsteven 7 months ago
Cant count on the 11th Corps to do much. Gettysburg offfered Hancock the opportunity to again bail them out with his 2nd Corps Fighting men from the midwest on the 2nd day on Cemetery Hill.
You should see the 14th Indiana in action today -
type in and watch 14th Indiana vs. Taylor Swift
1967mustanggta 7 months ago
@1967mustanggta Worse was the fact that, as Reynolds was dead, Howard was senior officer on the field, so he reported to Hancock when he arrived, claiming that I Corps gave way compelling the XI to retire. The complete opposite was true. The I Corps stand was an epic, they took heavy losses while holding most of the day whereas XI Corps. collapsed in less than two hours. Doubleday, because of this, was relieved of I Corps command and replaced with John Newton. Doubelday never forgave Howard.
Shafeone 7 months ago
@darling67 Don't forget that Meade commanded with utter competence, anticipated Lee's every move (even told Gibbon that on July 3 they'd hit his lines in the center and reiforced it....and Lee didn't disappoint), addressed problems with rapid-fire decisiveness (like sending in V Cosprs reserves to link up with Sickles' ill-advised slaient). Meade was supported by his Corps commanders and they respected him. No intercine squabbling. The AoP fought with the mettle of any southern army there.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
Big mistake why didn't he just listen to Longstreet.
steve5123456789 8 months ago
Didn't the actor who plays the reporting courier who reports to Lee at 2:20 play the line-less Robert Rodes in "Gods And Generals"? Check it out.
Shafeone 8 months ago
lee lost the battle after day 1. longstreet was right, the union army was beaten, but they had the advantage going into day 2. if lee had gone around, lincoln would have compelled meade to attack and the confederate army would have had the ground of their choosing.
funny to think of things turning out differently
byrniemac791 8 months ago
@Rebel2276
This argument always amuses me. "Well, actually a large number of them turned and fled, not actually making the charge".
Really? So they weren't able to contribute to the battle? They were essentially combat ineffective? The artillery did its job demoralizing the charge causing a significant portion to turn around or stay where they were? Leaving the braver and more experienced to die/get captured and be lost to Lee up to and including generals? Leaving those with far less resolve?
Mahbu 8 months ago
I would hardly call the Union performance on Day 1 a "collapse of the lines." This was an orderly withdrawal, done in accordance with a well-conceived battle plan.
The Confederates paid dearly for this "collapse."
TheLoyalOfficer 9 months ago
@TheLoyalOfficer AP Hill even admitted to Fremantle the yankees fought with exceptional tenacity. The I Corps stand was a true epic and they held off superior numbers for most of the day before finally succombing to relentless--and costly--Reb flank attacks. The XI Corps was routed again as they were at Chancellorsville which didn't help. But the Rebs suffered heavy casaulties (especially the brigades of Archer, Davis, Iverson and O'Neil) and the union held the high ground south of town.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@darling67 When George Pickett was asked why his attack on July 3 failed, he replied: "I think the Union Army had something to do with it." ;)
Shafeone 9 months ago
as said in the book (The Killer Angels) longstreest was very hardheaded and didn't believe in everything lee did...and in the foreward at the beginning of the book, Michael Shaara said he wrote this book not on cold facts but on letters written by the people engaged in the battle
sjbaseball6 9 months ago
@sjbaseball6 After the battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet wrote to his Uncle and in that letter, Longstreet wrote that General Lee should have put in double the men into "Pickett's Charge". Now that is odd, because here the "Hollywood" movie, makes it look like Longstreet was against the attack. So as you can read, Longstreet got caught in lies. Between his Uncle's letter, his 1896 " From Manassas to Appomattox" book and Hollywood, all differ.
Longstreet outlived all the Confederate high command
rebel2276 9 months ago
@rebel2276 Longstreet didn't want to attack He wanted to defend or withdraw.. He certainly didn't want to attack that position with only 15000 men. Longstreet probably figured that they needed, at least,15000 to breach the Federal line AND then another15000 to fully exploit that breach. Lee was nuts to hang around after the second day.
warager37 9 months ago
@warager37 Refer to my last post above. Now John Michael Priest, in the North&South Magazine, Volume 1, Issue 6, pages 42-55. Proved that half the Confederates either ran back to the woods or got down and found any cover they could. That only 6,000 marched on to Emittsburg Road and that those 6,000 were the main "Casualties". Mr. Priest listed the total loss, at "4,802".
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276
You may as well count people that run, in a given battle, as a "casualty" for that specific instance. Are they fighting? No. Are they contributing? No. Is their act demoralizing? Yes. If you're uncertain and you see your own guys running, meaning less people with you, you start to feel heavy doubts because you know there'll be more people looking at you.
So yes, taking into account the people that fled, you'd need a significant number to offset that and the actual casualties.
Mahbu 8 months ago
@Mahbu This IS a fact. Because the casulaties (killed, wounded, captured) occured in enemy territory, the Pennsylvania campaign cost Lee over 17,000 men that had to be permanently struck from the rolls of the Army Of Northern Virginia...the vast majority of them trained infantry or artillerymen. This out of an army that had a total (everything from teamsters to blacksmiths to foot soldiers) of ~80,000. From a nation already suffereing manpower shortages. Yet Reb says Lee "won" the campaign.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone
Was that directed at me? Anyway, I totally agree with you there.
Mahbu 8 months ago
@Mahbu Exactly. One dictum in combat is to shoot to WOUND, not to kill if you can. Because the 1-4 men required to evacuate a wounded man are that many less enemy combatants in the field. Same applied at Pickett's Charge. The 6,000 or so who never got within a football field of the union lines because of the topography, the Emmitsburg Rd. fence and the artillery field of fire were as good a casualties in terms of efeectiveness. The union men holding the line did their work well that day.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@rebel2276 I still don't know what your point is here other than to prove the impregnable nature of the union position on Cemetery Ridge that was such a killing firing line that half of the assaulting Rebs turned around before even getting close to the yankee lines. Seems to me you're just supporting the case that Pickett's Charge never should have been made in the first place.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone Had the Confederate artillery barrage been more effective and cleared more Union artillery pieces and soldiers off the ridge, great I am all for the charge. Using hindsight we know the artillery barrage did not work, thus it was a bad idea. I don't know why there is so much hype on Pickett's Charge when the total loss was 4,802. Seems everyone wants to forget about Fredericksburg and the Union's Marye's Height's charge, for a total loss of 8,000. The worst charge during the war.
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Don't forget Malvern Hill, Reb. Or the horrific losses Lee suffered at Chancellorsville. The Union could afford ten Marye's Heights. Pickett's Charge matters because these were casualties Lee could ill-afford. Tell me, who could afford 17,000 absolute lost men during the PA campaign? The Union or the CSA. C'mon Reb. Oh, and only Southern Boys trapped in a delusion of antebellum bliss call it "The War Of Rebellion" Anyone who lives in the present calls it THE CIVIL WAR. Sheez.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Cold Harbor was the worst charge of the war.
In any case, the Army of the Potomac of 1863 was not going to be defeated at Gettysburg. They had been improved in every conceivable way - especially with their cavalry coming from the fresh victory at Brandy Station.
They were far better than they were at any point earlier in the war - leadership, weapons, logistics, doctrine, and morale.
TheLoyalOfficer 8 months ago
@TheLoyalOfficer Cold Harbor was not a SINGLE charge, it was a three day battle. Fredericksburg was a one day battle in which Seven Union divisions attacked in a single day. None of the three days at Cold Harbor produced over 8,000 casualties. It has long been disputed of the AOP losing 7,000 men in 10 minutes. Several historians have proved that wrong. Brandy Station was a tactical draw, neither side winning. So that was not a "Victory".
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276 You are off on Brandy Station. The only reason why the Rebs were not beaten badly was that the main body of Confed infantry showed up in the nick of time. The Union cavalry, for the first time in the whole war, got the "jump" on Stuart's horsemen. Perhaps a draw, but a very embarrassing one for the South. Union morale skyrocketed. This key battle was viewed as an ill omen by the Army of N. Virginia as they invaded PA.
Victory can come in many forms...
TheLoyalOfficer 8 months ago
@rebel Fredricksburg was not a single charge, either. The Union came up in waves. I think Cold Harbor was worse because the Union, by 1864, should have known better. Perhaps lower in terms of lives lost, but certainly higher in stupidity. It was Grant's worst mistake - one that he regretted bitterly - in an otherwise underrated and stellar career.
TheLoyalOfficer 8 months ago
@TheLoyalOfficer I call it a "Single Charge" for the overall loss. Eight Union divisions did attack. First French's division which attacked at 11AM, French lost 30% of his men and 33% of his officers. Hancock's division was next, out of 5,500 men he lost 2,000 men. Howard's division was next and then Sturgis' division. Griffin's division then came up and then Humphrey's division, then Getty and Sykes. A grand total of 35,000 Union soldiers attacked and lost 8,000.
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Yeah. We can read too.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@TheLoyalOfficer Cold Harbor in no charge on any of those days, produced higher loss then the charge at Marye's heights. No Confederate attack ever lost 8,000 men. Pickett's Charge (4,802). It was not that the "Union" should have known better, it was "Grant" should have known better. Grant was an idiot by attacking Lee's breastworks and finally on June 18th, 1864, Grant finally stopped that. From then all it was dig, dig, dig. Grant had learned that after losing 55,000-60,000 men.
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel Fair enough, but the Vicksburg Campaign, under the command of Grant, was a work of pure genius. Grant should have known better at Cold Harbor. But I don't think it took him 60,000 losses to figure it out.
Grant is one of the most underrated Generals in American military history.
TheLoyalOfficer 8 months ago
@TheLoyalOfficer First off, Grant faced Lt. General Pemberton who was promoted far beyond his rank and skill. Pemberton ended up in Richmond demoted to Lt. Colonel in command of the inner artillery. In the majority of battles: Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, MS, Champion's Hill, Big Black River, the Confederates were either outnumbered 2-1 or 3-1.
I feel Grant is one of the most overrated generals, not in any major battle was he ever outnumbered 2-1. Imagine, 80,000 Confederates at Shiloh......
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276 So? He maximized resources. When you look at the tactical situation, it took much more that just 2-1 to win on the attack.
Also, in many of those battles, Grant was against shit troops. But, I guess you don't think that any of the units of the Confederacy were shit, huh? Well, I am here to tell you that they were total crap - especially in the West.
The Confederacy did not have the necessary strategic resources to win. The war was over from its first day.
TheLoyalOfficer 8 months ago
@rebel2276 I felt Grant was overrated too...right up until the point where he WON the war. LOL. Give it up Reb. Grant did in eleven months what six other generals hadn't been able to do in 3 years. Grind down Lee's army to the nub while coordinating efforts agains the entire CSA to bring the war to an end. And then he was so magnanomous in victory, so embracing of his one-time enemy, that he laid the seeds of a lasting, if still imperfect, peace--despite Booth's efforts.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@rebel2276 And who the f**k did the "brilliant' Lee face Reb? McClellen? Pope? Burnsides? A concussed Hooker? In his first battle against a solid AoP commander in Meade--who was only in command for four days mind you and was on the verge of mental collapse--was at Gettysburg and he was thoroughly outgeneralled. Then came Grant and a mere eleven months later his surrendering at Appomattox after putting up the highest % casualities of any major commander in any CW theater.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@MrJeefry1
Lee is a good general but, yeah, perhaps not the greatest. Most of his opponents were incompetent or only in their position out of politics, not tactical/strategic brilliance. None of them had an idea of how to effectively use their superior numbers which was very disappointing.
Mahbu 8 months ago
@rebel2276 And Lee fought the brilliant McClellan, Pope, McClellan again (who somehow couldn't destroy Lee at Sharpsburg?) Burnsides and then Hooker who was concussed as Jeff down there says. Lee suffered horrendous casualties relative to the size of his force, never quite grasped that the days of Napoleanic tactics were negated by rifling and threw his men into buzzsaws At Malvern Hill then Cemetery Ridge. He also almost lost his entire army at Antietam but for facing an incompetent oopnent.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 And Grant acknowledged it had been a terrible mistake in his memoirs. Did Lee ever acknowledge that about Malvern Hill or Pickett's Charge? And who could afford more? The AoP -8k or the ANVA -6k? Grant could afford the casualties and he knew it. Lee could not. By dig dig dig, denying the inferior Lee the flexibility of manuever but pinning him down to waste away, Grant did the exact thing he should have. "He knew how to beat Lee and he did it." Shelby Foote.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Actually Grant outfoxed Lee by moving on Petersburg rather than Richmond after that and but for a botched assault may have carried the town. The Reb reinforcements got there in time after that. Grant dug in because Lee did. But that was fine. He knew it was just a matter of time then. The war was effectively over. Just a matter of when. Grant forced Lee into Grant's kind of fight.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 YOu have an interesting definition of "victory". Sure Brandy Station was a "draw" in the sense that neither cavalry force was destroyed. But it was a damn near run thing for Stuart (his aides offered this was the first time they ever saw him flustered). It gave the Union cavalry the confidence they needed, and set the hyper-sensitive Stuart (criticized in the papers) hell bent on redemption which is probably why he persisted in his ride around Hooker despite the warning signs.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 "Battelfield Detectives" concluded roughly the same in its investigation as to why the casualties on July 3 weren't much higher for the South. (July 2 was the bloodiest day of the three-day battle).
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@MrJeefry1 Yes, duh, July 2nd had the highest losses. I have been in this business for Thirty years and your 21, oh no wait, 25. It does not matter what you type, I already long have read, wrote and covered it.
Instead of wasting your time, typing on here, take another twenty years and do more reading on the Civil War.
Anymore questions?
rebel2276 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Maybe in twenty years you, too, Jeffry can conclude that Lee "Won the PA campaign" as this Ken Burns wannabe claims. He mistakes reading and reciting useless data with understanding. He's a pedantic buffoon masquerading on the net as an historian. (And an 'army man' too).
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Where did you "cover it"? I'd like to read your published works about this battle.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 4800 casualties makes perfect sense. Most of them probably hoofed it when they got stalled at the Emmitsburg Road fence and cried uncle. (I would have too. No shame. The thought of climbing over that obstacle literally was the Union guns stare down at you from 100 yards or so away is terrifying even now). But that is just a testimant to the strength of Meade's line and further vindication of those who feel the assault never should have been made. What is your point?
Shafeone 8 months ago
@warager37
after the first day even. Lee knew that the union had the high ground going into day 2, this movie and killer angels made it seem like lee had some strange concept of fighting the enemy simply because it was in front of him. Had lee acted differently the war might have turned out a lot differently
byrniemac791 8 months ago
@byrniemac791 Lee said that if the enemy is there in the morning he was going to strike him. Longstreet's argument was more sound: "If he's there tomorrow, General, it's because he WANTS us to strike him. A good enough reason in my opinion for not doing so."
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone
Yeah exactly, Meade had the better field position on the second day. It's odd because Lee was otherwise such a brilliant general, hahayou're almost wishing for Lee to see and understand that so he can outsmart the Union Army
byrniemac791 8 months ago
@byrniemac791
Yeah exactly, Meade had the better field position on the second day. It's odd because Lee was otherwise such a brilliant general, you're almost wishing for Lee to see that so he can outsmart the Union Army
byrniemac791 8 months ago
@rebel2276 Reb. Why do you insist on twisting words to form-fit you Lee worship? Longstreet was making the point that without at least 30,000 men that position could never have been taken and thus the assault never should have been made. Longstreet was not just against this attack but fighting offensively at Gettysburg period. He only went along with Lee's invasion under a specific understanding that though their strategy would be offensive, once the battle was on it would be defensive.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@rebel2276 How is that a lie? I too believe that Lee should have put in 30,000 men. But, like Longstreet, I know he only had 12,000 available (and of them only one fresh division). So therefore the attack was foolhardy. That is completely consistent. Obviously Longstreet given his performance at 2nd Bull Run and Chickamauga was not against any offensive tactics at all. But he knew what any good military man knows. Attacks are more costly than defense so you better have sufficient numbers.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@sjbaseball6 I agree with you 110% that soldier's letter are the primary source. But all soldiers wrote what they saw and heard, so most have a different story to tell. Micheal and Jeff Shaara are not professional historians on the Civil War. Micheal left out characters he felt were "Non-Important", but who was he to judge who was "Important and Non-Important?" I have to ask why they base Civil War movies off of one single book writer, why not the top 25 experts on Gettysburg?
rebel2276 9 months ago
Nobody knows what was said between General Lee and General Longstreet, it was never recorded by anyone. General Lee after the war, never wrote about much on the war and he died in 1870. So all of this is from Longstreet's pen. So of course, Longstreet is going to write that, we should have done this and I would have done that, etc. Longstreet was using "Hindsight". Just as we do in our time period.
rebel2276 10 months ago 2
Never issue unclear orders. "If practicable" doomed the south
The2ndFirst 10 months ago
@The2ndFirst Stonewall was brilliant and unstood those type of loose orders
Sto20784 10 months ago
Nonsense! A order to do something if it is practicable is very clear and very precise; and every officer must know by instinct that it means to do it with the given means to the full extent, safe destroying the given troops in the attempt to do so; as the order demands the occupation of a certain position the commander can expect zealous attempts to have this position occupied by the officer ordered to do it; anything else would put the whole command structure of the army in question!
FireEyedMaidOfWar 10 months ago
@The2ndFirst General Lee could not be all over any battlefield and he left it up to the area commander to judge for himself "If Practicable" to attack or not. If General Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill, he would have lost and suffered many casualties. Gordon and Smith two brigades would not have been in the charge, they were guarding the York Pike (Extreme Left) of the entire ANV. So that left Hays and Avery's Brigade. Those two brigades were in Early's division.
rebel2276 10 months ago
@The2ndFirst Between Hay's brigade and the Hoke/Avery brigade they had a total of 8 regiments. Rodes' division fought hard and was not going to be in the attack, Heth and Pender's divisions were hit hard, so that only leaves 8 regiments to make the attack. But they were busy gathering up thousands of Union prisoners running all around Gettysburg streets. Ewell made the right decision by not attacking.
rebel2276 10 months ago
Longstreet seemed to have the right idea that time around. I thik Longstreet was the best strategist in the south
Proudnewfoundlander1 11 months ago
@Proudnewfoundlander1 If Longstreet moved around the right flank of the AOP that was on the field, they would have run into BG. Merritt's Cavalry Brigade on the extreme left. Longstreet wanted to "Get between the AOP and Washington City". What Longstreet did not know, was the 6th Corps had not come up yet. The 6th Corps arrived at 4:30PM on July 2nd. So the ANV would have been hit from behind and the front, strung out in a long column. Lee would not have had a "Rear". Game over.
rebel2276 10 months ago
@Proudnewfoundlander1 Another problem was Pickett's division was still back at Chambersburg, PA. It is not easy to move an Army of 70,000 men. Lee would have to collect all of his wounded from July 1st, bury his dead, collect thousands of rifles on the field, care for the Union wounded and do all that in one night? I have been in the US. Army for Twenty-Eight years and in no shape or form would that ever work. Lee should have pulled back to Herr's Ridge, then go on the defense.
rebel2276 10 months ago
@Proudnewfoundlander1 After the battle on July 1st, General Lee actually wanted to pull General Ewell's Second Corps back from where it was positioned. But General Ewell said, "I can hold my position". Sure, Ewell could hold it, but attacking wise, he was in no position, as we have read on July 2nd (Culp's Hill). General Ewell's last division (Ed Johnson) arrived "At dusk" on July 1st. Rodes's division was hit hard, Early not bad and Johnson fresh.
rebel2276 10 months ago
Interesting stuff guys !! As a British soldier and a keen military historian i find the whole American civil war fascinating. Battles always come down to the decisions of commanders and also when they leave the field ( Napoleon at Waterloo ). Lee was a great commander who had some bad luck at Gettysburg. Paton was probably the best modern day General. And bye the way UK & USA ALL THE WAY !!!
bhoyjack 1 year ago
The man responsible for this defeat at Gettysburg was Robert E. Lee and he was enough of a general and man to take the blame. After day 1, once he realized that Culp's Hill was not taken and he did not have the high ground the Confederate Army should have redeployed per Longstreet's suggestion. Instead the Confederates suffered the fate the Union Army did at Fredericksburg,
battlestar9 1 year ago
@battlestar9
Truly.
It is unfortunate that many southerners who subscribe to the "Lost Cause" blame Longstreet for the failure.
Mahbu 11 months ago
@Mahbu it was both who were at fault
TsumeBeta038 11 months ago
@TsumeBeta038
What, both sides at fault for the war? Of course. Never said not. It takes two to tango, after all. But it is important to understand the reasons and what led up to them.
Unfortunately subscribers of the lost cause (which seems to be a lot of youtubers on these videos), like to rewrite history and live in denial because they're terrified their beloved south will look bad.
Mahbu 11 months ago
Does anyone knows why Martin Sheen was critised so much for his performance playing Lee?
eyederrick 1 year ago
Lee should have never taken his army north of Washington...They did not have the resources to "take" the fight to north...biggest mistake of the war...
xanderluv 1 year ago
Lee was the epitome of the southern gentleman.
seeingthesigns 1 year ago 17
@seeingthesigns
Lee permitted his army to engage in the seizure of Black Pennsylvanians, who were forcibly marched South to slavery. Whites who tried to interfere with the ANV's slaving efforts were threatened with death or property destruction...yes...Lee WAS the epitome of a true Southern 'gentleman'.
UnionStatesHeritage 1 year ago
@UnionStatesHeritage Well some people on here want to live in the fantasy world of the southern gentleman. What they were fighting for not only enslaved blacks but impoverished poor white southerners who didn't know any better. 90% of whites did not own slaves yet they fought for the system anyway.
onolex76 1 year ago
@onolex76
Johnnies don't like to talk about the massive numbers of poor white conscripts who deserted Lee's army. Seems kind of strange that the CSA, which claimed to be fighting for "Southern Independence", had to start forcing poor whites to fight, just one year into the war...until you look at the passage of the Twenty Slave Law, which exempted slave-holding planters from military service...the very people who started the war.
UnionStatesHeritage 1 year ago
@UnionStatesHeritage
just goes to show that govt. sucks
holidayhouse03 1 year ago
The men who fought were fine gentlemen.
SIG551P 1 year ago 14
@SIG551P I agree. Chamberlain was very educated and a fine warrior and gentleman.
onolex76 1 year ago
@onolex76
The embodiment of a Citizen Soldier you might say.
unsf8518 1 year ago
@onolex76 I was not specifically referring to Chamberlain...
SIG551P 1 year ago
fascinating events, but I have to say the acting in this (not so much the main characters, but all the cameo roles) is very wooden - it's almost like there are 2 directors...one of them could have directed the school play I did when I was 16, it's that bad. what a shame.
blueray1969 1 year ago
Its amazing how warefare has changed over the years
YakumoHideaki 1 year ago
Lee shoulda listened to Longstreet
SRSRSRSR 1 year ago
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GETTYSBURGbook 1 year ago
Meade should get credit for empowering his Corps commanders with picking the batlefield in his absence--even though he wanted to defend the area of Big Pipe Creek to he south. But once Reynolds chose to fight there and then Hancock later decided "well sir, I choose this as the battlefield" Meade tossed out his plans and ordered all units to concentrate at Gettysburg asap. Meade was decisive and determined. And once on the field his tactics were those of a composed confident genl.
Shafeone 1 year ago 2
@Shafeone a well thought out comment and accurate to boot.
IndyRamMan 1 year ago
@Shafeone Forget about Reynolds, Hancock was the man that convinced Meade to fight a Gettysburg. It was he who stabilizes the front .
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Well. It was Reynolds who sent to word to Meade that he intended to fight a holding action and hold the town, saying he would barricade the streets if he had to "Good," said Meade down at Taneytown. "That is just like Reynolds!" (Not realizing the man who'd sent the message was already dead.) Reynolds picked the battlefield, Hancock confirmed it declaring it excellent ground. Buford, the Reynolds, the Hancock (and even Howard to some extent) all saw the advantages of the position.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone And so did Longstreet. He was the architecht of the Union massacre at Fredericksburg on Marye's Hieghts and now could envision his corps suffering a similar fate before Cemetery Ridge. On the night of July 1 he was not optimistic, knowing that they had punished two union corps severely but failed to take the high ground and now were left with exterior lines and few options other than to fight uphill or cede the field in the face of Meade's superior tactical advantage.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone As to John Reynolds choosing the battlefeld [ Gettysburg ] I have to disagree with you. Simply because the facts are some what different to how you would make us believe. Fristly Reynolds actions off that day 1st July was to support Burford's cav with his 1st Corps where upon he sent two missives one too Howard to bring up the 11th Corps and the other to Meade to inform him that serious fighting had broken out west of Gettysburg. cont
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Meade give Hancock two assignment on that day 1st July. First to take command off all forces present ,Secondly to choose whether or not to fight a major battle at Gettysburg. upon Hancock's observation of the site it was he who informed Meade that Gettysburg would be a good place to fight. Meade reply was "i'll send up the troops". So in my estimation it was Hancock how chose the battlefield not John Reynolds.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@Shafeone Just an after thought,on who's advice was the Union army destine to fight at Gettysburg.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 What chose the battlefield was the same thing that chose the battlefield at Sharpsburg ten months before also in northern territory...it was where the roads came together. Hooker had ordered the calvary to reconnoiter as far as Gettysburg based on the maps he saw. And even Lee had indicated to Ewell well before they even knew of the Army Of The Potomac's presence nearby that a battle may be fought "Gettysburg or Frederick's [sic] City." Hancock confirmed officially what all saw.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone Wow... CAVALRY (hate that Calvary mistake...typo I promise!)
Shafeone 1 year ago
@noleybo56 In all fairness Reynolds was killed within the first HOUR of the battle. He and Henry Heth have a half share in choosing the field. Heth by recklessly attacking unknown union forces and tasking his to "advance and take the town" and then Reynolds ordering up i, the XI and III Corps. and vowing not to give up the town without a fight. Unlike Heth, though, Reynolds had full authority to make the call. Heth threw down the gauntlet and Reynolds accepted the challenge.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone you and I are looking at pre- Gettysburg [Battle] somewhat differently. I am of the school of though that Lee's sojourn north was in all intended purposes a large raid for supplies and nothing more.For if indeed Lee intention was to fight a battle on northern soil he would have kept his best cav with him. As Lee himself said the" eyes and ears of this army". So on that premise ,Lee was never going to fight a battle at Gettysburg neither was Meade. What happen there was a collision.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 It was more than a raid. Lee intended to bring the AoP to battle by stretching it out & attacking it piecemeal with his entire force at a time, thereby neutralizing it's superior numbers. He planned on fighting a battle near the end of summer on ground of his choosing. He approved Stuart's raid under two conditions: 1) he not lose touch with the army and 2) he leave a sufficient screening force. Stuart did neither. Thus was Lee caught unawares when he learned the Union's position.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone Ironically, even though it was by accident, the dispositions of the two armies...with two Lee's three corps with an almost 2:1 numbers advantage bearing down on first the I then XI overwhelming their flanks was exactly what Lee wanted albeit it was not of his choosing & without his cavalry he felt blindfolded. The South's best shot at pressing the advantage was to take undefended Culp's Hill (Ewell failed to do). Most historians agree that cemetery hill's artillery was unassailable.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone first and foremost. Lee had no idea as to the strength of his foe. for one he had thought he had outpaced the Union army his first mistake Secondly, in your piece regarding Gen'l Ewell lack of action in taking "Culp's Hill"you have omitted a glaring fact in this regard. Lee order to Ewell" attack if practicable" but in the same breath Lee's next order to Ewell.Do not bring on a general engagement until the army is up.It's no wonder that Ewell was some what bewilder......
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 lee's orders or lack off. do but don't do, but if you think you can..As too you're point in regards to Gen'l Stuart conduct . Lee give his cav commander wide latitude in his assignment.All this talk about Stuart leaving Lee blind is untrue. Lee had over 1'800 cavarly with his army so this nails the lie.The truth of the matter is, was the absent of Stuart that he felt keenly.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Lee's cavalry at Gettysburg 1st July..... 1,800 troopers. Jenkins brigade and White's batt from Jones Brigade.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Lee was referring to Cemetery Hill (and yes he was asking Ewell to start a fight but not a battle which was contradictory). Lee curiously did not offer support of Hill's Corps for any assault so Ewell wisely decided attacking uphill through town against 43 field pieces and an unscathed Union reserve division was not practicable. But Culp's Hill was undefended. Ewell had left orders to Allegheny Johnson to take it but then absent-mindedly left to see Lee and never followed up(cont)
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone Gen'l Ewell had asked Early to attack Culp's Hill but as you rightly pointed out the excuse used by Gen'l Early was that his men had done all the hard fighting and marching and were tuckered out and suggested that Johnston dIv do there share. Here is were the problem arose. Ewell had as he himself being given a discretionary orders decided not to force the issue and acquiesce to Gen'l Early. Ewell was not blame for not taking Culp's Hill, he had an under strength corps johnston div...
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 being several miles from the battlefield. If it is fault finding or scapegoating then is not Ewell, Stuart or Longstreet. The defeat a Gettysburg was Lee's and Lee's alone. A written order to Ewell to take Culp's Hill was all that was needed. And I'm quite sure Dick Ewell would have pitch in with all his vigor. That was the type of soldier and the man Dick Ewell was. A gallant and noble soldier.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Oh I agree the buck stops with Lee. And he should have never fought on July 2 onward. But it also stops with Ewell who never followed up with Johnson until it was too late. Lee was used to giving Jackson discretionary orders, knowing Jackson would understand the meaning. "If practicable" was a gentlemanly way of saying 'take the hill." I think that Ewell didn't give the Yankees credit for seeing what they saw by way of CH's import. Typical of the hubris by the Rebs on July 1.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone The strange thing about Dick Ewell, Lee never wanted him to command 2nd corps infact Lee tried every manoeuvre without directly telling Ewell that he had no use for him at all in the ANV. Beyond damaging the Gen'l reputation [Ewell] he probably thought after loosing his leg at 2nd Manassas Dick Ewell was half the man he was.And I am quite sure Ewell knew Lee's feelings in this regard in a sense that Lee was undermining him and possibly that Lee had penciled in Dick Anderson as.......
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 successor to Jackson.so if you put yourself in Ewell's shoe, he would relish the opportunity to prove Lee wrong and seize the moment with both hands which I feel he did on 1st of July. All things consider.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 As too the hubris of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg, "Pickett's Charge" sums this attitude up pretty nicely.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 All great points yes. Ewell acted decisively by bringing on a general engagement when he saw the dipositions of his corps vis-a-vis the Xl and ordered them forward. But it seems when the dust settled he shrank to listening to his subordinates way too much. Also, he dissuaded Lee from shifting his corps to the right, but didn't knwo what to do with his command where it was facing two powerful positions and an town in its way to boot. Strange behavior from a strange man. You agree?
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone In some points I agree wholeheartedly with your trust and in other I don't. For example, in my eyes the biggest scoundrel from the debacle at Gettysburg was"Old Jube" this guy blamed the usual suspects, Ewell, Stuart and Longstreet. If anyone undermined his commander it surely was Early. Again post Gettysburg he condems JEB Stuart but here again who's guns does he here at Hanover of course Stuart's what does he do ? absolutley Zip Oh!! He could not even send word of a change ....
.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Of base if he had Stuart would have been at Gettysburg from day one, but as it happen" Old Jube" just rode away. The same with Longstreet, this guy jump on the bandwagon. Yes mistakes were made but I can't for the life off me pick out three men and blame these men for the confederate defeat. In my estimation. there was plenty of blame to go round.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 No argument there. Earley was a self-serving revisionist to say the least. By all accounts an SOB. Runner up to Gettysburg scoundrel would be Howard on the Union end for falsely reporting to Hancock (just arrived) that the l corps gave way causing Xl's rout when it was the exact opposite. l corps fought superbly. This caused Meade to relieve Doubleday who performed quite well of corps command in favor of John Newton. Doubleday never forgave Howard--or Meade-- for this slight.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@Shafeone Again you are quite correct, the 1st Corps retreat through Gettysburg was as well organized as it could have been. It's as you say the 11th corps troops started the rout when they charge through the town in an uncontrolled mob. Unfortunately the 1st Corps got caught up in it.As to Howard being a scoundrel I concur.
noleybo56 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Culp's Hill, 800 yards east of Cem. Hill dominated the former and Ewell's aids found it undefended. Had Ewell ordered Earley to take it immediately rather than wait for Johnson he could have had it easily. Earley claimed his men were fought out which was bogus since he'd suffered vs. XI corps nowhere near Rhodes' losses vs. I corps. Instead he left it to Johnson and went to see Lee. Johnson neglected it and by the time he tried attacking the remnants of the Iron Brig. was there.
Shafeone 1 year ago
@noleybo56 Lee did not anticipate that Staurt would have allowed himself to be separated as he did. They thought the gaps between the Union corps were much more porous. Allowing for Stuart to slip in and out at will while gathering intel and sowing mayhem. Lee had every intention of fighting a battle north of the MD line and even pointed out to Hood: "Ah general, the enemy is a long time in finding us. If he does not do so soon, we must go looking for him." Hardly a man on a raid.
MrJeefry1 8 months ago
@MrJeffrey 1 I am not being rude nor disrespectful.Your comments are based on assumptions that come "Hell or High water" Lee was determined to fight a battle on Northern soil, this is the belief held by most commentators which in my opinion is erroneous. Lee moved North for forage and provisions for his army, Stuarts orders from Lee,were too move north, guard the mountain passes,Keep in contact with Ewell's right and collect ALL the supplies you can for the use of the army.So here we have Lee..
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 ordering his cavalry chief to collect provisions for the army.The ANV had 7 Brigades of cavalry JEB Stuart took 3 brigades for his mission which left 4 with the army. If indeed Lee was gearing up for a fight why have your best cavalry out stealing chickens when then should be looking for the enemy.Its illogical it makes no sense whatever. The fault here lies with Lee not Stuart, Lee's orders were vague and ambiguous a portent of Lee's performance at Gettysburg's. As to the porous...
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 union lines. This info was supplied by Mosby to Stuart who then passed it onto Lee. but here again Lee fall down. For he is off the belief that Hooker "might steal a march on us" and make for the Potomac ahead of us, so on that premise why send your cavarly out to hunt for proviosions? strange!!! Just one further point on Lee busting a gut to fight a battle on northern soil. His letter to Jeff Davis post Gettysburg in which he writes"it had not been intended to fight a general battle
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 at such a distance from our base", but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains". moreover, said Lee, collecting NEEDED supplies in the face of the enemy was dangerous". "A battle thus became in a measure, unavoidable". As I always contented, Lee was out hunting for supplies but ended up with a battle instead.
noleybo56 8 months ago
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@noleybo56 [cont'd] It was more than a raid. Lee intended to bring the AoP to battle by stretching it out & attacking it piecemeal with his entire force at a time, thereby neutralizing its superior numbers. He planned on fighting a battle near the end of summer on ground of his choosing. He approved Stuart's raid under two conditions:1) he not lose touch with the army and 2) he leave a sufficient screening force. Had Lee known he'd get separated by a less porous AoP Lee wouldn't have ok'd it.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 You are citing Lee's after-battle report. Southern papers were criticizing him harshly and it wounded his pride deeply. Of course he is going to paint it like "well gee I never really wanted to fight at all." YET during the campaign Lee even said to Hood: "Ah General. The enemy is a long time in finding us. If he does not soon we must go looking for him." You tell me if those are the words of a man on a raid or looking for a showdown battle. He even offered that the battle [cont
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 [cont'd] he forsaw coming would be either "at Frederick's Town [sic] or Gettysburg." Lee had every intention of fighting the AoP north of the M&D line. What he did not plan on was fighting it so soon on a field not of his choosing. This is where the intelligence blackout was the key factor. Was provisioning part of it? Of course. But his letters to Davis seeking permission for the invasion speak of defeating the Union army and suing for peace afterwards ... from strength.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 The aim wasn't just to hunt for provisions. It was to sow chaos behind the Union lines, cut telegraph wires, and keep them guessing by appearing to threaten Washington DC. Stuart was told to only embark on the raid if he found the AoP's line of march to be porous. He thought there were ten mile gaps between crops. Once he found that the Union lines were indeed solid, he should have aborted. But his pride compelled him onwards. Another effect of Brandy Station. Here Stuart failed.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafer One There is some merit in your comment in regards too Jeb Stuart's pride being hurt. But the fact remains, Lee sent his cavalry chief on foraging expedition. So how can you carry out the task of which the cavalry " the eyes and ears of this army " are lumbered with a wagon train ? Ah you say !!why did he not burn it and ride to Gettysburg. To do so would have been against orders. Just one other point in regards too the wagon train. Without the supplies the train carried Lee could not..
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 When Stuart brought Lee the wagons Lee supposedly said to him "General they are an impediment to me now. I ask you to help me whip these people." Think about it logically. Why would Lee invade the North under ANY circumstances, knowing that the AoP would be compelled to follow him (indeed one of his goals was to clear VA of the invaders by drawing them north) and then deny himself the instrument by which he could track Hooker's movements just for the sake of foraging? [cont]
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 have fought on the third day "Pickett's Charge". Ironic that provisions that was needed to save the army were used to destroy it. These same wagons were used as ambulances too transport the wounded back to Va.So here we have another reason to castigate Stuart for,"Pickett's Charge".
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 [cont] It would make no sense and be folly even if it was just a raid to purposefully blind himself. So Lee approved the raid so long as Staurt remained in contact or left a sufficient screening/tracking force to accompany the army north. Staurt was to abort if it was not feasible. Stuart found that there were not the gaps in the federal columns he thought...but pushed on further south and east anyway. Lee was shocked when he only found out through a spy about Hooker's movements.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone you raise a couple of points in your comments which I will answer.you. You are correct when you say Lee's aim was to draw the Union army out of Va. Why ? there was no subsistence for Lee's army.What did he hope to achieve by going North? Revitalization of his army and of course to embarrass the Lincoln's Admin. Had Lee any cavalry with his army? Yes, 1,800 troopers so bang goes the lie that the ANV were without cavalry. As to Lee being shocked to find the AOP hot on his heels...
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 Lee knew as you rightly point out that the AOP would follow him North so why did he not use the cavarly he had with him for this purpose?
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 The Gettysburg campaign was a disaster for Lee from start too finish. He blunder from one castrope into another. His strategy was poor to say the least. Here is an example of Lee's strategy. The support for "Picket's Charge", that the arty would lumber up and follow the infantry. this tactic comes from the Napoleonic period . Yeah it was a good tactic when the enemy was using smoothbore muskets but not such a good idea when the enemy is using the rifled musket.I guess we will blame..
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 the usual suspects for this brilliant stratagem, after all it is all their fault.
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 As I said. Lee assumed that a) Stuart had broken through with little issue. b) that he had left ample cavalry. c) that he was on schedule to link up with Ewell, d) the alwasy resourceful Stuart would have gotten word to him asap if the AoP crossed into MD. Lee showed an odd complacency during this campaign (it could be that, like Napolean at Waterloo, he was ill). Lee wasn't surprised by the news of Hooker's pursuit. Only not hearing about it from Stuart first.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 Those cavalry though were second rate and were either watching empty passes in the Shennendoah (while Lee's army moved away from them into enemy territory) or were irregulars off to the West plundering and slave catching like Mosbey. Remember the way communications were back then. No radio. So Lee simply thought that having heard nothing from Stuart, it meant he had nothing to report. It was with much disquiet that the spy Harrison told him that Hooker had crossed 48 hrs ago.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone First and foremost your comment i have too say is laughable. Second rate rate cavalry in Jeb Stuarts corps i will enlighten you. The cavalry that Lee had with him 1,800 troopers were Jenkins brigade and White's Batt from Jones brigade their purpose to be the eyes and ears of this army. My friend the question that you should be asking yourself why Lee failed to use their services? In stead of looking for a scapegoat scrutinize the actions of Lee.
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 The raid was anticipated to last 3-4 days. In that time the brigades of Jones and Robertson--2700--troopers were carefully instructed by Stuart to guard Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. "Watch the enemy. Be always alert. Let nothing escape your observation," he instructed Robertson. Should the Federals move "beyond your reach" he was told to STAY TO THE RIGHT OF LEE'S ARMY. Yet the entire AoP crossed the Potomac without the incompetent Robertson seeing them. Do tell.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@noleybo56 And Albert Jenkins' troopers out in front of Ewell's corps were too busy raiding PA barns and smokehouse to perform cavalry functions. That is a matter of historical record. Same with John Imboden's irregulars, foraging and slave-catching to the west of Lee's advance. Oh please, enlighten me some more. Sorry. The cavalry (so derided by the infantry as flamboyant thieves and showman) lived up to its reputation at every turn this campaign.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone The point that I am making is that there was cavalry with the ANV how they were used was a matter for the commander of that army. And yes i do agree with your recent statement in regards to the use of Lee's cavalry.So on that theme how can one blame Jeb Stuart for the failings of the army commander, Lee, on the proper use of cavalry when especially in enemy terr. When Lee said he stumble into battle" blind" because of want of cavalry he is being liberal with the truth.
noleybo56 7 months ago
@noleybo56 us army or cs army
aaron654lo 4 months ago
@aaron 654 First and foremost the order to Ewell from Lee was a discretionary order, thereby leaving the decision up to Ewell.but there are a few reason why Ewell never took up the option of attacking Cemetery Hill. Fristly his corps was under strength, Johnston div was at least three hours away.Secondly he was to attack Cemetery Hill on his own with no help from A.P Hill 3rd corp. And finally,Gen Early div was" tuckered-out and could fight no more" as stated to Gen'l Ewell by Early himself.
noleybo56 4 months ago
@noleybo56 I don't think Ewell could have taken Cemetery Hill. It was just too strong a position and the town made approach and forming up difficult. It was the right call. Where Ewell did drop the ball was not taking then unoccupied Culp's Hill when he could. That position dominated Cemetery Hill, making it untenable. A great missed opportunity.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@Shafeone You are 100% correct in regards to Ewell not strong enough to attack two Union corps entrenched upon Cemetery Hill. Ewell Knew that Culp's Hill was the hill to be taken, here is where Lee fell down as a commander. The most prominent feature on the sky line was Culp's hill which you rightly point out dominated the Union position. Why Lee wanted Ewell to attacked such a strong position with an under strength corps God knows. If you could cast back Lee orders to Ewell.....
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 "take the hill if practicable but do not bring on a general engagement" Therefore Culp's Hill should have been the target for Lee's assault. it would have given Lee what he must desire. A strong defensive position without bring on a general engagement in fact killing two birds with one stone. For the Union troops on Cemetery Hill would have too move house or attack Culp's hill in strength to push the confederate troops off this key position. Most commentors blame Ewell but her is the
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 thing he knew the strategic importance of Culp's Hill in that part of the battle field. In my opinion there are two men too blame for not taking Culp's Hill that July day. One was with out doubt Gen'l Early and the other was General Lee. It prove one thing, Lee as an aggressive commander was rubbish. If one looks at Lee's performance at Gettysburg there is no other out come one could come to. His plans lack flexibility they were to rigid for the fluidity of battle.
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 Lee's problem with Gettysburg was that he was without intelligence yet could sense that his plans of stringing out the Union army and hitting them corps by corps was falling into place regarless. He was aggressive, but was also used to giving he corps commanders (until May Jackson and Longstreet) discretion knowing they would know what to do on the scene. His two new corps commanders proved to be poor subs for Jackson and Longstreet and unsupportive of the offensive tactics.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@Shafeone In my opinion on a defensive offensive stragem Gen'l Lee has no equal anywhere. gettysburg was some what different. Lee took the reins any suggestions were brushed aside there was to be no debate his orders were final. Now if you cast your mind back Lee had penciled in Hood's and Mclaws div to lead the assault on the Union centre until he was reminded by Gen'l Longstreet of the causalties that these two divs suffered. now this to me shows Lee misunderstood what actually had..
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 taking place on the 2nd of July. This to me shows his aloofness from the battle or not grasping the amount of blood letting a serious error for a battlefield commander not knowing the extent of your engagement in battle. Where was he?
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 For the first time in his command of the army, Lee was actually receiving push-back from his senor commanders. Longstreet was hesitant to fight and kept pushing Lee to disengage and move south to higher ground, and Ewell successfully talked Lee out of moving II Corps southwest to Seminary Ridge, and so stayed in his ineffective posirion around the town and Culps/Cem. Hill. Thus by day three Lee had had enough and was determined to reassert his authority. Thus his stubbornness.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@noleybo56 Ewell dropped the ball on Culp's Hill more than Lee. Ewell was the commander on the field. Instead of ordering Earley to take it immediately when unoccupied, he let Earley convince him to wait for Johnson's fresh division. He ordered Johnson to take the hill but never followed up on it. Johnson never got around to it until very late July 1...by then the remnants of the Iron Brigade had been moved there and dug in.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@Shafeone Lee's discretionary orders to Ewell was to attack the Union position on Cemetery Hill not Culp's Hill.When Lee looked through his field glasses Culp's Hill was the most prominent feature on the terrain and as experienced engineer he should have known the strategic value of Culp's Hill on that part of the battlefield.
noleybo56 3 months ago
@noleybo56 Remember. Jackson had only been dead for 2.5 mos by this time and Ewell had been Jackson's favorite subordinate so Lee trusted Ewell who was actually there at the foot of the hills, not peering through his glass. But the fact that Ewell served under Jackson ironically ill-served Lee here for Ewell had probably never received a discretionary order in his entire time under Stonewall. Lee was used to giving discretionary orders as a courtesy knowing Jackson would read them as direct.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@Shafeone Lee never wanted Ewell to command the 2nd corps and Ewell knew it. Lee tried every move in the book to retire Ewell to desk job with out hurting his feelings. Lee's preferred choice was Dick Anderson. And yes Ewell knew this also. What Lee did manage was to undermined Dick Ewell's confidence.As for as Lee's discretionary orders go, they were with out doubt ambiguous and played out at Gettysburg a disaster for the South.
noleybo56 3 months ago
With that said. Ewell actually handled his first command decision nicely by laying into the XI Corps flanks north of town without getting explicit orders to do so. Unfortunately I think he was swayed by Earley to wait for Johnson and when the adrenaline wore off and things cooled down, Old Bald head fell into some indecision. A direct order to take Culp's Hill would have served Ewell well in this case. He HAD to see its prominence and know that if he did the Yanks would too and soon fortify it.
Shafeone 3 months ago
@Shafeone Just one more point about Ewell and Early. First and foremost It was Ewell who ask Early to attack Culp's Hill not ordered. For Ewell Culp's Hill never came to the fore as far as Lee's orders were concerned he was more occupied upon the Union position on Cemetery Hill and overlook Culp's Hill completely. As far as Gen'l Early conduct is concerned he point blank refused to attack Culp's Hill. But here a question,did Lee over look Culp's Hill purposely?
noleybo56 3 months ago
@aaron654lo confederate army.
noleybo56 4 months ago
@noleybo56 cs is confederate us is united
aaron654lo 4 months ago
@noleybo56 There were many reasons for his invasion of course. 1) Give the VA planters a break by removing ravaging armies. 2) draw the union army out of VA and the threat to Richmond. 3) possibly -- unlikely - take pressure off Vicksburg 4) a victory in the east to offset a loss in the west; 5) destroy a large part of the AoP and force Washigntonto sur for peace; 5) live off the PA land-forage. But Lee never doubted that, barring no opportunities at all, he'd fight a battle in PA or MD.
Shafeone 8 months ago
@Shafeone The point I am making is that Lee never intended to fight a general battle so far from his base. if for argument sake, say Lee won a Gettysburg what do you think he would have done? A simple answer, gone back to Va, Why should he do such a thing after winning a victory on northern soil? He would have been annihilated as sure as the sun rises had he stayed. The fact is that the ANV wasn't large enough.
noleybo56 8 months ago
@noleybo56 So when Lee told Hood that he must go looking for the enemy if they didn't find him soon. WHen he told Ewell that the battle would likely take place at Gettysburg or Frederick's Town [sic]. When he cast about for every reinforcement he could get from DH HIll in N. Carolina for his "raid" then what are we to m