Do you think that when the Vatican decides to research a miracle and confirms it, it has done science?
Is it your goal to show that science can logically research miracles and/or the possibility thereof? How about practically as opposed to logically? Do you think miracles are within the scope of modern science?
@Lingula77 I think miracles are more explicable in terms of logic and/or historical investigation. As for science, I'm rather agnostic towards the ability of science to investigate miracle claims. There are some philosophers who not that breaks in naturalistic explanations would be indicative of libertarian agency and therefore miracle, but I have not investigated these topics in full.
@telemantros Do you mean that historical investigation can be done outside of science? One the one hand, if you're trying to find out if at a certain point in time, something really happened as a historical fact, you're doing science. On the other hand, I'd say that investigations into miracles are usually part of a religious tradition to figure out how certain dogmas should be applied in practice, which is not science.
@Lingula77 It depends on how you define science, otherwise this could easily become a nonstarter. In my experience, most people hold an incorrect view of what science actually is.
@telemantros Well, since you seem to compare explanations in terms of their likelihood (or perhaps that should be probability) of being true, you've pretty much given your definition of science, right? Apparently, it's a probabilistic one.
I think the matter is important because you seem to be arguing that it should be possible to demonstrate that a miracle really took place, regardless of religious context. That would come very close to historical science, if it's not the same thing.
Keeping in mind the original question (Do you think miracles are within the scope of modern science?), my question about your definition of science had to do more with method not justification. Concisely, I was wondering about method (e.g. Inductivism vs Eclectic models) and not so much how you solve the specific justification question within scientific methodology ... in regards to justification I'm personally not sure if I would go with a Bayesian or a positive-instance view.
@telemantros I hadn't noticed that you asked me for my definition, sorry. I can't really give a definition of science to save my life, although I think Kuhn did a pretty good job if you read his book between the lines. I suppose the term 'eclectic' would do for me. But actually, I was wondering if you feel historical research into miracles is within modern science by your definitions, since I was responding to your video. So by all means, use the definition that suits you best.
Fair enough. I think ultimately, the investigation of miracles is a philosophical and historical matter (including need for logical, metaphysical investigation as well as investigation into philosophy of science). I also personally make a distinction between science and other disciplines, although some (e.g. history) seem to use methods similar to scientific methods. So can science comment on miracles? Using an inductive model, I don't think it can. Using eclectic, maybe ... but I would say no.
I almost feel like you didn't read "Of Miracles". Or if you did, you've really misunderstood it. Some of your objections are just plane strawman of what Hume argues. Mill's objection is a misunderstanding of Hume's philosophy. Lewis either never read Hume's Treatise or completely misunderstands him. There's just too much here to critique and unfortunately, it would be too much of an effort and an expense of my time to do just that. Hume says we judge two empirical claims by WEIGHING the evidence
Also we don't accept testimony to our common perceptions. Hume say that, we admit to testimony of people in different places and different times. We know people win the lottery, therefore there is no surprise that someone will win the lottery. The man living in a hot climate just doesn't follow; specifically you've forgotten that we accept the testimonies of people in different places and different times. And there's much else deeply flawed, but that's all that came to my immediate attention.
@stealspell He does talk about weighing the evidence; that's why he talks about Bayesian statistics. The idea is then, I presume, that the hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur. Whatever is most likely or probable is considered true. That's a definition of science, and quite a specific one, too. Not my definition mind you.
@Lingula77 "The idea is then, I presume, that the hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur." Wait, what do you mean by hypothesis? Assumption? What does this have to do with hypotheses or assumptions? I said claims not explanations, which is what a hypotheses are, or assumptions, something taken as a given. I am not sure what you're talking about. Claims are truth evaluable. The claim is either true or false. I think you're misunderstanding here.
I mean a weakly or un-corroborated theory. Like most modern epistemologists, I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions.
"Claims are truth evaluable. The claim is either true or false."
@Lingula77 Okay so you are misunderstanding. Where is the hypothesis in "All men are mortal"? What is being explained? Nothing that see. Let's not twist language. Propositions are not uncorroborated theories. Where do you get explanation from proposition? This just bewilders me. "Hehe. If only it were that simple!" Uhmm, yea?! I am not quite sure what's so funny. It actually is quite that simple. A claim is a statement or proposition. And statements are either true or false. Strange response.
@stealspell I wouldn't consider 'All men are mortal' weakly corroborated, so I wouldn't call it a hypothesis. For a formal definition, I follow Curd & Cover's 'Philosophy of Science', p. 1298. In relation to that I see no logical difference between a hypothesis and a theory. The term proposition I use in much the same way as authors like Lakatos.
Perhaps I find your epistemology funny because I'm something of a Kuhnian conventionalist. Ofcourse statements can be true or false, but how would we know? That question is central to epistemology. There is no logical proof that all men are mortal; surely you're aware of the problems with inductive reasoning.
@Lingula77 "Ofcourse statements can be true or false, but how would we know?" Well it all depends on your meaning of "know". I see that you're twisting language here. To ask "how do we know such-and-such a thing" is to misunderstand what we generally mean by the word "know". So I never claimed that I have a certain epistemology. I was merely defending the traditional usage of the word "proposition" in the philosophical context. You're really sidetracking by asking me to justify "how do we know".
@Lingula77 "I wouldn't consider 'All men are mortal' weakly corroborated, so I wouldn't call it a hypothesis." Well, that's understandable; what you mean by a prop. is not what is generally understood. And you are right that there is no difference between a hypo. and a theory. But I disagree with your def. of prop. "Jesus walked on water" is a prop. "Jesus walked on water BECAUSE he is God" is a hypo. I am curious, what word do you chose to use for 'A statement that affirms or denies something.'
@stealspell If you think I use terms incorrectly, you should point out how I differ from the sources I gave, how those sources define the terms are incorrect, or something similar. 'Generally understood' is pointless. As Curd & Cover imply, a proposition is basically any claim, including a theory, hypothesis or even an article of faith.
Adding 'because' didn't change any status of about your statements; one can just as well formulate the hypothesis that Jesus walked on water.
@Lingula77 "one can just as well formulate the hypothesis..." Now you're using words without meaning. Hypothesis means 'tentative explanation'. 'Jesus walks on water' is not a tentative explanation. That's as about as incoherent as you can get.
"If you think I use terms incorrectly, you should point out how I differ from the sources I gave" I don't care how you choose to use it from where you choose to use it. But you're deviating from the traditional usage of the word proposition. That's all.
@stealspell When definitions are disputed, it is better to cite a source for the definition than simply say 'That is just what it means' or refer to some unsourced generally accepted meaning. I gave my source and according to Curd & cover's definition, I don't think my use of the term hypothesis was wrong. Also, I don't think that, since the book gives a good and educated overview of modern philosophy of science, their definition is off. So I choose to believe them over you.
@Lingula77 "The meaning of a proposition includes having the quality or property of being either true or false" (Wikipedia) "Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity." (Stanford Encyclopedia) "A logical proposition is any proposition that can be reduced by replacement of its constituent terms to a proposition expressing a logical truth" (Britannica) "(a) A statement which is capable of truth or falsity" (Oxford Eng. Dict.)
@Lingula77 "A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for a phenomenon." I don't know how to explain this except in plain language. A hypothesis is an explanation; a proposition is a statement that is either true or false. e.g. "Jesus walked on water" is a proposition. The explanation for that proposition may be 'BECAUSE he is God'. Rather than throwing sources at me, give a direct quote. And if all you've read is Curd & Cover, you haven't read enough philosophy.
@stealspell No, I certainly haven't read enough philosophy, but somewhat more than wikipedia though. I don't see what is wrong with the book, and I don't see how your definitions conflict my understanding that a hypothesis is a kind of proposition and more specifically a kind of theory, I suppose a logical statement cannot be a theory but can be a proposition, but miracle claims are not logical statements. They can be true or false and they can explain observations.
@Lingula77 "I don't see what is wrong with the book" You still haven't given me a direct quote from it. So I TOO can't say where the problem is. I'm only critiquing the definitions you're giving me. "a hypothesis is a kind of proposition" Well now, that's changing things. Earlier you wrote that there is no difference between a hypothesis and a proposition. And now you say that it is "a kind of proposition". Well anything can be formulated into a proposition. There's no argument about that.
@stealspell I gave a citation, that should be good enough. Page 1298, under 'hypothesis'.
I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis. I would, however, see why the terms 'hypothesis' and 'theory' can be used interchangeably, because certain interpretations of the theses of underdetermination can dissolve the difference. For example, you could, with Popper in hand, claim that all theories are weakly corroborated.
@Lingula77 "I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis." Well, at least I can easily copy and paste: "I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions."
@stealspell That is not the same as saying there is no difference. The two statements are identifiably not the same, I don't see how anyone could confuse them. You don't have to take the trouble of finding out what I mean by 'no strong qualitative difference' but it is unjustified to take that sentence as stating I see no difference whatsoever.
@Lingula77 "I gave a citation, that should be good enough" Good enough for those that have the book. "I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis." Okay, let me copy and paste it for you: "Like most modern epistemologists, I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions."
@Lingula77 " "No strong qualitative difference" is different from "no difference"." Well I see no strong qualitative difference between "no strong qualitative difference" and "no difference".
@Lingula77 "but miracle claims are not logical statements. They can be true or false and they can explain observations." They are both propositions and can be hypothesis e.g. "Jesus walked on water" is a proposition that is either true or false but does not explain anything. "Jesus cured Bob's cancer" is a hypothesis. In contrast to what you wrote: "[T]he hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur." That's not Hume. Hume refers to propositions.
@stealspell If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so. It may not be an explanation that is rejected on various grounds, but that is different from saying it is not an explanation at all.
I did not say Hume weighs hypotheses. It is what Telemantros does. Telemantros weighs evidence through Bayes' theorem (something Hume couldn't). "Hume says we judge two empirical claims by WEIGHING the evidence", and so does Telemantros.
@Lingula77 "If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so." No, that's just wrong. First what does it even mean to say that you can explain an observation? You're just using words without meaning at this point. We don't explain observations. "I saw an apple fall from a tree". Why in the world do I have to explain that I saw the apple falling from a tree? I'm still bewildered here.
@stealspell I consider a theory's aim to explain a set of observations. The observation is that the apple falls, the explanation is that there is a gravitational force. Here I must point out again that I am mostly in agreement with Kuhnian conventionalism and with Lakatos' use of the term 'observation' (including quotation marks), because the exact epistemological status of an observation (or 'observation') is disputed. See Lakatos in Lakatos & Musgrave, 'Criticism and the growth of knowledge'.
@Lingula77 "The observation is that the apple falls, the explanation is that there is a gravitational force." But now your taking your own words out of context. "If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so." Your explanation here was not WHY someone saw Jesus walk on water, or why Jesus walked on water, BUT that Jesus actually walked on water. I simply used your own definition against you and now you want to switch it again.
@stealspell There is no logical distinction between what constitutes an explanation and what doesn't; logically, any observation can be explained by any theory. In other words, there is no formal logical distinction between 'because Jesus walked on water' and 'because there is a gravitational force'; i.e. both can be taken as a sufficient explanation and both can be taken as a tautological reformulation of the basic propositions.
@Lingula77 Once again your using words without meaning. Let me try this again: You say that the explanation to the claim "I saw Jesus walk on water" is "Jesus actually did so". That's just false. The claim is either true or false and "Jesus actually did so", provided that it is sufficient evidence, bears truth to the claim. It's NOT explaining anything. Explanations, typically, answer the WHY question i.e. why did the apple fall? Gravitational force. In this case, your answer is incoherent.
@stealspell I disagree and it is here that I refer to Kuhn's work. An acceptable explanation is one that solves a problem in a paradigm, according to the paradigm's methodology. In other paradigms, such explanation seem senseless, but that doesn't rob them of their explanatory power within their own paradigm. For example, we may consider scholastic explanations to be tautological, but they made sense within scholastics.
@Lingula77 "I disagree and it is here that I refer to Kuhn's work." I don't know exactly what your disagreeing about here. I agree with what you said, though I would never use the word "paradigm" but context. But I don't see in what way that applies to what I wrote previously. It's just senseless to say "I saw Jesus walk on water BECAUSE Jesus actually did so". Take any man or woman from the street and tell them that and watch how quickly they'll run away from you.
@Lingula77 "There is no logical distinction between what constitutes an explanation and what doesn't; logically, any observation can be explained by any theory." Well you are right that any proposition can be the explanation of any proposition, granted it is followed by the word "because". But it MUST make logical sense. e.g. Why did Jesus walk on water? Because, he's a square circle. So, no. Not every theory can explain any observation. Only the *logical* theories.
@stealspell If I restrict 'logic' to formal or deductive logic, theories are never logical insofar that they are never constructed by logic. When I say that any observation can be explained by any theory, I am reformulating the strongest version of the various theses of indetermination, which obviously has very little relevance in practice. We do intuïtively suspect that theories are logical in a way, but actually fail to construct them deductively. That is a problem I'm calling attention to.
@Lingula77 We intuitively use logic. We intuitively deduce. I think what you mean to say is that *scientific theories* are Empirical and not Rationalistic. "but actually fail to construct them deductively." I think what you mean here is that a Rationalist could not construct the theory of Evolution from reason alone. Theories are logical; they can never fail to be. In-fact, we would feel very uneasy to hold one as true or valid if it contained a contradiction. Theories are logical and empirical.
@Lingula77 "I did not say Hume weighs hypotheses. It is what Telemantros does." Yes, true. It doesn't make sense to give a miracle weight 1) because of its probability and 2) to weigh it against other hypotheses. Scientific hypotheses, are given weight only when they can be tested. We can't put any of the miracle claims under the microscope; and I mean none. Therefore, they can't be treated as hypotheses. The possibility that all miracles are coincidences is just as equally valid.
@stealspell "Scientific hypotheses, are given weight only when they can be tested." Not always. See: Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, chapters 4 and 5.
"We can't put any of the miracle claims under the microscope; and I mean none." This is what Telemantros' rather complex series is about. He argues we can, based on a probabilistic approach. I disagree, because I think probabilism cannot help in theory choice and because I think he misapplies Bayes' theorem anyway.
@Lingula77 "Not always." An example would be more preferable rather than having me read chapters. I appreciate that your citing sources, but without examples or direct quotes, they are worthless to me.
@stealspell It is always a very good idea to read Kuhn. I began his book with a sense of 'I have to read this', but I could never imagine how deeply it would affect me. It's a readable masterpiece of 20th century philosophy. In addition, it makes the point much better than I can do in a youtube comment.
@Lingula77 If there's any masterpiece that ought to be read from the 20th Century, it's Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It has to be THE masterpiece of the 20th Century, if not one of the top five masterpieces of all philosophy. But if you don't find it to be that, perhaps your more of a Heidegger fan, which if you are, I'll gladly stop talking to you now before it gets out of proportion.
@stealspell My remarks about Kuhn should not be taken as an attempt to belittle any other great work of philosophy, and certainly not Wittgenstein's. Although I never read Wittgenstein (only secondary sources) I suspect his attitude towards language and logical positivism is especially poignant on youtube and the 'bionicdance school' of naïve logical positivism that is so prevalent here. It's a subject I need to learn more of.
Added to that are miracles experienced by the Israelites over the course of about two thousand years, such continuous interaction, coupled with the fact that intelligence is evident in creation causes me to give the benefit of the doubt to God himself. It is quite obvious, as well, that man has an inherent need to be religious, which also agrees with the idea of purpose that everything down to atoms exhibit. The fact of God's existence is obvious, so miracles are no problem, as I see it.
If a person doesn't believe in God then it would follow that miracles are impossible. All I would really say with regards to the existence of miracles is if God has created this complex universe He obviously has the power to influence natural law if He chooses. Also, historically speaking, I find it highly improbable that the miracles were made up, as the Christian movement was started by eye witnesses of these miracles.
Acceptence of a miraculous occurrence depends largely on whether the person believes that miracles can occur or otherwise. I'll describe a situation I had in this area: I was discussing a commercial I had seen on TBN, where Oral Roberts heals a deaf girl, in a chat room . Automatically, the unbelievers began giving naturalistic reasons for why this couldn't have been a miracle, and believers were arguing otherwise. So, like I said...
@jarbon5 Right, hence, this series on the possibility of miracles and their identification. Those who object to certain miracle claims, like the one you provided, could be and in some circumstances are correct. But the falsity of one claim does nothing to establish that miracles are impossible, they would need to give an account as to why they think that. And this series, hopefully, delineates why some of the major arguments given are quite weak. Peace.
Do you think that when the Vatican decides to research a miracle and confirms it, it has done science?
Is it your goal to show that science can logically research miracles and/or the possibility thereof? How about practically as opposed to logically? Do you think miracles are within the scope of modern science?
Lingula77 11 months ago
@Lingula77 I think miracles are more explicable in terms of logic and/or historical investigation. As for science, I'm rather agnostic towards the ability of science to investigate miracle claims. There are some philosophers who not that breaks in naturalistic explanations would be indicative of libertarian agency and therefore miracle, but I have not investigated these topics in full.
telemantros 11 months ago
@telemantros Do you mean that historical investigation can be done outside of science? One the one hand, if you're trying to find out if at a certain point in time, something really happened as a historical fact, you're doing science. On the other hand, I'd say that investigations into miracles are usually part of a religious tradition to figure out how certain dogmas should be applied in practice, which is not science.
Lingula77 11 months ago
@Lingula77 It depends on how you define science, otherwise this could easily become a nonstarter. In my experience, most people hold an incorrect view of what science actually is.
telemantros 11 months ago
@telemantros Well, since you seem to compare explanations in terms of their likelihood (or perhaps that should be probability) of being true, you've pretty much given your definition of science, right? Apparently, it's a probabilistic one.
Lingula77 11 months ago
(cont.)
I think the matter is important because you seem to be arguing that it should be possible to demonstrate that a miracle really took place, regardless of religious context. That would come very close to historical science, if it's not the same thing.
Lingula77 11 months ago
Keeping in mind the original question (Do you think miracles are within the scope of modern science?), my question about your definition of science had to do more with method not justification. Concisely, I was wondering about method (e.g. Inductivism vs Eclectic models) and not so much how you solve the specific justification question within scientific methodology ... in regards to justification I'm personally not sure if I would go with a Bayesian or a positive-instance view.
telemantros 11 months ago
(cont) Asking all this because depending on your view of scientific methodology I would answer your question differently.
telemantros 11 months ago
@telemantros I hadn't noticed that you asked me for my definition, sorry. I can't really give a definition of science to save my life, although I think Kuhn did a pretty good job if you read his book between the lines. I suppose the term 'eclectic' would do for me. But actually, I was wondering if you feel historical research into miracles is within modern science by your definitions, since I was responding to your video. So by all means, use the definition that suits you best.
Lingula77 11 months ago
Fair enough. I think ultimately, the investigation of miracles is a philosophical and historical matter (including need for logical, metaphysical investigation as well as investigation into philosophy of science). I also personally make a distinction between science and other disciplines, although some (e.g. history) seem to use methods similar to scientific methods. So can science comment on miracles? Using an inductive model, I don't think it can. Using eclectic, maybe ... but I would say no.
telemantros 11 months ago
I almost feel like you didn't read "Of Miracles". Or if you did, you've really misunderstood it. Some of your objections are just plane strawman of what Hume argues. Mill's objection is a misunderstanding of Hume's philosophy. Lewis either never read Hume's Treatise or completely misunderstands him. There's just too much here to critique and unfortunately, it would be too much of an effort and an expense of my time to do just that. Hume says we judge two empirical claims by WEIGHING the evidence
stealspell 11 months ago
Also we don't accept testimony to our common perceptions. Hume say that, we admit to testimony of people in different places and different times. We know people win the lottery, therefore there is no surprise that someone will win the lottery. The man living in a hot climate just doesn't follow; specifically you've forgotten that we accept the testimonies of people in different places and different times. And there's much else deeply flawed, but that's all that came to my immediate attention.
stealspell 11 months ago
@stealspell He does talk about weighing the evidence; that's why he talks about Bayesian statistics. The idea is then, I presume, that the hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur. Whatever is most likely or probable is considered true. That's a definition of science, and quite a specific one, too. Not my definition mind you.
Lingula77 11 months ago
@Lingula77 "The idea is then, I presume, that the hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur." Wait, what do you mean by hypothesis? Assumption? What does this have to do with hypotheses or assumptions? I said claims not explanations, which is what a hypotheses are, or assumptions, something taken as a given. I am not sure what you're talking about. Claims are truth evaluable. The claim is either true or false. I think you're misunderstanding here.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell "what do you mean by hypothesis?"
I mean a weakly or un-corroborated theory. Like most modern epistemologists, I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions.
"Claims are truth evaluable. The claim is either true or false."
Hehe. If only it were that simple!
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 Okay so you are misunderstanding. Where is the hypothesis in "All men are mortal"? What is being explained? Nothing that see. Let's not twist language. Propositions are not uncorroborated theories. Where do you get explanation from proposition? This just bewilders me. "Hehe. If only it were that simple!" Uhmm, yea?! I am not quite sure what's so funny. It actually is quite that simple. A claim is a statement or proposition. And statements are either true or false. Strange response.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell I wouldn't consider 'All men are mortal' weakly corroborated, so I wouldn't call it a hypothesis. For a formal definition, I follow Curd & Cover's 'Philosophy of Science', p. 1298. In relation to that I see no logical difference between a hypothesis and a theory. The term proposition I use in much the same way as authors like Lakatos.
Lingula77 10 months ago
(cont.)
Perhaps I find your epistemology funny because I'm something of a Kuhnian conventionalist. Ofcourse statements can be true or false, but how would we know? That question is central to epistemology. There is no logical proof that all men are mortal; surely you're aware of the problems with inductive reasoning.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "Ofcourse statements can be true or false, but how would we know?" Well it all depends on your meaning of "know". I see that you're twisting language here. To ask "how do we know such-and-such a thing" is to misunderstand what we generally mean by the word "know". So I never claimed that I have a certain epistemology. I was merely defending the traditional usage of the word "proposition" in the philosophical context. You're really sidetracking by asking me to justify "how do we know".
stealspell 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "I wouldn't consider 'All men are mortal' weakly corroborated, so I wouldn't call it a hypothesis." Well, that's understandable; what you mean by a prop. is not what is generally understood. And you are right that there is no difference between a hypo. and a theory. But I disagree with your def. of prop. "Jesus walked on water" is a prop. "Jesus walked on water BECAUSE he is God" is a hypo. I am curious, what word do you chose to use for 'A statement that affirms or denies something.'
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell If you think I use terms incorrectly, you should point out how I differ from the sources I gave, how those sources define the terms are incorrect, or something similar. 'Generally understood' is pointless. As Curd & Cover imply, a proposition is basically any claim, including a theory, hypothesis or even an article of faith.
Adding 'because' didn't change any status of about your statements; one can just as well formulate the hypothesis that Jesus walked on water.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "one can just as well formulate the hypothesis..." Now you're using words without meaning. Hypothesis means 'tentative explanation'. 'Jesus walks on water' is not a tentative explanation. That's as about as incoherent as you can get.
"If you think I use terms incorrectly, you should point out how I differ from the sources I gave" I don't care how you choose to use it from where you choose to use it. But you're deviating from the traditional usage of the word proposition. That's all.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell When definitions are disputed, it is better to cite a source for the definition than simply say 'That is just what it means' or refer to some unsourced generally accepted meaning. I gave my source and according to Curd & cover's definition, I don't think my use of the term hypothesis was wrong. Also, I don't think that, since the book gives a good and educated overview of modern philosophy of science, their definition is off. So I choose to believe them over you.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "The meaning of a proposition includes having the quality or property of being either true or false" (Wikipedia) "Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity." (Stanford Encyclopedia) "A logical proposition is any proposition that can be reduced by replacement of its constituent terms to a proposition expressing a logical truth" (Britannica) "(a) A statement which is capable of truth or falsity" (Oxford Eng. Dict.)
stealspell 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for a phenomenon." I don't know how to explain this except in plain language. A hypothesis is an explanation; a proposition is a statement that is either true or false. e.g. "Jesus walked on water" is a proposition. The explanation for that proposition may be 'BECAUSE he is God'. Rather than throwing sources at me, give a direct quote. And if all you've read is Curd & Cover, you haven't read enough philosophy.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell No, I certainly haven't read enough philosophy, but somewhat more than wikipedia though. I don't see what is wrong with the book, and I don't see how your definitions conflict my understanding that a hypothesis is a kind of proposition and more specifically a kind of theory, I suppose a logical statement cannot be a theory but can be a proposition, but miracle claims are not logical statements. They can be true or false and they can explain observations.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "I don't see what is wrong with the book" You still haven't given me a direct quote from it. So I TOO can't say where the problem is. I'm only critiquing the definitions you're giving me. "a hypothesis is a kind of proposition" Well now, that's changing things. Earlier you wrote that there is no difference between a hypothesis and a proposition. And now you say that it is "a kind of proposition". Well anything can be formulated into a proposition. There's no argument about that.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell I gave a citation, that should be good enough. Page 1298, under 'hypothesis'.
I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis. I would, however, see why the terms 'hypothesis' and 'theory' can be used interchangeably, because certain interpretations of the theses of underdetermination can dissolve the difference. For example, you could, with Popper in hand, claim that all theories are weakly corroborated.
Lingula77 10 months ago
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@Lingula77 "I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis." Well, at least I can easily copy and paste: "I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions."
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell That is not the same as saying there is no difference. The two statements are identifiably not the same, I don't see how anyone could confuse them. You don't have to take the trouble of finding out what I mean by 'no strong qualitative difference' but it is unjustified to take that sentence as stating I see no difference whatsoever.
Lingula77 10 months ago
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@Lingula77 "I gave a citation, that should be good enough" Good enough for those that have the book. "I never wrote that there is no difference between a proposition and a hypothesis." Okay, let me copy and paste it for you: "Like most modern epistemologists, I don't see a strong qualitative difference between a hypothesis and other sorts of propositions or sets of propositions."
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell The book should be in a decent library. Are you enrolled at a university?
"No strong qualitative difference" is different from "no difference".
Lingula77 10 months ago
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@Lingula77 " "No strong qualitative difference" is different from "no difference"." Well I see no strong qualitative difference between "no strong qualitative difference" and "no difference".
stealspell 10 months ago
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@Lingula77 "No strong qualitative difference" is different from "no difference"."
I see no strong qualitative difference between "no strong qualitative difference" and "no difference".
stealspell 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "but miracle claims are not logical statements. They can be true or false and they can explain observations." They are both propositions and can be hypothesis e.g. "Jesus walked on water" is a proposition that is either true or false but does not explain anything. "Jesus cured Bob's cancer" is a hypothesis. In contrast to what you wrote: "[T]he hypothesis that a miracle occurred is weighed against the hypothesis that one didn't occur." That's not Hume. Hume refers to propositions.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so. It may not be an explanation that is rejected on various grounds, but that is different from saying it is not an explanation at all.
I did not say Hume weighs hypotheses. It is what Telemantros does. Telemantros weighs evidence through Bayes' theorem (something Hume couldn't). "Hume says we judge two empirical claims by WEIGHING the evidence", and so does Telemantros.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so." No, that's just wrong. First what does it even mean to say that you can explain an observation? You're just using words without meaning at this point. We don't explain observations. "I saw an apple fall from a tree". Why in the world do I have to explain that I saw the apple falling from a tree? I'm still bewildered here.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell I consider a theory's aim to explain a set of observations. The observation is that the apple falls, the explanation is that there is a gravitational force. Here I must point out again that I am mostly in agreement with Kuhnian conventionalism and with Lakatos' use of the term 'observation' (including quotation marks), because the exact epistemological status of an observation (or 'observation') is disputed. See Lakatos in Lakatos & Musgrave, 'Criticism and the growth of knowledge'.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "The observation is that the apple falls, the explanation is that there is a gravitational force." But now your taking your own words out of context. "If someone says "I saw Jesus walk on water" you can explain that observation by stating that Jesus actually did so." Your explanation here was not WHY someone saw Jesus walk on water, or why Jesus walked on water, BUT that Jesus actually walked on water. I simply used your own definition against you and now you want to switch it again.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell There is no logical distinction between what constitutes an explanation and what doesn't; logically, any observation can be explained by any theory. In other words, there is no formal logical distinction between 'because Jesus walked on water' and 'because there is a gravitational force'; i.e. both can be taken as a sufficient explanation and both can be taken as a tautological reformulation of the basic propositions.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 Once again your using words without meaning. Let me try this again: You say that the explanation to the claim "I saw Jesus walk on water" is "Jesus actually did so". That's just false. The claim is either true or false and "Jesus actually did so", provided that it is sufficient evidence, bears truth to the claim. It's NOT explaining anything. Explanations, typically, answer the WHY question i.e. why did the apple fall? Gravitational force. In this case, your answer is incoherent.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell I disagree and it is here that I refer to Kuhn's work. An acceptable explanation is one that solves a problem in a paradigm, according to the paradigm's methodology. In other paradigms, such explanation seem senseless, but that doesn't rob them of their explanatory power within their own paradigm. For example, we may consider scholastic explanations to be tautological, but they made sense within scholastics.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "I disagree and it is here that I refer to Kuhn's work." I don't know exactly what your disagreeing about here. I agree with what you said, though I would never use the word "paradigm" but context. But I don't see in what way that applies to what I wrote previously. It's just senseless to say "I saw Jesus walk on water BECAUSE Jesus actually did so". Take any man or woman from the street and tell them that and watch how quickly they'll run away from you.
stealspell 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "There is no logical distinction between what constitutes an explanation and what doesn't; logically, any observation can be explained by any theory." Well you are right that any proposition can be the explanation of any proposition, granted it is followed by the word "because". But it MUST make logical sense. e.g. Why did Jesus walk on water? Because, he's a square circle. So, no. Not every theory can explain any observation. Only the *logical* theories.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell If I restrict 'logic' to formal or deductive logic, theories are never logical insofar that they are never constructed by logic. When I say that any observation can be explained by any theory, I am reformulating the strongest version of the various theses of indetermination, which obviously has very little relevance in practice. We do intuïtively suspect that theories are logical in a way, but actually fail to construct them deductively. That is a problem I'm calling attention to.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 We intuitively use logic. We intuitively deduce. I think what you mean to say is that *scientific theories* are Empirical and not Rationalistic. "but actually fail to construct them deductively." I think what you mean here is that a Rationalist could not construct the theory of Evolution from reason alone. Theories are logical; they can never fail to be. In-fact, we would feel very uneasy to hold one as true or valid if it contained a contradiction. Theories are logical and empirical.
stealspell 10 months ago
@Lingula77 "I did not say Hume weighs hypotheses. It is what Telemantros does." Yes, true. It doesn't make sense to give a miracle weight 1) because of its probability and 2) to weigh it against other hypotheses. Scientific hypotheses, are given weight only when they can be tested. We can't put any of the miracle claims under the microscope; and I mean none. Therefore, they can't be treated as hypotheses. The possibility that all miracles are coincidences is just as equally valid.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell "Scientific hypotheses, are given weight only when they can be tested." Not always. See: Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, chapters 4 and 5.
"We can't put any of the miracle claims under the microscope; and I mean none." This is what Telemantros' rather complex series is about. He argues we can, based on a probabilistic approach. I disagree, because I think probabilism cannot help in theory choice and because I think he misapplies Bayes' theorem anyway.
Lingula77 10 months ago
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@Lingula77 "Not always." An example would be more preferable rather than having me read chapters. I appreciate that your citing sources, but without examples or direct quotes, they are worthless to me.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell It is always a very good idea to read Kuhn. I began his book with a sense of 'I have to read this', but I could never imagine how deeply it would affect me. It's a readable masterpiece of 20th century philosophy. In addition, it makes the point much better than I can do in a youtube comment.
Lingula77 10 months ago
@Lingula77 If there's any masterpiece that ought to be read from the 20th Century, it's Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It has to be THE masterpiece of the 20th Century, if not one of the top five masterpieces of all philosophy. But if you don't find it to be that, perhaps your more of a Heidegger fan, which if you are, I'll gladly stop talking to you now before it gets out of proportion.
stealspell 10 months ago
@stealspell My remarks about Kuhn should not be taken as an attempt to belittle any other great work of philosophy, and certainly not Wittgenstein's. Although I never read Wittgenstein (only secondary sources) I suspect his attitude towards language and logical positivism is especially poignant on youtube and the 'bionicdance school' of naïve logical positivism that is so prevalent here. It's a subject I need to learn more of.
Lingula77 10 months ago
Can we really even prove George Washington ever really existed?
Blogrich55 1 year ago
Added to that are miracles experienced by the Israelites over the course of about two thousand years, such continuous interaction, coupled with the fact that intelligence is evident in creation causes me to give the benefit of the doubt to God himself. It is quite obvious, as well, that man has an inherent need to be religious, which also agrees with the idea of purpose that everything down to atoms exhibit. The fact of God's existence is obvious, so miracles are no problem, as I see it.
danmeast 1 year ago
If a person doesn't believe in God then it would follow that miracles are impossible. All I would really say with regards to the existence of miracles is if God has created this complex universe He obviously has the power to influence natural law if He chooses. Also, historically speaking, I find it highly improbable that the miracles were made up, as the Christian movement was started by eye witnesses of these miracles.
danmeast 1 year ago
Acceptence of a miraculous occurrence depends largely on whether the person believes that miracles can occur or otherwise. I'll describe a situation I had in this area: I was discussing a commercial I had seen on TBN, where Oral Roberts heals a deaf girl, in a chat room . Automatically, the unbelievers began giving naturalistic reasons for why this couldn't have been a miracle, and believers were arguing otherwise. So, like I said...
This might be a bit off topic...
jarbon5 1 year ago
@jarbon5 Right, hence, this series on the possibility of miracles and their identification. Those who object to certain miracle claims, like the one you provided, could be and in some circumstances are correct. But the falsity of one claim does nothing to establish that miracles are impossible, they would need to give an account as to why they think that. And this series, hopefully, delineates why some of the major arguments given are quite weak. Peace.
telemantros 1 year ago